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Abstract
This thesis examines the effect of IFRS and SOX-like regulations on earnings man-
agement in Asian countries. Firstly, the study finds no strong evidence that IFRS
convergence leads to a decline in discretionary accruals in Thailand. Institutional
factors including debt and equity financing exhibit a positive relationship with dis-
cretionary accruals. Boards of directors and block shareholders appear to play a role
in mitigating discretionary accruals, while big-4 auditors do not. Secondly, in the
post-IFRS period, listed firms in China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore ex-
perience a decline in income smoothing, especially those with a high level of income
smoothing in the pre-IFRS period. These firms seem to switch from accruals to real
activity manipulation, especially overproduction. In the post-IFRS period, however,
their income smoothing level is still relatively high compared to those with a low
level of income smoothing. Finally, JSOX contributes to a decline in loss avoid-
ance of Japanese firms, especially large firms, but it has no effect on manipulating
methods. Japanese firms with a propensity for avoiding losses, used both specific
accruals and investment adjusting in both the pre- and post-JSOX periods. The
study also finds that firms switch from one specific accrual to another to achieve
loss avoidance and are likely to alter capital expenditure rather than research and
development expenses. In short, changes in accounting standards and regulations
contribute to some decline in earnings management in Asian countries. The insti-
tutional factors still negatively affect accounting quality in this region after many
years of the changes.
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Recently, there have been two main changes in financial reporting around the world.
The first is the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in
many countries. A large body of research has been conducted to examine the effect
of that adoption on accounting quality (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Hung
and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Callao and
Jarne, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2010; Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Liu et al.,
2011; Zéghal et al., 2011; Chua et al., 2012; Houqe et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2012).
However, the extent to which the adoption of IFRS contributes to an improvement
in the quality of corporate accounting information is inconclusive. The second one
is the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in the US, in response to
accounting scandals, such as the cases of Enron and WorldCom, which has influenced
regulatory changes in many other countries. The extant studies consistently report
a positive effect of SOX on the reliability of accounting information of US firms
(Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Nagy, 2010;
Singer and You, 2011; Aubert and Grudnitski, 2014; Gilliam et al., 2015).
Asian countries have adopted or converged to IFRS for years and some have en-
acted SOX-like regulations, but studies on the impact of such changes on accounting
quality in this region are still small. This provides an opportunity to shed some light
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on the effect of IFRS and SOX-like regulations on accounting quality in an Asian
context. The central question in this thesis is to what extent the changes affect the
earnings management of Asian firms.
The thesis consists of five chapters: an introduction, three substantive chapters,
and a conclusion. In the introduction chapter, we document and discuss earnings
management, IFRS, SOX, and gaps in the extent literature. The chapter also in-
cludes a brief discussion of the contribution of the thesis. The first study asks to
what extent convergence to IFRS affects the discretionary accruals of Thai listed
companies. In addition, it seeks to examine the influence of institutional factors
and corporate governance on accounting quality. The second study examines the
effect of IFRS adoption/convergence on income smoothing in four Asian countries
including China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. It also contributes to the
existing income smoothing literature that seems to focus mainly on accrual income
smoothing by examining both accrual and real activity manipulation. The last study
investigates the effect of Japanese SOX on loss-avoidance behaviour in Japan. It
also includes an analysis of specific accruals and investment manipulation of those
Japanese firms that have a propensity for loss-avoidance behaviour. The last chapter
concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Earnings management
Earnings are considered an important figure for financial statement users to make
decisions about a corporation and so management may have incentives to manip-
ulate earnings (Degeorge et al., 1999). Accounting researchers have been studying
the relationship of earnings management and its motivations for years. It has hy-
pothesised many factors that create incentives for earnings management, such as
executive bonuses (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995), debt covenants (DeFond
and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994), and political costs (Watts and Zimmerman,
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1990; Cahan, 1992; Key, 1997). For example, according to the bonus plan hypothesis,
when managerial remuneration is tied to firm accounting performance, management
tend to inflate earnings to increase their bonuses, which results in misleading re-
ported earnings. Many other incentives have also been reported, such as to increase
stock price during initial public offerings (IPOs) (Shivakumar, 2000; Marquardt and
Wiedman, 2004), to maintain self-reputation (Graham et al., 2005), to avoid losses
or meet analyst’s earnings expectation (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge
et al., 1999).
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) themselves provide some
room for discretion including accounting choices and estimation for management to
report firm economic performance. Hence, by selecting accounting choices and/or
adjusting estimation of particular accounts such as an allowance for doubtful ac-
counts receivable, earnings management can be partly accommodated within GAAP.
Moreover, corporate management can also employ real activity manipulation to in-
flate earnings. Real activity manipulation is achieved by timing the decision of
investment and/or manipulating business activities, such as offering special credit
to boost sales, or overproducing to reduce cost of goods (Schipper, 1989; Goel and
Thakor, 2003; Roychowdhury, 2006).
Schipper (1989, p.92) defines earnings management as: “...a purposeful inter-
vention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some
private gain”. Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368) define earnings management as:
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic perfor-
mance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend
on reported accounting numbers.
Walker (2013, p.446) define earnings management as:
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The use of managerial discretion over (within GAAP) accounting choices,
earnings reporting choices, and real economic decisions to influence how
underlying economic events are reflected in one or more measures of
earnings.
According to these definitions, earnings management seems problematic for financial
reporting in that the underlying economic performance of the firm may not be truly
and fairly presented – given the principles provided by accounting standards. How-
ever, the literature reports conflicting viewpoints on earnings management among
countries and professions. For instance, Geiger et al. (2006) report that accounting
students in Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, consider both account-
ing and real earnings management as acceptable, while those in the US and Australia
tend to perceive merely the latter as acceptable. American management are prone
to perceive real earnings management as more ethical than accounting earnings
management (Bruns and Merchant, 1990). Practitioners and regulators are likely
to consider earnings management as dubious while academics are not (Dechow and
Skinner, 2000). For example, income smoothing seems acceptable in that it may
improve the informativeness of accounting information (see for example Tucker and
Zarowin 2006; Jayaraman 2008; Sun 2011). This thesis takes the regulatory view
and considers earnings management as an obstruction of the true and fair presenta-
tion of corporate accounting information which plausibly results in wrong financial
decisions of financial statement users.
Accounting researchers have been developing a variety of proxies to study earn-
ings management for decades. According to McNichols (2000), the studies can be
grouped into three topics: discretionary accruals, specific accruals, and earnings dis-
tribution. Discretionary accruals (DAC) occur when management select accounting
choices and/or estimate accruals that do not present a true and fair view of the
economic performance of their company. The extant literature employs the Jones
model and its variations to compute DAC (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari
et al., 2005). Specific accrual studies focus on measuring accrual bias from particu-
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lar accounts such as an allowance for doubtful accounts receivable or a provision for
warranty (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Jackson and Liu, 2010; Cohen et al., 2011).
The last group studies zero-earnings discontinuity in earnings distribution, focusing
on manipulating earnings to meet thresholds such as small positive earnings and
last year earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Burgstahler
and Chuk, 2015).
Each type of study is problematic in some aspects. For example, the first type is
based mainly on a regression model to quantify DAC so it appears to suffer from the
omitted-variable bias and model specification (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al.,
2005). For specific accruals, because one particular accrual may only be a small
part of overall earnings management engaged by management so, as suggested by
McNichols (2000), to study the extent of earnings management one may require
many models and more data. The last one may suffer from sample selection bias
which may cause zero-earnings discontinuity in earnings distribution from an absence
of loss-making firms in the sample set (Durtschi and Easton, 2005, 2009).
Another type of earnings management is income smoothing. Goel and Thakor
(2003, p.151) define income smoothing as:
Earnings smoothing is a special case of earnings management involv-
ing intertemporal smoothing of reported earnings relative to economic
earnings; it attempts to make earnings look less variable over time.
According to this definition, income smoothing is a long-term strategy and relates
to both earnings inflating and deflating. Income smoothing studies focus on the
volatility/smoothness of earnings measured by, for example, the variance or standard
deviation of earnings alone or relative to referencing figures, such as revenues or
operating cash flow (Eckel, 1981; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Lang et al., 2003; Leuz
et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006). Many accounting studies have mainly investigated
accounting or accruals income smoothing in various aspects (Beattie et al., 1994;
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Chaney et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2003; Peek, 2004; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Sood
and Abou, 2012) but have paid little attention to real activity income smoothing.
1.2.2 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are generally considered
principles-based accounting standards since they provide a basic principle for ac-
counting methods. A process to improve the standards has been undertaken for
years by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). In particular,
the IASC has removed some accounting choices from the International Account-
ing Standards (IAS) – as suggested by the International Organization of Securities
Commission before some revised standards went into effect in 1995 (Nobes, 2008b).
The process has been carried on by the IASC successor, namely the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which additionally aligns IAS with fair-value
orientation. Adopting such revised IAS/IFRS may lead to an improvement in ac-
counting quality since they constrain management in their use of discretion in ac-
counting choices (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001).
A large body of research has been undertaken to test the effect of IFRS/IAS
adoption on accounting quality. For instance, the adoption leads to a decrease in
earnings management (Barth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2010; Iatridis
and Rouvolis, 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Zéghal et al., 2011; Chua et al., 2012). However,
many studies, especially those investigating European firms, find no significant effect
of IFRS on accounting quality (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Jeanjean and
Stolowy, 2008; Callao and Jarne, 2010; Lin et al., 2012). Houqe et al. (2012) show
that IFRS adoption does not contribute to a decline in discretionary accruals unless
the adopting country has strong investor protection rights. Daske et al. (2008) and
Landsman et al. (2012) report that legal enforcement plays an important role in
ensuring the effectiveness of IFRS.
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1.2.3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
The high profile accounting scandals, such as the cases of Enron and WorldCom
have led to scepticism about the reliability of accounting information and the qual-
ity of public auditors in the US. The US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 in response to these incidents so as to regain public confidence. The Act pre-
scribes several mechanisms to amend financial reporting of US firms. For instance,
it prescribes managerial certification of financial report accuracy and completeness,
imposes more penalties for financial misconduct, and institutes more auditing stan-
dards. Many prior studies have documented that SOX has contributed to a positive
change in the reliability of accounting information of US listed firms (Lobo and
Zhou, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Nagy, 2010; Singer and
You, 2011).
Many other countries have embraced SOX-like regulations to improve their cor-
porate accounting practices, such as Canada, Australia, and China. Japan is among
the first in Asia following the US in passing a new securities law, the Financial
Instrument and Exchange Law, in 2006. The law prescribes some requirements sim-
ilar to those of SOX, the so-called JSOX. For instance, JSOX requires managerial
certification of financial reports and assessment of internal control systems for listed
companies to comply with from April 2008. The new regulations also increase the
penalties for several market fraud activities including the submission of financial
statements and associated documents containing either material misstatements or
fictitious accounting information.
1.3 Contribution and outline of the thesis
This thesis contributes to accounting research in many ways. Basically, it adds to a
large body of research about IFRS, SOX, and earnings management. We document
the effect of IFRS on earnings management in many Asian settings and also on a
variety of earnings management proxies. The findings also add to the ongoing debate
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about quantifying and testing earnings management, such as the case of earnings
management to avoid losses.
1.3.1 The effect of IFRS on accounting quality in Thailand
Research in the region mainly focused on market-based accounting quality (such
as value relevance and timeliness of accounting information) and the effect of the
Asian financial crisis of 1997 (Graham et al., 2000; Davis-Friday et al., 2006; Vi-
chitsarawong et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2011). Charoenwong and Jiraporn (2009)
and Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) report that the corporate governance mechanisms
newly implemented after the crisis led to an improvement in accounting quality in
many Asian countries. It can be argued that improvement in market-based account-
ing quality may be attributable to economic recovery after the crisis. In addition,
three or four years after the crisis, as in the case of Thailand, corporate governance
was still in the early stage of implementation. So the findings of prior studies may
be premature.
This study asks to what extent IFRS affects the accounting quality of Thai listed
companies. We extend prior research by examining the accounting-based proxy
(i.e. discretionary accruals). From the univariate tests, we find some evidence of a
decline in discretionary accruals of Thai listed companies. However, the regression
results that control for related factors mainly show no significant effect of IFRS on
discretionary accruals. The multivariate results additionally show that firm-level
factors have a significantly negative influence on discretionary accruals including
debt and equity incentives while only board size and block shareholders appear to
be associated with a decline in discretionary accruals. Interestingly, we find no
relationship between big-4 auditors and discretionary accruals.
Based on the accounting-based proxy, the findings are inconsistent with prior
studies (Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2009; Vichitsarawong et al., 2010) that find
an improvement in market-based accounting quality shortly after the crisis. In
addition, our findings do not support the findings that IFRS contribute to a decline
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in discretionary accruals in many countries (Chen et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2010; Ipino
and Parbonetti, 2011; Zéghal et al., 2011; Chua et al., 2012).
We conclude that because firm-level factors that negatively influence financial
reporting practices may not be changed easily, policy makers and regulators may
require country-level mechanisms to support IFRS compliance. For example, a law
regarding the right of minority holders may be required for an improvement to be
measurably present. The process of enforcement should be vigorously implemented
accordingly.
1.3.2 The effect of IFRS on income smoothing in Asia
Prior income smoothing research mainly focuses on accounting income smoothing
(see for example Beattie et al. (1994); Chaney et al. (1998); Elgers et al. (2003);
Tucker and Zarowin (2006); Athanasakou et al. (2007)) while it pays little attention
to real income smoothing. It may be that researchers perceive real manipulation as
less problematic for financial reports. Recently, Roychowdhury (2006) has developed
models to compute real earnings management using accounting information, so it
is possible to contribute to the literature by examining both accounting and real
income smoothing. The extant literature reports that to smooth income, US firms
substituted real earnings management for accounting earnings management when
the accounting options were restricted (Tan and Jamal, 2006). With many strong
income-smoothing incentives (Francis et al., 2004; Graham et al., 2005; Ball, 2006),
the attempts of IFRS to constrain accounting manipulation may lead to the use
of real earnings management instead and the effect of IFRS on income smoothing
may be unclear. This study investigates the effect of IFRS on income smoothing in
China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. We group samples into quartiles based
on the level of income smoothing to investigate not only the effect of IFRS on income
smoothing but also changes in accounting and real activity earnings management
between IFRS periods of each group.
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We find that firms in these countries exhibit a significant decline in income
smoothing (more earnings volatility) in the post-IFRS period, especially those with
a high level of income smoothing in the pre-IFRS period, which agrees with the
findings of prior studies (Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Liu et al.,
2011; Chua et al., 2012). In addition, firms with a high level of income smoothing
exhibit a decrease in signed discretionary accruals and an increase in the use of real
activity methods, especially those related to overproduction to reduce cost and some
evidence of cutting discretionary expenses. The findings are consistent with prior
studies (Tan and Jamal, 2006; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011) about the substitution
of earnings manipulation methods.
The analysis of firms with a low level of income smoothing shows that IFRS have
different effects on income smoothing and manipulating methods. They exhibit an
increase in income smoothing and discretionary accruals. We assume that these
firms may have conservative accounting practices so we conjecture that IFRS may
shift their accounting practices to be more neutral. Taking into account the role of
legal enforcement, we find some evidence that a strong legal enforcement enhances
the efficacy of IFRS, which is consistent with the findings of Daske et al. (2008)
and Landsman et al. (2012). However, we find no evidence that a strong legal
enforcement leads to a greater prevalence of real earnings management as found in
the study of Ipino and Parbonetti (2011).
The findings suggest that firms with greater income-smoothing incentives are
more likely to turn to real activity in the post-IFRS period after accounting meth-
ods have been restricted. It is important to note that though the level of income
smoothing of these firms statistically declines, their income smoothing level is still
relatively high in comparison to that of low level income-smoothing firms. So com-
pliance with IFRS may not contribute to an economically significant decrease in
income smoothing.
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1.3.3 The effect of Japanese-SOX on earnings management to avoid
losses in Japan
The positive effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on accounting quality reported
in the US has raised interesting questions about the effect of SOX-like regulations
on accounting quality in other countries. We examine the effect of JSOX on the
loss-avoidance behaviour of Japanese firms. Firstly, we find evidence that, in Japan,
zero-discontinuity of earnings distribution may result from earnings management to
avoid losses, which is in line with the findings of Thomas et al. (2004) and Shuto
and Iwasaki (2014). We also find that JSOX has a negative effect on loss-avoidance
behaviour in Japan, especially for large firms. The findings are partly consistent
with the US findings (Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen,
2009; Aubert and Grudnitski, 2014; Gilliam et al., 2015). We conjecture that a
different degree of the effectiveness of JSOX may be that 1) JSOX is less stringent
in relation to SOX and 2) there is a difference in the institutional factors, such as
different legal enforcement levels and/or Japanese business practice for reporting or
maintaining a modest profit.
In both pre- and post-JSOX periods, loss-avoidance firms (suspect firms) use
both methods to achieve loss avoidance in relation to other firms. Comparing only
suspect firms between the JSOX periods, we find that they still use both accounting
and real activity earnings management methods to achieve their goals. The findings
do not support prior US studies (Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009) that
report a decline in accounting and an increase in real earnings management after
SOX. JSOX appears to have no effect on the methods used to manage earnings in
Japan. It may be that, as already mentioned, JSOX is less stringently applied. An-
other possible explanation may be the different perceptions of earnings management,
in that Japanese management may perceive both methods as acceptable.
Furthermore, we find that suspect firms appear to switch from one specific ac-
crual to another account to manipulate earnings. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004)
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establish that different accounts may have different costs of manipulation. There-
fore, Japanese managers may turn to other particular accruals, perceiving them
as having lower costs in order to compensate for the increased costs imposed by
JSOX (e.g. penalty costs). Interestingly, we find that suspect firms are less likely
to adjust research and development expenses (R&D) while they are more likely to
adjust CAPEX to achieve loss avoidance. A possible explanation may be because
firms invest in more CAPEX in relation to R&D, so a larger amount may be more
susceptible for manipulation. In addition, we find that small suspect firms are less
likely to use real earnings management.
The study sheds some light on the effect of SOX-like regulations in a business
context that is different from that of the US. In addition, it contributes to the
ongoing debate about the validity of loss-avoidance investigating methods.
Chapter 2
The effect of IFRS on accounting quality in Thai-
land
2.1 Introduction
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 has motivated researchers to investigate account-
ing quality and corporate governance in Asia. The accounting quality of firms in
the region has been reported to be low resulting from many institutional factors
that are different from those of the western countries. After the crisis, many Asian
countries have adopted or converged to the International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS)/ International Accounting Standards (IAS) and implemented corpo-
rate governance mechanisms to improve their corporate accounting information. The
Thai government was under pressure to improve corporate governance, including the
transparency in financial reporting practices. Many regulatory changes and IFRS-
based accounting standards were enforced after the crisis. Albeit many studies have
been conducted, they appear to focus on the effect of the crisis on accounting qual-
ity, while the effect of changes in accounting standards and corporate governance on
accounting quality after the crisis has been little investigated.
IFRS are considered principles-based accounting standards because they pro-
vide basic principles for accounting methods. Many accounting choices have been
eliminated from IFRS/IAS for years to limit managerial discretion. A large body
of research reports mixed effects of compliance with IFRS on accounting quality
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(Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Barth et al., 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy,
2008; Zéghal et al., 2011). The difference between prior findings may be caused by
the different research settings, such as samples and proxies used for accounting qual-
ity. Many institutional and corporate governance factors have been documented as
playing a critical role in determining accounting quality, such as legal enforcement
(Leuz et al., 2003; Landsman et al., 2012), ownership structure (Leuz et al., 2003;
Coffee, 2005), and leverage (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). The
related factors possibly pose a challenge to accounting researchers to investigate the
effect of IFRS.
The literature reports that accounting quality of firms in the region is poor
(based mainly on market-based proxies, including value relevance and timeliness)
and the quality became even worse during the crisis but displayed an improvement
shortly after it (Graham et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Davis-Friday et al., 2006;
Vichitsarawong et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2011). Charoenwong and Jiraporn (2009)
and Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) propose that the improvement results from newly
implemented corporate governance mechanisms after the crisis. It may be argued
that improvement in market-based accounting quality is partly attributable to eco-
nomic recovery. In addition, for Thailand, several years after the crisis, corporate
governance was still in the early stage of implementation so prior proposals may be
ambiguous.
The present study adds to the literature by investigating the effects of IFRS
convergence and corporate governance implementation in Thailand. The advantage
of investigating one particular country is that it requires no control for country-level
institutional factors. We test discretionary accruals (DAC) of Thai listed companies
between 1994-2011. We group discretionary accruals into the pre-accounting reform
(AR) period, 1994-2002, and the post-AR period, 2003-2011.
From the univariate tests, we find some evidence of a significant decline in the
level of overall absolute discretionary accruals. However, the results from multivari-
ate tests that control for related factors and industry- and year-fixed effects show no
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effect of IFRS on accounting quality. The analysis additionally shows that related
factors have relatively strong influences on discretionary accruals, both desirable and
undesirable. We find that equity issuance and debt have a positive relationship with
DAC. While equity issuance is linked to income-increasing DAC, debt is linked to
both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. The findings
partly support the debt covenant hypothesis. A possible explanation for the relation
between income-decreasing accruals and debt may be that firms that are under debt
restructuring may use negative accruals to emphasise their poor performances to
gain a better condition from debt negotiations (DeAngelo et al., 1994). Board size
and block shareholders appear to be related to a decline in discretionary accruals.
In contrast to prior studies (Street and Gray, 2002; Zéghal et al., 2011), we
find no relationship between the big-4 auditors and discretionary accruals. As in
Thailand the demand for high quality external financial reports is low and the legal
enforcement is weak, the role of the big-4 auditors may be different from those in
the US or UK (Francis and Wang, 2008).
In conclusion, at least on the basis of accounting-based proxy, we find no strong
evidence that IFRS convergence has a positive effect on the accounting quality of
Thai listed companies. The findings are inconsistent with prior studies about the
positive effect of IFRS on accounting quality (Barth et al., 2008; Iatridis and Rouvo-
lis, 2010; Zéghal et al., 2011). Firm-level institutional factors, such as leverage and
equity financing, tend to obstruct the efficacy of IFRS. Big-4 auditors in Thailand
mainly appear to have no effect on managerial discretion. The Thai government and
policy makers may require country-level corporate governance, such as improved in-
vestor protection law and enforcement mechanisms as part of the reform to improve
financial reporting practices.
The contribution of our study is that we are among the first to exclusively exam-
ine the impact of IFRS on accounting-based accounting quality in Thailand. Prior
research focuses on market-based proxies to measure accounting quality. The re-
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search implication may benefit policy makers and regulators of Thailand and other
developing countries.
Section 2.2 discusses related literature. In section 2.3, we discuss our research
design and describe the data. Section 2.4 presents the analysis and empirical results.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Institutional factors and accounting quality in Thailand
The ownership structure of Thai businesses is family concentrated. They tend to
consider a simple accounting system as an adequate tool to supervise their business
and fulfil the requirements of the tax authority, which leads to a small incentive to
comply with accounting standards (Akathaporn et al., 1993). Though a company
has become a public company on the stock market, its ownership structure is still
concentrated. Management and the majority of stakeholders are likely to be from
the same family or related parties so they can internally communicate financial
information which results in a small demand for high quality external financial
reports (Ball et al., 2003).
The law of Thailand is highly codified with the influence of common law.1 The
Commercial law enacted by the Ministry of Commerce (MC) prescribes many re-
quirements for accounting practices, such as the minimum disclosure in financial
reports, maintaining bookkeeping records, and audited financial reports for statu-
tory filing. Tax law has a strong influence on accounting practices (Vichitsarawong
et al., 2010); however, it merely requires the standardisation of financial reports but
does not prescribe valuation methods of reported accounts (Tay, 1994). It also re-
quires an agreement between financial reporting and tax reporting for claimable
expenses which results in a firm adopting accounting methods to minimise tax
(Angus-Leppan, 1997).
1www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html
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In Thailand, the first stock market was privately formed in 1962. It ceased oper-
ation in 1974 because of the lack of knowledge in the securities market (Tay, 1994)
and corruption in trading (Angus-Leppan, 1997). The new stock market, the Se-
curities Exchange of Thailand (SET), began operating in 1975 with governmental
support. In 1978, with the new Public Companies Act B.E. 2521 (1978) enacted,
listed companies were required to adopt public company status and have their fi-
nancial statements audited by auditors. Fourteen years later, the Public Limited
Companies Act B.E. 2535 (1992) – which replaced the first public company act –
requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to be formed as an inde-
pendent regulator. The Thai SEC has a responsibility to prevent unfair security
trading practices, and license and regulate listed company auditors.2 SET is classi-
fied as a less developed stock exchange with weak investor protection rights (Leuz
et al., 2003).
The development of Thai Accounting Standards (TAS) has no long history in
comparison to those of the UK and US. TAS, before being revised to align with
IFRS, were influenced by the accounting standards of common law countries. Gray
et al. (1984) document that IASC and IFAC have a significant influence and the
UK accounting standards have a moderate influence on Thai financial reporting
practices.
After the crisis of 1997, Thailand was under pressure to improve its corporate
governance and financial reporting practices. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) required Thailand to improve the transparency of financial reporting by com-
pliance with international practices including accounting standards, as parts of a
financial support programme. The Thai government and regulatory bodies imposed
several methods to improve corporate governance. In 1998, the Institute of Certified
Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT) announced a plan to converge TAS
to be in line with the International Accounting Standards. According to appendix
A, around 20 revised accounting standards have been in effect since 2002 and around
2www.sec.or.th
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25 revised standards have been in effect since 2006. As at July 2015, Thailand has
not fully adopted IFRS, some standards regarding financial instruments including
‘IFRS 9 - Financial Instruments’ and ‘IFRS 7 - Financial Instruments: Disclosures’
have not been adopted.3
The Thai Accounting Act B.E 2543 (2000) was enacted requiring corporations
to comply with Thai accounting standards (TAS) developed by ICAAT. Since then,
TAS have been endorsed by law so non-compliance is subject to penalties. The
Accounting Profession Act B.E. 2547 (2004), the second accounting law, estab-
lished self-regulatory organization, namely the Federation of Accounting Professions
(FAP). FAP (which replaced ICAAT) has authority to autonomously license and
regulate the accounting profession. Auditors and accountants are required to be
members of FAP and comply with regulations and standards prescribed under this
Act.
Thai SEC has prescribed that listed firms are to have an audit committee, start-
ing in 1999. In 2002 the corporate governance principles were introduced by SET
for listed companies to implement from the year 2002. The principles were revised
to be compatible with the OECD corporate governance principles in 2006 by in-
cluding requirements such as the right of shareholders, financial disclosure, director
responsibility, and the composition of a board of directors. However, the require-
ments are on a comply-or-explain basis. White (2004) reports that, a few years after
the prescription of the principles, there had been no desirable changes in financial
reporting practices because the controlling families of Thai firms seemed to have no
intention of complying with new regulations. In 1998, the Thai regulatory bodies
founded the Thai Institute of Directors Association to educate directors of the listed
companies and improve corporate governance. Thailand seems to place more duty
of corporate governance on directors rather than on top executives in comparison
to the US regulators (Persons, 2006).
3www.ifrs.org
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Based on market-based proxies, accounting information in many Asian countries
(including Thailand) has been reported to be of low quality. For example, it is less
timely (Ball et al., 2003) and even less conservative and timely during the crisis
(Vichitsarawong et al., 2010). Graham et al. (2000) report that the value relevance
of book values and earnings declined during the crisis of 1997. Accounting quality
has been reported to improve shortly after the crisis resulting from the newly im-
plemented corporate governance (Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2009; Vichitsarawong
et al., 2010). The improvement, we argue, may partly result from the effect of eco-
nomic recovery after the crisis. Srijunpetch (2004) reports that three years after
the crisis the degree of compliance with IAS significantly increased. As discussed,
Thailand started accounting standard convergence in 1998 and listed companies
were required to have an audit committee starting from 1999. Revised corporate
governance principles were introduced three years later and were revised to catch up
with the OECD principles in 2006. Given corporate governance mechanisms had not
been implemented properly in the early period of accounting reform, the findings
about the accounting improvement of the prior studies may be premature.
2.2.2 International Financial Reporting Standards and accounting qual-
ity
IFRS are generally considered principles-based accounting standards as they pro-
vide a basic principle for accounting methods. The IASC had been improving the
standards for years – such as removing accounting choices and accounting rules con-
taining precise thresholds from the standards before some revised standards went
into effect in 1995 (Nobes, 2008b).4 For example, there have been no more options
for the recording of particular development expenses. The LIFO (Last-in, First-out)
method for inventory valuation is no longer permitted. Numeric threshold figures
for classifying lease contracts have been replaced with general principles focusing
4The process of IAS improvement has been handed over to the IASC successor, namely the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The new standards developed by IASB are
called the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
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on the substance of them. Therefore, the adoption of improved IAS/IFRS plausi-
bly contribute to an improvement in accounting quality since the standards impose
constraints on the accounting policy choices available to management (Ashbaugh
and Pincus, 2001). According to the conceptual framework of IASB, the qualita-
tive characters of financial statements include relevance and faithful representation.
Elimination of accounting choices is explicitly the means to the faithful representa-
tion character of the financial statements of adopting firms. However, Barth et al.
(2008) point out that 1) fewer options may lessen the ability to reflect firm per-
formance and 2) the principles-based concept may provide more opportunity to
management to alter earnings. In addition, the literature reports that limiting ac-
counting choices can lead to the use of real earnings management (Tan and Jamal,
2006; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011).
IFRS also employ a fair-value principle to create a true and fair presentation of
accounting information. The standards prescribe a fair-value presentation of both fi-
nancial and non-financial assets. Ball (2006) suggests that the concept may improve
the quality of reported earnings if they timely report new gain/loss information.
However, Ball (2006) also points out that this may not be the case since manage-
ment might manipulate earnings by adjusting the fair value calculation via financial
models. According to the SEC (2005), this concern would happen when an active
market for particular assets being valued is not available. The report conversely
notes that the fair-value concept would mitigate earnings management involving
accounting-motivated transaction structures, such as selling of available-for-sale in-
vestment to realise unrealised gain that could not be recognised to inflate earnings
(SEC, 2005).
A large body of research has documented a positive effect of IFRS adoption on
accounting quality. For instance, the adoption leads to a decrease in discretionary
accruals in many countries (Chen et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2010; Ipino and Parbonetti,
2011; Zéghal et al., 2011). Both voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS leads
to a decline in income smoothing (an increase in earnings volatility) worldwide
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(Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Liu
et al., 2011; Chua et al., 2012). Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) find that adopting new
standards in Greece appears to pay off in the period subsequent to the adopting
year.
However, many studies find no significant effect of IFRS on accounting quality.
They find no significant improvement in accounting quality (based on the study of
discretionary accruals and income smoothing) after IFRS adoption (Van Tendeloo
and Vanstraelen, 2005; Paananen and Lin, 2009; Lin et al., 2012; Ahmed et al.,
2013). IFRS compliance leads to no decline in earnings management to avoid losses
in many European countries and Australia (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Callao and
Jarne, 2010) and even leads to an increase in discretionary accruals of European firms
(Callao and Jarne, 2010). Many firm-level factors, such as the quality of auditors
and block shareholders (Street and Gray, 2002; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen,
2005; Zéghal et al., 2011) and country-level factors such as investor protection rights
(Houqe et al., 2012) and legal enforcement (Daske et al., 2008; Landsman et al.,
2012) have been documented as playing a critical role in supporting the efficacy of
IFRS compliance. So these factors possibly pose a challenge to researchers studying
the effect of IFRS. In addition, Pope and McLeay (2011, p.235) suggest that the
different findings may result from ‘pseudo-adoption’, in that firms do not faithfully
adopt IFRS.
Researchers appear to be interested in accounting quality in Asian countries af-
ter the Financial Crisis of 1997 but have tended to focus on the effect of the crisis
(Graham et al., 2000; Davis-Friday et al., 2006; Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2009;
Vichitsarawong et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2011) and not on the effect of accounting
standard and corporate governance changes. Accounting information in most Asian
countries has been reported to be of low quality in comparison to that of the devel-
oped countries resulting from many institutional factors such as ownership structure,
legal system, debt financing, and ownership concentration (Ball et al., 2003; Leuz
et al., 2003). Many countries in Asia have adopted or converged to IFRS for years
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to improve the quality of their corporate accounting information, partly due to the
increasing globalization of financial investment and at times under the conditions
for financial support programmes from IMF after the crisis. Research has paid little
attention to the effect of such changes in this region.
2.2.3 Corporate governance and accounting quality
Leuz et al. (2003) find that countries whose firms have concentrated ownership have
more aggressive earnings management than those with dispersed ownership struc-
ture. However, Coffee (2005) proposes that controlling shareholders can directly
supervise their business so they need no system such as a bonus plan to drive man-
agement, which results in fewer managerial incentives to manipulate earnings for
self-interest. Zéghal et al. (2011) report that in France, block shareholders play
an important role in reducing earnings management when their firm complies with
IFRS. As discussed, institutional blockholders and family blockholders may play dif-
ferent roles in financial reporting so the effect of ownership structure on accounting
information seems inconclusive.
Many studies have reported that big-4 auditors play an important role in mit-
igating earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Becker et al., 1998;
Krishnan, 2003).5 In addition, they appear to play an important role in ensuring
the efficacy of IFRS in earnings management reduction (Van Tendeloo and Vanstrae-
len, 2005; Zéghal et al., 2011) or disclosure compliance with IFRS/IAS (Street and
Gray, 2002). However, in countries with low investor protection rights, the audit
quality of big-4 and non-big-4 auditors tends to be similar (Francis and Wang, 2008).
In Asia, the role of auditors has been differently documented. Auditors in ASEAN
countries are considered to have weak quality (Claessens and Fan, 2002) and are
somewhat compromising with their clients (Favere-Marchesi, 2000). The literature
5The term “big-4 auditor(s)” in our study also refers to big-5 or big-6 auditors before many
mergers.
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shows that the accounting quality of Asian firms audited by big-4 and non-big-4
auditors appears to be no different (Jeong and Rho, 2004; Herrmann et al., 2008).
Boards of directors have been reported to have an effect on accounting quality.
For instance, for US firms, board size appears to be related to accounting fraud
(Beasley, 1996). Xie et al. (2003) report a negative relationship between board size
and discretionary accruals of US firms. The authors also report that the existence
of CEO duality (CEO holds the role of chairman on the board) has no significant
relationship with discretionary accruals. The independence of the audit committee
has a negative relationship with discretionary accruals (Klein, 2002). In the UK,
the number of outside directors on the board is negatively related to the likelihood
of the use of income-increasing accruals to avoid presenting losses/ an earnings
decrease (Peasnell et al., 2005). In Hong Kong where a business tends to have
highly concentrated ownership, Jaggi and Leung (2007) and Jaggi et al. (2009)
demonstrate that the audit committee and independent directors play a key role in
mitigating earnings management but their duties are less effective when other board
members consist of persons from a controlling family. However, in the UK, Peasnell
et al. (2005) find no relationship between the presence of an audit committee on
the board and accrual earnings management. In Thailand, an independent director
seems to have a small role since she/he is nominated because firms solely want to
meet regulatory requirements (Dhnadirek and Tang, 2003).
Based on the debt covenant hypothesis, firms may manipulate earnings to miti-
gate the likelihood of debt covenant violation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). The
hypothesis holds among those US firms approaching a violation of debt covenants
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). Inconsistently, researchers investi-
gating Asian firms find a negative relationship between income-increasing manip-
ulation and the level of debt (Astami and Tower, 2006). Companies in financial
difficulties have been reported to use income-decreasing accruals to emphasise their
problem to gain better debt restructuring conditions (DeAngelo et al., 1994). In ad-
dition, equity issuance has been reported to link to earnings manipulation. Compa-
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nies are more likely to inflate their earnings around the period of IPOs and seasoned
equity offerings (SEOs) to maximize stock prices (Shivakumar, 2000; Marquardt
and Wiedman, 2004). In Asia, Malaysian companies tend to engage in income-
increasing earnings management during the IPO year (Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2011).
Locally traded Chinese firms, however, use income-decreasing manipulation in the
pre-IPO period to boost their long-term performance (Kimbro, 2005).
Based on the political cost hypothesis, large firms are more likely to manage earn-
ings downward to avoid strong regulatory measures from the government/regulators
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Many studies in the US context support this hy-
pothesis (Cahan, 1992; Key, 1997). Shen and Chih (2007) find that large Asian
firms are more likely than small firms to smooth earnings. Conversely, Astami and
Tower (2006) find that there is no relationship between firm size and a managerial
decision to choose accounting methods in the Asia Pacific region.
This study extends prior literature on the effects of IFRS adoption by investigat-
ing accounting-based proxies for accounting quality in developing Asian countries.
The main research question is to what extent IFRS convergence contributes to an
improvement in accounting quality in Thailand.
2.3 Research design and sample selection
This study examines accounting quality based on the criteria proposed by Ball
(2006) that high quality accounting information contains less managerial accounting
discretion. We use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management.
2.3.1 Measuring discretionary accruals
A method generally used to calculate discretionary accruals (DAC) consists of two
steps. Firstly, total accruals (TAC) have to be computed by either the balance sheet
approach or the cash flow approach. The balance sheet approach calculates TAC
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from working capital as follows:
TAC = (∆CA−∆CASH )− (∆CL −∆STD)− DEP, (2.1)
where, CA is current assets; CASH is cash and cash equivalents; CL is current
liabilities; STD is short-term debt; DEP is depreciation and amortization. The cash
flow approach computes TAC as the difference between net income and operating
cash flow. Hribar and Collins (2002) document that non-recurring events such as
mergers and acquisitions recorded in the balance sheet partly cause the difference
between balance-sheet TAC and cash-flow TAC, suggesting that the former may
be inferior. However, Shi and Zhang (2011) argue that the balance-sheet TAC is
superior if non-recurring events have been removed. This study uses TAC from the
cash flow approach to reduce the effect of non-recurring transactions.
Secondly, TAC will be separated into nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary
accruals (DAC). Jones (1991) is among the first to develop an accrual model (here-
after the Jones model) to calculate DAC. The author regresses TAC on change in
revenues and property, plant and equipment (PPE), assuming that these accounts
are less contaminated by managerial discretion. So accruals that cannot be explained
by these accounts are hypothesised to be DAC. The Jones model is as follows:
TAC it/TAit−1 = β0 + β1(∆REV it/TAit−1) + β2(PPE it/TAit−1) + εit, (2.2)
where, REV is revenues; PPE is gross property, plant and equipment; TA is total as-
sets; ε is a residual representing DAC. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets
to reduce the effect of heteroscedasticity (Jones, 1991). To estimate the coefficients
for the model, the same model is used for firm’s time series data (estimation period)
assuming that in the estimation period management have smaller incentives to ma-
nipulate earnings compared to the event period. Therefore, DAC gained from the
event period being tested is hypothesised to be greater than that in the estimation
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period. In the study of Jones (1991), the event period is the period when a firm is
under import relief investigation so it has a strong incentive to deflate earnings to
gain the grant.
Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones model by adjusting changes in revenues
by changes in accounts receivable (hereafter the Modified Jones or MJ model) to
control year-end earnings manipulation through recognition of unearned revenues.
However, this implies that all changes in accounts receivable are caused by earnings
manipulation (Kothari et al., 2005). Dechow et al. (1995) also note that the models
may be misspecified when used to test a sample consisting of firms with extreme
financial performance. The MJ model is reported to be more powerful for detecting
DAC relative to the Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). The MJ model is as follows:
TAC it/TAit−1 = β0 + β1(∆REV it −∆ARit)/TAit−1) + β2(PPE it/TAit−1) + εit,
(2.3)
where, AR is accounts receivable. Ronen and Yaari (2008) suggest that both the
Jones model and MJ model can correctly detect earnings management directions
(income-increasing or income-decreasing manipulation) but the likelihood of type II
error of the latter seems smaller.
Kothari et al. (2005) propose a performance-matched approach to calculate DAC
and report that this approach exhibits better performance in comparison to the
traditional models. The performance-matched DAC is the difference between DAC
gained from the MJ Model and DAC from the ROA-Matched firms assumed to
have less earnings management. They also include (lagged) return on assets (ROA)
into the traditional models to control for the effect of firms’ performance. Though
the models with ROA are not comparable with the performance-matched approach,
the traditional model with lagged ROA shows some evidence of an improvement
in calculating DAC (Kothari et al., 2005). The model including lagged ROA is as
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follows:
TAC it/TAit−1 = β0 + β1(∆REV it −∆ARit)/TAit−1) + β2(PPE it/TAit−1)
+ β3(ROAit−1) + εit. (2.4)
Researchers extend the Jones model and MJ model by including many other vari-
ables reported to have a relationship with accruals, such as change in cash flow from
operating activities (CFO) and book-to-market ratio (Kasznik, 1999; Larcker and
Richardson, 2004). Albeit adding more variables may lessen an omitted variable bias
and yield a higher R-squared value, such extended models have not been statistically
tested for specification and power in calculating DAC.
Other aspects on the use of accrual models have also been documented. For
example, using a small sample size is likely to yield large standard errors and may
lead to type II error (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Cross-sectional regression analysis
appears to be more powerful than time series analysis when applied to firms with
large earnings management (Bartov et al., 2001).
The present study lacks firms assumed to have small earnings management for
the matching approach, so we use the MJ model including lagged ROA to control
for a firm’s performance (Kothari et al., 2005). Because of the availability of data,
we use net property, plant and equipment for the analysis in stead of gross property,
plant and equipment. According to Culvenor et al. (1999), gross property, plant and
equipment can also be used without significant differences in DAC. We conduct a
cross-sectional regression by year and industry to obtain DAC.
To test the effect of IFRS on discretionary accruals of Thai firms, we firstly
employ a univariate test comparing the level of DAC between periods. Secondly we
develop a multivariate model to control for related factors discussed earlier including
firm size (Key, 1997; Shen and Chih, 2007), debt (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994;
Sweeney, 1994), ownership structure (Leuz et al., 2003; Coffee, 2005; Zéghal et al.,
2011), equity financing (Shivakumar, 2000; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Ahmad-
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Zaluki et al., 2011), CEO duality and board size (Xie et al., 2003), and auditor
quality (Street and Gray, 2002; Zéghal et al., 2011). We also include industry- and
year-fixed effects to control for industry-specific accruals and economic cycle. We
employ a regression model as follows:
|DAC |it = β0 + β1IFRS it + β2CGit + β3CRISIS it + β4SIZE it + β5LEV it + β6EQit
+ β7AUDit + β8BSIZE it + β9DUAL + β10BLOCK it
+ Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + υit, (2.5)
where, DAC is discretionary accruals; IFRS is a dummy variable (1 = sample in
the IFRS period (2003-2011), 0 = otherwise); CG is a dummy variable (1 = sample
in the CG period (2006-2011), 0 = otherwise); CRISIS is a dummy variable (1 =
sample in the crisis period (1997-1998), 0 = otherwise); SIZE is the logarithm of
total assets; LEV is total debt scaled by total assets; EQ is a dummy variable for
equity financing (1 = sample in the pre-IPO and during IPO periods or issuing stock
for more than 10%, 0 = otherwise); AUD is a dummy variable (1 = the firm’s auditor
is a big-4 auditor, 0 = otherwise); BSIZE is the number of directors on the board;
DUAL is a dummy variable for duality (1 = the firm with CEO holding a position
of chairman of the board, 0 = otherwise); BLOCK is the summary percentage on
common stock holdings equal to or in excess of 5%.
2.3.2 Sample and descriptive statistics
Our data are accounting data for Thai companies listed on the SET extracted from
the DataStream databases. Some variables are collected from public sources in-
cluding firms’ websites, annual reports, and the database publicly provided by Thai
SEC and SET. Firms in financial and oil and gas industries are excluded due to the
difference in accounting standards used. State-owned enterprises are also excluded
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since they are tightly regulated by the government.6 The final sample consists of
309 firms (4,041 firm-year observations) for the fiscal years between 1994 and 2011
across seven main industries.7
Thailand started converging its local accounting standards in 1998 and there
have been around 20 revised standards enforced since 2002. For the case of Thai-
land, it was not a one-time adoption so to assign the cut-off point for the analysis
is somewhat challenging. Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) report that between 1999
- 2002 (around five years after the crisis) there had been no significant changes
in accounting measurements by Thai firms. We assume that at the end of 2002
there were a sufficient number of revised standards (20 standards) that may con-
tribute to changes in accounting quality. So we classify the period between 1994 -
2002 as the pre-accounting reform (AR) and the period between 2007-2011 as the
post-accounting reform period. In addition, Thailand has an improved version of
corporate governance principles in 2006 (compatible with the OECD version) so we
classify the period between 2003-2006 as the adjusting period and also the period
between 2007-2011 as the CG period for additional tests. Note that since 2006 there
were around 25 revised standards that have been in effect. The periods being tested
are presented in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Time period for the analysis
The sample distribution is presented in Table 2.1 as follows.
[Table 2.1 about here]
6State-owned firms in China have been found to have less earnings management (Ding et al.,
2007; Wang and Campbell, 2012).
7The industrial grouping is based on International Classification Benchmark (ICB).
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Panel B of Table 2.1 shows that the post-AR period has a greater number of obser-
vations because many new companies joined the stock market. Panel C shows that
the consumer goods industry has the highest number of observations accounting for
around 26%, while the health care industry has the lowest number accounting for
around 5% of the overall sample.
[Table 2.2 about here]
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables being tested. Mean absolute
DAC shows no significant decline in the post-AR period (around 7% of total assets
in both periods) while the median value shows a minor decline from around 5.1% to
4.8%. Firms show some growth in the post-AR periods based on total assets. Mean
debt declines from a leverage ratio of around 57% to 41%. Around 56% of firms in
the pre-AR period are audited by big-4 auditors while the number in the post-AR
period is around 58%. The average number of directors drops from around 12 to
11. The decline could be because many newly listed firms in the post-AR have not
yet nominated directors to the board. Around 20% of firms in each period have
management holding the chairman’s position on the board. As expected, Thai firms
have relatively high ownership concentration with a mean value of around 56% of
total equity in the pre-AR period and around 58% in the post-AR period.
[Table 2.3 about here]
Table 2.3 presents the Spearman (above diagonal) and the Pearson (below di-
agonal) pairwise correlations between variables. Both Pearson and Spearman cor-
relations show an absolute value of 0.563 (the largest magnitude) for the relation
between IFRS and CG. For all pairs of variables the absolute values of the Pearson
and Spearman correlation coefficients are relatively low, suggesting that there is a
low likelihood of multicollinearity in the regression analysis. Considering the sign of
coefficients between DAC and other variables, IFRS, firm size, and board size have
a negative association with DAC while crisis, leverage, equity financing, and duality
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have a positive association. The directions of relationships seem to be consistent
with prior studies. However, big-4 auditor has a positive association with DAC. The
relationships discussed are consistent between Spearman and Pearson correlations.
The inconclusive one is block ownership which has a positive association with DAC
for Spearman but a negative relationship for the Pearson correlation.
2.4 Empirical results and discussion
This study conducts two main sets of tests: 1) a univariate test comparing DAC
between the AR-periods using the Mann-Whitney U test, and 2) a multivariate test
using a regression analysis.
2.4.1 Univariate tests
The results from the tests are presented in Table 2.4 as follows:8
[Table 2.4 about here]
Panel A of Table 2.4 shows no significant decline in overall absolute DAC. We find
that only industrials and consumer goods industries experience a significant decrease
in absolute DAC at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In contrast, we find that
two industries including basic materials and other industries show a statistically
significant increase in DAC. Panel B presents the results from comparing DAC of
firms after excluding samples during the adjusting period (2003-2006). The results
show a significant decline in overall DAC at the 5% level – absolute discretionary
accruals decrease from around 5.1% to 4.7% of total assets. The analysis by industry
shows similar results to Panel A.
We also conduct the analysis based on a constant sample (firms with at least
one observation in the pre- and post-AR periods). Panel A of Table 2.5 shows a
significant decline in overall absolute DAC at the 1% level – absolute discretionary
8We also conduct a test for skewness and kurtosis similar to the Jarque-Bera test of normality.
Based on the tests, samples of each group being compared exhibit no normal distribution of DAC.
So using a nonparametric method may be more appropriate.
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accruals decrease from around 5.1% to 4.5% of total assets. As found in Table
2.4, we find that industrials and consumer goods industries experience a significant
decrease in absolute DAC at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. We also find that
two industries show a statistically significant increase in DAC. Panel B presents
the results from comparing the DAC of firms after excluding samples during the
adjusting period. The analysis shows similar results to Panel A.
From the univariate tests, the findings are partly consistent with prior studies
that find a decline in discretionary accruals (Chen et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2010; Zéghal
et al., 2011) though some industries show the opposite results. Note that many
corporate governance mechanisms were introduced during the post-AR period so we
caution that a positive change in accounting quality may partly result from such
mechanisms and IFRS combined.
2.4.2 Multivariate tests
The results from the regression model are as follow:
[Table 2.6 about here]
The regression results are presented in Table 2.6.9 From Panel A, model 1 shows
that IFRS has no significant effect on absolute DAC. CRISIS has no significant
effect on DAC, which is inconsistent with the findings of Graham et al. (2000) and
Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) who find that the crisis leads to a decline in market-
based accounting quality. CG also shows no effect on DAC.
Other factors appear to have a relatively strong influence on DAC. In particular,
the coefficients on SIZE, BSIZE, and BLOCK are significantly negative at the 1%,
1%, and 10% levels, respectively, suggesting larger firms, firms with bigger board
size, and firms with concentrated ownership have a lower level of discretionary ac-
cruals. However, considering the value of the coefficients, there seems to be no
economic significance from the three variables. In contrast, the coefficients on LEV
9The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is also computed showing no evidence of multicollinearity.
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and EQ are significantly positive at the 1% level, suggesting that more debt and
equity issuance lead to a greater degree of discretionary accruals.
We additionally conduct regression models for positive DAC (model 2) and neg-
ative DAC (model 3) separately to gain more insight into the effects of IFRS and
related factors. From the additional tests, both models show no significant effects
of IFRS, CRISIS, and CG. From Model 2, debt and equity issuance appear to have
a strong influence on income-increasing DAC. Board size seems to be an important
factor in mitigating income-increasing DAC. From model 3, debt is still significantly
positive, so an increase in debt leads to an increase in the use of income-decreasing
discretionary accruals. The relationship between debt and income-increasing dis-
cretionary accruals found in Model 2 supports the debt covenant hypothesis. A
possible explanation for the use of income-decreasing accruals found in Model 3
may be that, as suggested by DeAngelo et al. (1994), firms in financial difficulty
may use income-decreasing accruals to emphasise their performance to gain better
debt restructuring condition. Therefore, the effect of debt on DAC of Thai firms
seems to be inconclusive during our sampling period. Block shareholders are related
to a decline in income-decreasing DAC. Large firms seem to have less earnings man-
agement for both income-increasing and income-decreasing DAC. From the tests,
we find no evidence that CEO duality and big-4 auditors significantly affect DAC.
This is consistent with the findings of Francis and Wang (2008) that in a country
with low investor protecting rights, big-4 and local auditors tend to have the same
audit quality.
We also conduct the F-test for the combined effect of corporate governance mech-
anism on discretionary accruals. The first one is the combined effect of big-4 auditor
and board size and the second is the combined effect of big-4 auditor, board size,
and concentrated ownership. However, we find no significant effect of a combined
effect, except that they have a significant effect on negative DAC at the 10% level.
We also conduct a regression analysis with standard errors adjusted to address
possible correlation within industry (the results are presented in Panel B of Table
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2.6). The findings are more or less similar to those found earlier, except that the
effect of firm size in Model 2 and the effect of board size and block shareholders
in Model 3 disappear. We additionally conduct a regression analysis with constant
sample (firms with at least one observation in the pre- and post-IFRS periods). The
results are presented in Table 2.7 as follows:
[Table 2.7 about here]
From the results, the effect of firm size, debt, equity issuance, and ownership struc-
ture on DAC are similar to those from the analysis of the full sample. Interestingly,
the analysis shows that the coefficients on AUD and CG are significantly positive
at 10% level for models 1 and 2. The results suggest that big-4 auditors positively
affect the overall DAC and income-increasing DAC, while the corporate governance
appears to be associated with a decline in the use of income-decreasing DAC. Con-
sistently, the F-test of the combined effect of big-4 auditor, board size, and con-
centrated ownership is significant at the 10% level for income-decreasing DAC. The
findings in Panel B with standard errors adjusted to address possible correlation
within industry show similar results to Panel A, except that we find no evidence of
the significant effect of big-4 auditors and corporate governance on DAC.
In short, changes in accounting standards in Thailand and corporate governance
mechanisms are less likely contribute to a decline in DAC. Factors such as debt
and equity financing appear to have a relatively strong negative influence on the
accounting quality of Thai listed firms. Directors on the board seem to play a role
in mitigating discretionary accruals while the big-4 auditors do not appear to play
a gatekeeper role in financial reporting in Thailand.
2.5 Summary and conclusion
This study investigates to what extent convergence to IFRS contributes to an im-
provement in the accounting quality of listed companies in Thailand. We examine
discretionary accruals as a proxy for accounting quality during 1994 and 2011.
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We find no strong evidence that IFRS lead to a decline in the magnitude of discre-
tionary accruals. The factors that play an important role in determining accounting
quality include debt and equity financing. Corporate governance mechanisms found
to reduce discretionary accruals of Thai firms are internal factors, such as the direc-
tors on the board, while external factors, such as the public auditors especially big-4
auditors, mainly show no effect. The tests also show some evidence that controlling
ownership is significantly related to a decline in discretionary accruals.
From the results, many issues may be of interest for future research. For example,
because of the findings on the effect of big-4 auditors, the role of auditors on IFRS
compliance in the Asian context may be of interest. The effect of board composition
in the Asian context may be another aspect for further investigation.
Finally, the evidence suggests that many attempts to improve accounting qual-
ity by the Thai government and regulatory bodies have hardly paid off. Rather
than firm-level institutional factors, country-level institutional factors, such as le-
gal enforcement and investor protection rights that are weak in Thailand, may also
obstruct the effect of IFRS. So the Thai government and policy makers may re-
quire country-level mechanisms such as an improved investor protection law and a
vigorous enforcement mechanism as part of accounting reform.
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Table 2.1: Sample distribution
No. of Percent
Observations
Panel A: Year breakdown
1994 94 2.33
1995 115 2.85
1996 126 3.12
1997 137 3.39
1998 151 3.74
1999 153 3.79
2000 156 3.86
2001 216 5.35
2002 226 5.59
2003 247 6.11
2004 276 6.83
2005 297 7.35
2006 307 7.60
2007 309 7.65
2008 308 7.62
2009 308 7.62
2010 308 7.62
2011 307 7.60
Total 4,041 100.00
Panel B: Period breakdown
Pre-AR 1,374 34.00
Post-AR 2,667 66.00
Total 4,041 100.00
Panel C: Industry breakdown
Basic Materials (1000) 482 11.93
Industrials (2000) 949 23.48
Consumer Goods (3000) 1,036 25.64
Household and Home Construction (3720) 402 9.95
Health Care (4000) 202 5.00
Consumer Services (5000) 633 15.66
Other 337 8.34
Total 4,041 100.00
Note:
Other includes Communications(6000), Technology (9000), and
Utility Sectors(7000). The industrial grouping is based on Inter-
national Classification Benchmark (ICB).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Pre-AR (N=1,374) Post-AR (N=2,667)
Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75% Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75%
|DAC| 0.070 0.066 0.024 0.051 0.094 0.069 0.066 0.023 0.048 0.092
SIZE 14.865 1.308 13.917 14.709 15.703 14.977 1.323 13.998 14.754 15.739
LEV 0.565 0.563 0.325 0.509 0.691 0.413 0.250 0.232 0.412 0.568
EQ 0.112 0.316 0 0 0 0.065 0.247 0 0 0
AUD 0.560 0.497 0 1 1 0.581 0.493 0 1 1
BSIZE 12 4 9 11 14 11 3 9 10 12
DUAL 0.199 0.399 0 0 0 0.209 0.407 0 0 0
BLOCK 0.557 0.165 0.458 0.569 0.673 0.582 0.180 0.469 0.603 0.708
Note:
Variable definitions are as follows: DAC is discretionary accruals computed from the MJ model with lagged ROA. SIZE is
the logarithm of total assets. LEV is total debt scaled by total assets. EQ is a dummy variable for equity financing (1=
sample in the period of one-year pre-IPO and IPO or stock issuance more than 10%, 0 = otherwise). AUD is a dummy
variable (1 = the firm’s auditor is big-4 auditor, 0 = otherwise). BSIZE is the number of directors on the board. DUAL
is a dummy variable for duality (1 = the firm with CEO holding the position of chairman on the board, 0 = otherwise).
BLOCK is the summary percentage on share holdings in equal to or in excess of 5%. All variables are winsorized at 1% to
control for outliers.
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Table 2.3: Correlation table
|DAC| IFRS CRISIS CG SIZE LEV EQ AUD BSIZE DUAL BLOCK
|DAC| −0.020 0.041 −0.038 −0.026 0.103 0.061 0.016 −0.120 0.022 0.012
(0.208) (0.009) (0.016) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.298) (0.000) (0.171) (0.434)
IFRS −0.012 −0.386 0.563 0.036 −0.188 −0.081 0.020 −0.124 0.012 0.078
(0.461) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.214) (0.000) (0.449) (0.000)
CRISIS 0.020 −0.386 −0.217 0.023 0.155 −0.001 −0.018 0.034 −0.012 −0.031
(0.194) (0.000) (0.000) (0.147) (0.000) (0.933) (0.252) (0.031) (0.436) (0.047)
CG −0.030 0.563 −0.217 0.067 −0.121 −0.149 −0.039 −0.099 −0.008 0.064
(0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.613) (0.000)
SIZE −0.028 0.040 0.020 0.069 0.304 0.052 0.345 0.174 −0.035 −0.076
(0.074) (0.011) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)
LEV 0.194 −0.184 0.104 −0.121 0.132 0.061 0.073 −0.066 0.045 −0.133
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
EQ 0.093 −0.081 −0.001 −0.149 0.051 0.022 0.009 −0.002 −0.010 −0.041
(0.000) (0.000) (0.933) (0.000) (0.011) (0.159) (0.579) (0.915) (0.533) (0.009)
AUD 0.016 0.020 −0.018 −0.039 0.354 0.030 0.009 0.102 −0.135 0.087
(0.306) (0.214) (0.252) (0.013) (0.000) (0.055) (0.579) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BSIZE −0.123 −0.144 0.050 −0.112 0.192 −0.080 0.018 0.085 −0.183 −0.073
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DUAL 0.026 0.012 −0.012 −0.008 −0.063 0.066 −0.010 −0.135 −0.164 0.062
(0.093) (0.449) (0.436) (0.613) (0.000) (0.000) (0.533) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BLOCK −0.017 0.068 −0.027 0.061 −0.068 −0.080 −0.043 0.089 −0.049 0.052
(0.287) (0.000) (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Note:
The Spearman correlations are presented above the diagonal and Pearson below the diagonal. Variable definitions are as follows: IFRS
is a dummy variable (1 = sample in the IFRS period, 0 = otherwise). CRISIS is a dummy variable ( 1 = sample in the crisis period
(1997-1998), 0 = otherwise). CG is a dummy variable (1 = sample in the CG period (2006-2011), 0 = otherwise). Other variables are
defined in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of discretionary accruals (DAC) - Overall sample
Pre-AR Post-AR
N Median N Median z-stat p-value
Panel A: Overall sample
Overall Sample 1,374 0.051 2,667 0.048 1.26 0.104
Basic Materials 144 0.057 338 0.059 −2.15∗∗ 0.016
Industrials 316 0.052 633 0.047 2.03∗∗ 0.021
Consumer Goods 400 0.052 636 0.039 4.48∗∗∗ 0.000
Household and Home Construction 142 0.069 260 0.070 0.78 0.218
Health Care 71 0.025 131 0.025 −0.50 0.310
Consumer Services 200 0.047 433 0.050 −0.62 0.268
Other 101 0.051 236 0.073 −2.93∗∗∗ 0.002
Panel B: Excluding sample in the adjusting period
Overall Sample 1,148 0.051 1,540 0.047 1.66∗∗ 0.048
Basic Materials 124 0.056 205 0.071 −2.83∗∗∗ 0.002
Industrials 261 0.053 364 0.043 3.13∗∗∗ 0.002
Consumer Goods 337 0.055 360 0.037 5.05∗∗∗ 0.000
Household and Home Construction 119 0.064 150 0.059 0.77 0.220
Health Care 59 0.023 75 0.020 0.06 0.478
Consumer Services 163 0.045 245 0.048 −0.93 0.176
Other 85 0.048 141 0.079 −3.58∗ 0.000
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U test. DAC is discretionary
accruals computed from the MJ model with lagged ROA to control for firm’s perfor-
mance (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005). ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 2.5: Comparison of discretionary accruals (DAC) - Constant sample
Pre-AR Post-AR
N Median N Median z-stat p-value
Panel A: Sample with data in both periods
Overall Sample 1,374 0.051 2,030 0.045 2.99∗∗∗ 0.001
Basic Materials 144 0.057 180 0.058 −1.69∗∗ 0.045
Industrials 316 0.052 495 0.047 2.20∗∗ 0.014
Consumer Goods 400 0.052 567 0.039 4.41∗∗∗ 0.000
Household and Home Construction 142 0.069 207 0.068 1.06 0.145
Health Care 71 0.025 108 0.022 0.03 0.487
Consumer Services 200 0.047 333 0.046 0.33 0.370
Other 101 0.051 140 0.061 −1.59∗ 0.056
Panel B: Excluding sample in the adjusting period
Overall Sample 1,148 0.051 1,126 0.043 3.33∗∗∗ 0.000
Basic Materials 124 0.056 100 0.066 −2.23∗∗ 0.013
Industrials 261 0.053 275 0.039 3.45∗∗∗ 0.000
Consumer Goods 337 0.055 315 0.036 4.97∗∗∗ 0.000
Household and Home Construction 119 0.064 115 0.055 1.09 0.137
Health Care 59 0.023 60 0.020 0.58 0.281
Consumer Services 163 0.045 185 0.048 −0.56 0.288
Other 85 0.048 76 0.064 −2.45∗∗∗ 0.007
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U test. DAC is discretionary
accruals computed from the MJ model with lagged ROA to control for firm’s perfor-
mance (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005). ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 2.6: Regression analysis of discretionary accruals
|DAC| PosDAC |NegDAC|
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Panel A: Overall sample
IFRS 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.23 −0.00 −0.00
CG 0.00 0.42 −0.00 −0.46 −0.00 −0.17
CRISIS 0.01 0.71 −0.01 −0.47 −0.00 −0.19
SIZE −0.00∗∗∗ −4.81 −0.00∗∗∗ −2.61 −0.01∗∗∗ −5.04
LEV 0.02∗∗∗ 8.66 0.04∗∗∗ 7.08 0.02∗∗∗ 6.31
EQ 0.02∗∗∗ 5.75 0.03∗∗∗ 6.11 0.00 0.70
AUD 0.00 1.51 0.00 1.09 0.00 0.78
BSIZE −0.00∗∗∗ −4.24 −0.00∗∗∗ −3.70 −0.00∗ −1.82
DUAL 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.50 −0.00 −0.54
BLOCK −0.01∗ −1.94 −0.01 −0.72 −0.01∗∗ −2.00
Constant 0.16∗∗∗ 10.72 0.14∗∗∗ 6.17 0.18∗∗∗ 9.59
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 4,041 1,944 2,097
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.09 0.08
F-test F-stat.(P-Value) F-stat.(P-Value) F-stat.(P-Value)
AUD+BSIZE 0.67(0.413) 0.25(0.614) 0.23(0.628)
AUD+BSIZE+BLOCK 2.50(0.114) 0.26(0.610) 3.09(0.079)
Panel B: Robust standard errors for within industry correlation
IFRS 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.17 −0.00 −0.00
CG 0.00 0.25 −0.00 −0.52 −0.00 −0.13
CRISIS 0.01 0.35 −0.01 −0.25 −0.00 −0.15
SIZE −0.00∗∗ −3.65 −0.00 −1.27 −0.01∗∗∗ −9.18
LEV 0.02∗∗∗ 14.26 0.04∗∗∗ 7.40 0.02∗∗∗ 6.66
EQ 0.02∗∗ 2.82 0.03∗∗ 2.75 0.00 0.81
AUD 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.44
BSIZE −0.00∗∗∗ −6.31 −0.00∗∗ −3.12 −0.00 −1.05
DUAL 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.37 −0.00 −0.34
BLOCK −0.01∗∗ −2.96 −0.01 −1.22 −0.01 −1.55
Constant 0.16∗∗∗ 5.69 0.14∗∗ 3.43 0.18∗∗∗ 7.96
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 4,041 1,944 2,097
R2 0.09 0.11 0.10
F-test F-stat.(P-Value) F-stat.(P-Value) F-stat.(P-Value)
AUD+BSIZE 0.18(0.682) 0.10(0.767) 0.08(0.781)
AUD+BSIZE+BLOCK 3.58(0.107) 0.24(0.642) 2.82(0.144)
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression model:
|DAC |it = β0 + β1IFRSit + β2CGit + β3CRISISit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6EQit + β7AUDit
+β8BSIZEit + β9DUAL+ β10BLOCKit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummyυit.
DAC is computed from the MJ model with lagged ROA to control for firm’s performance
(Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005). PosDAC is positive discretionary
accruals. NegDAC is negative discretionary accruals. IFRS is a dummy variable (1 = sample
in the IFRS period, 0 = otherwise). CG is a dummy variable (1 = sample in the corporate
governance period (2007-2011), 0 = otherwise). CRISIS is a dummy variable ( 1 = sample in
the crisis period (1997-1998), 0 = otherwise). Other variables are defined in Table 2.2. ∗, ∗∗ ,
∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Regression analysis of discretionary accruals - Constant sample
|DAC| PosDAC |NegDAC|
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Panel A: Constant sample
IFRS −0.01 −1.19 −0.01 −1.11 −0.00 −0.06
CG 0.01∗ 1.68 0.01 1.43 −0.02∗∗ −2.24
CRISIS 0.00 0.56 −0.00 −0.13 −0.00 −0.13
SIZE −0.00∗∗∗ −4.32 −0.00∗∗∗ −2.62 −0.01∗∗∗ −4.33
LEV 0.02∗∗∗ 8.61 0.04∗∗∗ 7.07 0.02∗∗∗ 6.36
EQ 0.02∗∗∗ 4.01 0.02∗∗∗ 3.84 0.01 1.09
AUD 0.00∗ 1.65 0.01∗ 1.73 0.00 0.47
BSIZE −0.00∗∗∗ −3.70 −0.00∗∗∗ −3.25 −0.00∗∗ −1.59
DUAL 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.96 −0.00 −0.49
BLOCK −0.01 −1.61 −0.00 −0.17 −0.01∗ −1.84
Constant 0.15∗∗∗ 9.81 0.14∗∗∗ 5.73 0.17∗∗∗ 8.58
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 3,404 1,597 1,807
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.09 0.09
F-test F-stat.(P-Value) F-stat.(P-Value) F-stat.(P-Value)
AUD+BSIZE 1.14(0.285) 1.48(0.224) 0.05(0.826)
AUD+BSIZE+BLOCK 1.37(0.242) 0.08(0.784) 2.96(0.086)
Panel B: Robust standard errors for within industry correlation
IFRS −0.01 −0.57 −0.01 −0.68 −0.00 −0.06
CG 0.01 1.09 0.01 1.90 −0.02 −1.57
CRISIS 0.00 0.28 −0.00 −0.07 −0.00 −0.11
SIZE −0.00∗∗ −3.31 −0.00 −1.42 −0.01∗∗∗ −4.67
LEV 0.02∗∗∗ 19.69 0.04∗∗∗ 7.28 0.02∗∗∗ 7.89
EQ 0.02∗∗ 3.09 0.02∗∗ 3.46 0.01 0.99
AUD 0.00 0.68 0.01 1.34 0.00 0.19
BSIZE −0.00∗∗∗ −4.69 −0.00∗∗ −2.69 −0.00 −0.88
DUAL 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.62 −0.00 −0.28
BLOCK −0.01 −1.90 −0.00 −0.23 −0.01 −1.37
Constant 0.15∗∗∗ 4.77 0.14∗∗ 3.21 0.17∗∗∗ 6.17
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 3,404 1,597 1,807
R2 0.09 0.11 0.10
F-test F-stat.(P-Value) F-stat.(P-Value) F-stat.(P-Value)
AUD+BSIZE 0.20(0.668) 0.79(0.408) 0.01(0.927)
AUD+BSIZE+BLOCK 1.29(0.299) 0.08(0.788) 2.00(0.207)
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression model as presented in
Table 2.6.
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The effect of IFRS on income smoothing in Asia
3.1 Introduction
This study investigates the impact of IFRS adoption/convergence on the income
smoothing behaviour of firms in Asian countries. Researchers have been studying
income smoothing for years but focused on accounting income smoothing. Though
management can smooth income using accrual or real activity manipulation or both,
the extent to which they employ real activity manipulation to smooth earnings has
been little investigated. Recently, Roychowdhury (2006) has developed models to
investigate real earnings management. Hence, together with accrual models that
are widely used to study accrual-based earnings management (Jones, 1991; Dechow
et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005), it is possible to fill the gap in the literature by
investigating income smoothing and both accounting and real earnings management.
IASC/IASB has been eliminating some accounting choices and rules with pre-
cise thresholds from IAS/IFRS for years. The improved standards may impose on
management a constraint in the use of accounting choices for opportunistic earnings
management (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001). Therefore compliance with IFRS possi-
bly contributes to a decline in accounting earnings management. IFRS also employ
a fair-value concept to create a true and fair presentation of accounting informa-
tion. Ball (2006) points out that IFRS may lead to more volatility of earnings (less
income smoothing) which improves the quality of reported earnings because earn-
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ings may timely report new information of gains and losses; the author, however,
also adds that earnings might be contaminated with managerial manipulation since
IFRS allow financial models for fair-value calculation.
Many incentives to smooth income have been documented. For instance, in-
vestors perceive firms with smooth income as less risky (Graham et al., 2005), reward
them with lower financial costs (Francis et al., 2004), and prefer smoother earnings
because the number can be used to predict future earnings easier (Ball, 2006). As
with many incentives, management may turn to other non-accounting manipulation
after IFRS adoption. Studies have reported switching between accounting and non-
accounting methods to manage the earnings in western countries after accounting
principles have been restricted (Tan and Jamal, 2006; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011).
We use the variance of change in net income as a proxy for income smoothing
(Lang et al., 2003, 2006; Barth et al., 2008). Our method is different from the
prior studies in that we employ a firm-level variance while they employ group-
level variance. Based on a firm-level variance, we can use a multivariate test to
control for related factors in testing the effect of IFRS. We measure accounting
manipulation based on discretionary accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995;
Kothari et al., 2005) and measure real manipulation based on abnormal cash flow,
abnormal production cost, and abnormal expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006). Our
sample consists of firms from four Asian countries that adopted/converged IFRS
around 2005-2007. Accounting data are collected five years prior to and post IFRS
adoption year, yielding a 10-year data sample span. To increase the power of the
tests, we group our sample into quartiles based on the smoothness of earnings from
the pre-IFRS period, assuming that the difference in smoothness degrees results
from the different degrees of managerial incentives. Dividing the sample into sub-
groups makes it possible to find a relation between accounting and real earnings
management in relation to the level of income smoothing after IFRS adoption of
each group.
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From the univariate and multivariate tests we find that Asian firms with a high
level of income smoothing have a significant decline in income smoothing (earnings
volatility increases) which is consistent with prior findings (Hung and Subramanyam,
2007; Barth et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2011). In addition, firms in these groups exhibit
a decrease in discretionary accruals and some evidence of an increase in the use
of real activity methods, especially overproduction. We also find that firms with
a lower level of income smoothing appear to use no real activity earnings manage-
ment, though they experience a decline in income smoothing. The findings suggest
that firms with greater income-smoothing incentives are more likely to turn to real
activity in the post-IFRS period after the accounting principles have been restricted.
In addition, we find that IFRS have different effects on firms with a low level
of income smoothing and assumed to have conservative accounting practices. They
exhibit an increase in income smoothing and discretionary accruals and are unlikely
to engage in real activity manipulation. We conjecture that IFRS may shift their
accounting practices from conservative to less conservative practices, which results
in more true and fair views of reported earnings.
Taking into account the effect of legal enforcement, we also find some evidence
that strong legal enforcement leads to a stronger effect of IFRS, which supports
the findings of Daske et al. (2008) and Landsman et al. (2012). However, we find
no evidence that it leads to a greater prevalence of real earnings management in
the post-IFRS period, as found by Ipino and Parbonetti (2011). From our tests,
strong income-smoothing incentives seem to be related to an increase in real activity
manipulation.
Finally, compliance with IFRS may lead to a statistical improvement of account-
ing quality but may not be economically significant because in the post-IFRS period
firms in a high level of income smoothing group still show a higher level of income
smoothing in relation to those in a low income smoothing group. The findings have
raised the question as to whether the accounting quality of firms in this region is
comparable in the post-IFRS period.
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related litera-
ture and discusses the research questions. Section 3.3 discusses the research method
including variable measuring and sample selection. Section 3.4 reports the empirical
results, and section 3.5 summarises and concludes.
3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Income smoothing, accounting and real earnings management
Eckel (1981) points out that there are two types of income smoothing: natural
and intentional smoothing. The former results from the accrual basis of accounting
process while the latter is engaged by corporate management for self-interest. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, income smoothing is related to both increasing and decreasing
earnings. Using solely discretionary accruals seems to fulfil a managerial require-
ment to smooth income for both goals. For example, management can over-estimate
a provision for warranty to reduce earnings during a good time or under-estimate
an allowance for doubtful accounts receivable to amplify earnings during a difficult
time.
Many studies have reported the use of accounting methods to smooth income,
such as in the banking industry (see for example, Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Sood
and Abou, 2012). Apart from the banking industry, Chaney et al. (1998) find that
firms listed on the New York stock exchanges use discretionary accruals to smooth
income. Beattie et al. (1994) report that UK firms unfairly classify extraordinary
items to smooth net income before extraordinary items. Peek (2004) reports that
Dutch companies use accrual estimation to smoothing earnings. Leuz et al. (2003)
also studied the effect of institutional factors on accrual-based income smoothing
in many countries. Literature has paid little attention to the use of real activity
manipulation to smooth income. To the best our knowledge, few have studied real
activity income smoothing. For instance, Nagy and Neal (2001) find that Japanese
firms listed on the US stock exchanges alter their R&D to a greater extent than
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their peer US firms do to smooth income. Consistently, Mande et al. (2000) find
that listed Japanese firms adjust R&D to smooth income and do even more in
expansion years. While accruals can be used to both inflate and deflate earnings, real
earnings manipulation seems to be the income-increasing strategy of management
during times of difficulty (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006). Walker (2013)
points out the findings of Graham et al. (2005) calling for more studies about real
activity earnings management and income smoothing.
Accounting profession and financial statement users seem to perceive income
smoothing differently. On the one hand, intentionally smoothing out fluctuating
earnings is considered undesirable by regulators (Levitt, 1998) because such smooth-
ness may misrepresent firm’s underlying economic performance. On the other hand,
investors seem to prefer smooth income for many reasons. For instance, Graham
et al. (2005) find that management believe that investors perceive firms with smooth
income as less risky in comparison to those with variable income. Francis et al.
(2004) find that investors reward such firms with lower costs of capital. Ball (2006)
points out that smooth income is preferable for earnings prediction. With its big in-
centives, income smoothing is generally considered to be common business practice
worldwide.
3.2.2 International Financial Reporting Standards and earnings man-
agement
As discussed in Chapter 1, a large body of research has investigated the effect of
IFRS on earnings management in many countries. While a number of previous stud-
ies focus on accrual earnings management after the IFRS adoption (Van Tendeloo
and Vanstraelen, 2005; Callao and Jarne, 2010; Zéghal et al., 2011; Houqe et al.,
2012), some test income smoothing. For instance, Barth et al. (2008) by comparing
earnings variation of firms worldwide – between the pre- and post-IAS periods and
between IAS firms and non-IAS firms, report that income smoothing declines after
voluntary IAS adoption. Consistently, Liu et al. (2011), by using the same methods
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with those of Barth et al. (2008), report a significant decline in income smoothing
in China. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) report an increase in income variability
of German firms after voluntary IAS adoption. In contrast, adopting IFRS in Eu-
rope shows different consequences. Chen et al. (2010) find an increase in income
smoothing of European firms after compliance with IFRS. Ahmed et al. (2013) re-
port a rise in income smoothing worldwide by comparing firms in IFRS adopting
countries and those in non-IFRS countries. Capkun et al. (2013) find an increase
in income smoothing for both voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters worldwide.
However, smoothing methods have been little investigated. Note that the majority
of these prior studies estimated a group variance of net income as a proxy for income
smoothing. So they could only employ a univariate test in order to investigate the
effect of IFRS.
Though accounting standards adopted by firms are considered of high quality,
other incentives also play an important role in determining the quality of account-
ing information (Ball et al., 2003). So if the income-smoothing incentives discussed
earlier still remain, management may use real activity manipulation to smooth in-
come instead. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) theoretically propose that restricting
accounting standards may lead to the use of real manipulation. Empirical evidence
has also been documented. For instance, Tan and Jamal (2006), based on results
from their experimental study, report that tightening accounting allowances leads
to a drop in accrual manipulation but a manager who has a clear picture of a firm’s
future earnings is still able to engage in real activity manipulation to smooth earn-
ings. Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) investigating both discretionary accruals and real
activity manipulation, find that adopting IFRS leads to an increase in overall real
manipulation, especially for firms in strong legal enforcement countries.
Given that management can employ both accrual and real activity manipula-
tion and if IFRS may directly affect accounting choices and allowances, a decline
in income smoothing after the adoption found in some prior research may be possi-
bly explained as follows (not mutually exclusive): 1) accrual manipulation decreases
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while real manipulation remains, or 2) the magnitude of decrease in accrual manipu-
lation is more than the degree of real earnings management increases. Nevertheless,
the relation between income smoothing and the methods used to reduce earnings
volatility around the IFRS adoption period has been less documented.
3.2.3 Institutional factors and income smoothing in Asian context
Leuz et al. (2003) investigate income smoothing and accrual quality in many coun-
tries and report that Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia – classified as the coun-
tries with a low level of ownership concentration, extensive outsider rights, high
disclosure, and strong legal enforcement – have a relatively low level of earnings
management. However, considering the median values of ownership concentration
of these countries presented in Leuz et al. (2003), we can find that the ownership
concentration of these three countries (between 52%-54%) is relatively high in com-
parison to those of the US, UK, Australia, and Canada (between 12%-28%). In
addition, Jaggi and Leung (2007) consider Hong Kong business ownership structure
as family concentrated. Chinese listed companies also have high ownership concen-
tration. Based on the study of Firth et al. (2007), the six-year average (1998-2003)
percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder was around 44%. In terms
of legality, while Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia have common-law influenced
legal systems, the legal system of China is based on the code law system. According
to the Rule of Law, China has a relatively low legal enforcement in comparison to
those of the other three.10 Singapore has the highest score, followed by Hong Kong
and Malaysia. Gassen et al. (2006) report that firms in common law countries have
a lower level of income smoothing compared to those in code law countries.
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia were British colonies for decades, hence
their local accounting standards were influenced by the British standards. Gray et al.
(1984) based on the international survey report that Hong Kong accounting practices
were strongly British influenced and those of Malaysia were very strongly British
10The scores of Rule of Law are presented in appendix B.
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influenced. Singaporean accounting standards were also strongly British influenced
(Ball et al., 2003). Hong Kong has adopted IFRS since 2005 but Singapore and
Malaysia have not fully adopted IFRS.11 Malaysia and Singapore, however, have
been converging their standards for years to align with IFRS. As at January 2006,
there were around 39 converged standards being effected for Malaysian firms to
comply with (Muniandy and Ali, 2012). Singapore has adopted around 37 IFRS-
based accounting standards since 2005.12 Chinese accounting practices once had
the purposes of macro-economic planning based on the Soviet system and many
attempts before accounting reform in 2007 to modernise accounting practices were
unsuccessful (Ding and Su, 2008). China has adopted IFRS since 2007.
Some studies have reported on income smoothing in the Asian region. For ex-
ample, Shen and Chih (2007) by investigating many emerging Asian countries such
as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, find that large firms in these countries are
likely to smooth income. Ashari et al. (1994) investigating companies listed on the
Stock Exchanges of Singapore (including Singaporean and Malaysian firms) report
that companies in high-risk industries, such as hotels and properties, and companies
in Malaysia are prone to smooth income. The authors suggest that nationality is a
significant factor to explain income smoothing behaviour between the two countries.
Their findings suggest that country-level institutional factors play an important role
in determining accounting quality. In the US market, there has also been evidence
about the effect of industry on firm’s income smoothing behaviour (Albrecht and
Richardson, 1990).
This study extends prior research investigating the effect of IFRS on income
smoothing in China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. It is different to prior
research in many ways. First, we study both accounting and real activity manip-
ulation in relation to the magnitude of income smoothing to find the connection
between income smoothing and the manipulating methods that management may
11www.ifrs.org
12www.iasplus.com
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use. We test income smoothing, linking methods used around the period of IFRS
adoption. Second, while prior literature employs group-level income smoothing, we
employ firm-level income smoothing. Third, we focus on income smoothing of Asian
firms that have different business specifics in relation to those of western countries,
such as ownership structure. The research questions are as follows:
1. Does income smoothing of Asian firms decline after the adoption of IFRS?
2. Given the level of income smoothing, to what extent does accounting and real
activity manipulation change around the period of IFRS adoption?
3.3 Research design and sample selection
3.3.1 Measuring income smoothing
Proxies for income smoothing have been constructed in a variety of concepts. For
instance, they include the ratio of coefficient of variation of net income (standard
deviation divided by mean value) to the coefficient of variation of revenues (Eckel,
1981) and the ratio of standard deviation of operating earnings to standard deviation
of operating cash flow (Leuz et al., 2003). Lang et al. (2003, 2006); Barth et al.
(2008), in order to control for economic activities that may partly influence the
smoothness of earnings, use the variance of residuals from a regression model of
change in net income on control variables as an income smoothing proxy. Their
regression model is as follows:
∆NI it/TAit = α0 + α1SIZE it + α2GROWTH it + α3EISSUE it
+ α4LEV it + α5DISSUE it + α6(REV it/TAit)
+ α7(CFOit/TAit) + υit, (3.1)
where, NI is net income; TA is total assets; SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets;
GROWTH is percent changes in revenues; EISSUE is percent changes in common
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stock; LEV is total debt divided by total assets; DISSUE is change in total liabilities;
REV is revenues; CFO is operating cash flow; υ is a residual representing change in
net income after economic activities have been controlled. To test income smoothing
of firms between the pre- and post-IAS periods, Barth et al. (2008) estimated the
model pooling samples from both the pre- and post-IAS periods to obtain firms’
respective residuals. After that, they employed the F-test of equality of variances to
test the variances of the residuals (i.e. the variance of net income after controlling
for economic activities) between groups of firms in the pre- and post-IAS periods.
Another proxy is earnings variability computed from the standard deviation of
net income before extraordinary items (STDNI) scaled by total assets (Dechow and
Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004). Based on these proxies, a high value of proxy
indicates a low level of income smoothing.
The measures that require referencing figures such as revenues (Eckel, 1981) and
operating cash flow (Leuz et al., 2003) imply that such figures are clean of manage-
rial manipulation. Nevertheless, these figures can also be manipulated. Revenues
may be contaminated if a company intentionally recognises premature revenues or
manipulates revenues by real activity methods. If a company cuts down expenses,
such as advertising or development expenses, cash flow is also affected. Rountree
et al. (2008) report that it is more likely that management manipulate cash flow
rather than earnings since a high level of cash flow volatility leads to a lower firm
value. So using these figures as benchmarks to construct income smoothing proxies
may bias the analysis.
To reduce the effect of economic activities on earnings smoothness, we follow
Lang et al. (2003, 2006) by employing the variance of residuals from the regression
model (equation 3.1) as a proxy of income smoothing – Var(υ). We conduct a cross-
sectional regression by country and year to obtain residuals. As discussed earlier,
smoothing income is considered a long-term activity, so we calculate Var(υ) at firm
level for the five-year pre- and post-IFRS adoption year yielding two values of the
variances (VARNI) for each firm. Our study is different from prior studies (Lang
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et al., 2003, 2006; Barth et al., 2008) in that they employ the group-level variance.
Our method permits us to use a multivariate test to control for firm-level related
factors.
3.3.2 Measuring accounting and real earnings management
We use an accrual model to compute discretionary accruals (DAC) for accounting
manipulation (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). The assumption of the model is
that accruals that cannot be explained by PPE and revenues represent accounting
manipulation because these accounts are assumed to be less contaminated by man-
agerial discretion. Following Kothari et al. (2005), we control for the effect of firms’
performance on the specification and power of the model as follows:
TAC it/TAit−1 = β0 + β1(∆REV it −∆ARit)/TAit−1) + β2(PPE it/TAit−1)
+ β3(ROAit−1) + εit, (3.2)
where, TAC is total accruals calculated from the difference between net income and
operating cash flow; TA is total assets; REV is revenues; AR is accounts receivable;
PPE is net property, plant and equipment; ROA is return on assets; ε is a residual
representing DAC. Consistent with the income smoothing proxy, we conduct a cross-
sectional regression by country and year to obtain DAC.
For real earnings manipulation, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) who hypothe-
sises that if a company boosts its sales by offering extra discounts/credit terms and
cutting discretionary expenses such as R&D, it will show an abnormally low operat-
ing cash flow and expenses, respectively. In addition, he also hypothesises that if a
company overly produces goods to lower average fixed cost per unit, it will show an
abnormally high cost of production. Roychowdhury (2006) constructs the models
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to detect these abnormal accounts as follows:
CFOit/TAit−1 = α0 + α1(REV it/TAit−1) + α2(∆REV it/TAit−1) + it, (3.3)
DISEXP it/TAit−1 = β0 + β1(REV it−1/TAit−1) + υit, (3.4)
PRODit/TAt−1 = δ0 + δ1(REV it/TAit−1) + δ2(∆REV it/TAit−1)
+ δ3(∆REV it−1/TAit−1) + εit, (3.5)
where, PROD is production cost (cost of goods sold + changes in inventory); DIS-
EXP is discretionary expenses;  represents abnormal operating cash flow (AbCFO);
υ represents abnormal discretionary expenses (AbEXP); ε represents abnormal pro-
duction cost (AbPROD). Abnormally low values of  and υ are assumed to represent
real activity manipulation by sale boosting and discretionary expenses cutting, re-
spectively. On the other hand, abnormally high value of ε is assumed to represent
over-producing. We multiply AbCFO and AbEXP by -1(minus one) to make the
three proxies consistent for interpretation – a high value indicates a high level of
real earnings management. We conduct a cross-sectional regression by country and
year to obtain AbCFO, AbEXP and AbPROD. Because of the unavailability of data
(Asian firms are less likely to disclose their R&D expenses) we use total selling and
administrative expenses excluding depreciation for equation 3.4.
To test the effect of IFRS on income smoothing and EMC, we use a univariate test
comparing income smoothing, and real and accounting earnings management. We
additionally employ a regression model to control for related factors including firm
size (Key, 1997; Shen and Chih, 2007), debt (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney,
1994), industry (Albrecht and Richardson, 1990; Ashari et al., 1994). Since VARNI
has a different scale (one value out of five years) in comparison to other variables
(e.g. five data sets for board size in each period), we use a five-year average value for
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controlling variables for an analysis. The regression model for the tests is as follows:
VARNI it = β0 + β1IFRS it + β2SIZE it + β3LEV it
+ Industry_dummy + it, (3.6)
where, IFRS is a dummy variable (1 = sample in IFRS period, 0 = otherwise);
SIZE is a five-year average logarithm of total assets; LEV is a five-year average
firm leverage. We expect a significantly positive coefficient on IFRS variable for an
increase in earnings variability (less income smoothing). We also include industry-
fixed effects to control for industry-specific accounting practices.
To test the effect of IFRS on accounting (DAC) and real earnings manipulation
(AbCFO, AbPROD, and AbEXP) we use a regression model as follows:
DEP it = β0 + β1IFRS it + β2SIZE it + β3LEV it
+ Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + εit, (3.7)
where, DEP represents the various earnings management proxies including discre-
tionary accruals (DAC), abnormal operating cash flow (AbCFO), abnormal pro-
duction cost (AbPROD), and abnormal expenses (AbEXP); SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets; LEV is firm leverage.
3.3.3 Sample and descriptive statistics
Our sample comprises firms from Asian countries that have adopted/converged to
IFRS including China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. We select a sam-
ple with accounting data covering five years before and after the adopting years
(two-year lagged data is also required for proxy computing). Firms in the financial
industry, oil and gas industries, and utilities are excluded because of the differences
in business nature and accounting standards used. The final sample consists of 1,135
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firms from six industries (11,350 firm-year observations) for the fiscal years between
2000 and 2012 (inclusive) as presented in Table 3.1.
[Table 3.1 about here]
The descriptive statistics of related variables are presented in Table 3.2. The statis-
tics are separated into the pre-and post-IFRS periods to gain an initial idea of the
variables.
[Table 3.2 about here]
VARNI exhibits an increase in the post-IFRS adoption period from the mean (me-
dian) value of 0.037 (0.004) to 0.048 (0.010). While mean DAC displays a little
change from -0.000 to -0.001, median DAC decreases from 0.003 to -0.002. Although
these statistics do not control for other factors, they suggest the positive effect of
IFRS since, in the post-IFRS period, firms seem to have lower levels of income
smoothing (an increase in variance of net income) and discretionary accruals. Un-
expectedly, real activity manipulations decline or show no changes. AbCFO shows
no significant changes between periods for both mean and median values. Mean
AbPROD slightly declines from 0.000 to -0.0003 while the median value shows no
changes. Mean (median) AbEXP decreases from 0.004 (0.024) to -0.002 (0.020).
Considering the median values, many interested variables are relatively skewed in
both periods. For example, VARNI is positively skewed while AbPROD, and Ab-
EXP are negatively skewed. Firms show some growth, larger in the post-IFRS
period (based on logarithm of total assets), while firm leverage displays no change
– the mean (median) value of total debt to total assets is around 46% (45%).
3.4 Empirical results and discussion
To increase the power to detect changes between periods and relationships between
income smoothing and manipulation methods, we classify our sample into quartiles
based on the level earnings smoothness (VARNI) of the pre-IFRS period. Quartile 1
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represents the sample with a high level of income smoothing while quartile 4 repre-
sents the sample with a low level of income smoothing. We assume that firms in each
quartile also represent different incentives for opportunistic earnings management;
quartile 1 has stronger earnings management incentives relative to quartile 4. We
also assume that quartile 4 represents firms with conservative accounting practices.
3.4.1 Univariate tests
We employ the Mann-Whitney U test to examine the difference of income smoothing
(VARNI), accrual (DAC) and real earnings management (AbCFO, AbPROD, and
AbEXP) between the pre- and post-IFRS periods. The results are presented in
Table 3.3 as follows:
[Table 3.3 about here]
From Table 3.3, the first three quartiles show a significant decline in income smooth-
ing (an increase in VARNI) all at the 1% level in the post-IFRS period. Consistent
with the findings of prior studies (Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 2008;
Liu et al., 2011), the results suggest that IFRS may contribute to a significant de-
cline in the income smoothing of Asian firms. Quartile 4 shows a significant increase
in income smoothing at the 1% level. The increase in income smoothing of this quar-
tile, however, may not be problematic since the level of earnings smoothing of this
group is still low in comparison to those of the first three quartiles. Specifically, the
median values of VARNI in the post-IFRS period are 0.003, 0.009, and 0.012 for
the first three quartiles, respectively, while the value is 0.027 for the fourth quartile.
There may be a statistical improvement in the income smoothing of firms in the
quartiles with a high level of income smoothing but it may not be economically
significant, given the level of earnings smoothness of quartile 4.
For accrual manipulation, the first three quartiles show a significant decline in
DAC at the 1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Conversely, the last quartile shows a
significant increase in DAC at the 1% level. For real activity earnings manipulation,
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quartile 1 shows a significant increase in AbPROD at the 1% level and quartile 2
shows a significant increase in AbCFO and AbPROD both at the 5% level. While
firms in the third and fourth quartiles are less likely to use real earnings management
except that the fourth quartile shows a significant increase in AbEXP at the 10%
level, and is less likely to adjust AbCFO and AbPROD.
From the analysis, IFRS plausibly constrain management to engage in accrual
income smoothing, especially firms with a high level of income smoothing. For firms
with a lower level of income smoothing, the effect of IFRS on earnings management
methods shows different directions. After IFRS adoption, firms with a low level
income smoothing tend to have a positive DAC and more income smoothing. We
conjecture that IFRS shift their conservative practices to be more neutral, resulting
in a true and fair presentation of earnings.
Given the strong income-smoothing incentives, firms, especially in the first two
quartiles, appear to engage in real earnings management including sales boosting
and overproducing in the post-IFRS period. The findings are consistent with those of
Tan and Jamal (2006) and Ipino and Parbonetti (2011), who find that management
use real manipulation when accounting methods have been restricted. The decrease
in income smoothing may result from the greater amount of accrual manipulation
decrease relative to that of real manipulation increase.
Roychowdhury (2006) mentions that a proxy for over-production may not be a
proper measure for non-manufacturing firms. We address the issue by recomput-
ing abnormal production cost (AbPROD2) excluding samples from health care and
consumer services sectors. The results are consistent with the findings found earlier,
though the increases are less profound (the z-statistics are lower).
It is worth noting that AbCFO and AbEXP appear to change in different direc-
tions – while the former increases, the latter decreases. Since discretionary expenses
also affect CFO, we cannot rule out a possible bias of AbCFO that may be affected
by an increase in discretionary expenses. In particular, assuming that a firm did not
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manipulate earnings via sales boosting, a big increase in expenses possibly leads to
an abnormally lower level of CFO.
To address country-level institutional factors (i.e. the legal enforcement level),
we conduct additional tests, regrouping the sample based on two criteria (i.e. the
levels of income smoothing and legal enforcement). Firstly, we group our sample
into high and low income smoothing groups. Then we separate each group into
strong and weak legal enforcement. Based on the Rule of Law score (presented in
Appendix B) we group China and Malaysia the scores of which are -0.42 and 0.52,
respectively, as a weak legal enforcement group (the score is eleven-year average
value). We group Hong Kong and Singapore the scores of which are 1.51 and 1.66,
respectively, as a strong legal enforcement group. The results from the analysis are
presented in Panel B of Table 3.3. For firms with a high level of income smoothing,
it appears that income smoothing significantly declines (VARNI increases) at the 1%
level for both strong and weak legal enforcement groups. DAC significantly decline
at the 10% and 1% levels for firms in strong and weak legal enforcement groups,
respectively. Real earnings management significantly increases in both strong and
weak legal enforcement groups. In particular, firms in a strong legal enforcement
group exhibit a significant increase in AbCFO at the 10% level and those in the weak
legal enforcement group have a significant increase in AbPROD at the 1% level. An
increase in AbPROD is still significant after non-manufacturing firms are excluded.
Firms are less likely to adjust expenses for earnings manipulation.
For firms with a low level of income smoothing, firms in a strong legal enforcement
group exhibit a significant decline in income smoothing at the 1% level, while those
in a weak legal group show an increase in income smoothing at the 5% level. Those
in a strong legal group, however, exhibit a significant increase in DAC at the 1%
level and show no evidence of using real activity earnings manipulation. Firms with
a low level of income smoothing in a weak legal enforcement group are less likely to
engage in real activity manipulation.
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The change in income smoothing shows more magnitude for firms in a strong
legal enforcement group in relation to those in weak group which is consistent with
the finding of Daske et al. (2008) and Landsman et al. (2012) that legal enforcement
plays an important role in the efficacy of IFRS. For example, the sample with a high
level income of smoothing in a strong legal enforcement group has a VARNI change
between periods of about 0.022 (0.024 minus 0.002) while those in a weak legal
enforcement group demonstrate a change of 0.003 (0.004 minus 0.001). However, we
find no evidence that a strong legal enforcement leads to a greater prevalence of real
earnings management in the post-IFRS period, as found by Ipino and Parbonetti
(2011). From our tests, it appears that stronger income-smoothing incentives seem
to be positively related to real activity manipulation. We exclude Malaysian firms
from the sample and additionally conduct the analysis. The results are presented in
Table 3.4. The results are more or less similar to those presented in Table 3.3.
As discussed earlier, Malaysia employed the convergence method for its stan-
dards, so the IFRS-period of Malaysia assigned by this study may lead to ambiguous
results from the analysis. We additionally conduct the univariate test based on the
sample but excluding Malaysian firms, the results of which are presented in Table
3.4. The main results from the analysis are more or less similar to those in Table
3.3.
We additionally test STDNI as another proxy of income smoothing. Accrual
and real manipulation are also regrouped on the basis of this proxy. Table 3.7
shows qualitatively similar results for income smoothing and discretionary accruals
for high level income smoothing groups. However, the effects of IFRS on AbCFO
and AbPROD are not significant though the directions of statistics are consistent
with the results in Table 3.3.
3.4.2 Multivariate tests
The results from the regression models for income smoothing and manipulating
methods are as follow:
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[Table 3.5 about here]
Table 3.5 presents the results from the regression analysis of IFRS on earnings man-
agement metrics controlling for firm size, debt, and industry- and year-fixed effects.
From Panel A of Table 3.5, quartile 1 shows a positive effect of IFRS on VARNI at
the 1% level. The coefficient on DAC is significantly negative at the 10% level. In ad-
dition, the coefficients on AbPROD and AbEXP are significantly positive at the 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. The findings are partly consistent with the findings from
the univariate tests discussed earlier, in that IFRS appear to be related to a decline
in income smoothing. In addition, firms with a high level of income smoothing in
the pre-IFRS periods show a decline in discretionary accruals and an increase in real
activity earnings manipulation including overproduction and cutting discretionary
expenses in the post-IFRS periods, suggesting that IFRS contribute to a decline in
discretionary accruals but lead to an increase in real activity manipulation of firms
with a high level of income smoothing. From the regression analysis of the other
three quartiles, though quartiles 2 and 3 show a decline in income smoothing, they
show no change in accruals and real activity manipulation after control for related
factors.
Panel B of Table 3.5 shows the results from the analysis of regrouped samples
based on the levels of smoothing and legal enforcement. For firms with a high level
of income smoothing, the results show that the coefficients on IFRS are significantly
positive at the 1% level for both strong and weak legal enforcement groups. How-
ever, we find no evidence of a decline in discretionary accruals. We find that the
coefficient on AbCFO is significantly positive at the 5% level of firms in a strong
legal enforcement group. For firms with a low level income smoothing, IFRS have a
significant effect on income smoothing solely for firms in a strong legal enforcement
group. We find no evidence of a decline in discretionary accrual and firms are less
likely to engage in real activity earning manipulation in the post-IFRS periods.
[Table 3.6 about here]
62 Chapter 3
We also re-test the regression analysis with the sample after excluding Malaysia,
the results of which are presented in Table 3.6. We find that the effect of IFRS on
income smoothing is consistent with the findings in Table 3.5. However, we find
no evidence of an increase in real activity manipulation of firms with a high level
of income smoothing. We re-test the effect of IFRS on income smoothing based on
STDNI the results of which are presented in Table 3.8. Discretionary accruals and
earnings manipulating methods are also regrouped based on STDNI. The findings
are more or less similar to those found earlier about the effect of IFRS on the
overproduction of firms with a high level of income smoothing.
From the analysis, IFRS appear to have a negative effect on the income smooth-
ing of Asian firms, especially those with a high level of income smoothing, which is
partly consistent with prior research (Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al.,
2008; Liu et al., 2011). Considering manipulating methods, it appears that IFRS
have a negative effect on discretionary accruals and a positive effect on real activity
manipulation, especially on firms with a high level of income smoothing.
3.5 Summary and conclusion
This study examines the effect of IFRS on income smoothing in Asian countries. We
also link income smoothing to the methods management may use to smooth income
including, accounting and real activity earnings manipulation. We assume that the
difference in income smoothing levels results from the different degrees of incentives
of financial reporting so they differently affect manipulating methods used around
IFRS adoption periods.
After IFRS adoption/convergence, Asian firms with a high level of income smooth-
ing exhibit a significant decline in income smoothing, though the level of their in-
come smoothing in the post-IFRS period is still relatively high in comparison to
those with a low level of income smoothing group. They also exhibit a significant
decline in discretionary accruals which may be due to the effect of IFRS that con-
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strain management from using discretionary accruals. In addition, we find some
evidence of an increase in the use of real activities including overproducing, espe-
cially for firms with a high level of income smoothing. We find some evidence that
a strong legal enforcement leads to a stronger impact of IFRS in reducing income
smoothing. However, our findings suggest that strong income-smoothing incentives,
not legal enforcement lead to a greater prevalence of real earnings management in
the post-IFRS period, as found in prior research.
Finally, IFRS adoption may lead to a statistical improvement in accounting
quality, such as a decline in income smoothing and accrual manipulation. However,
the effect of IFRS may not be economically significant since firms with a high level of
income smoothing in the pre-IFRS period still show a high level of income smoothing
in relation to those with a low level of income smoothing in the post-IFRS period.
The findings have raised questions as to whether the accounting quality of Asian
firms is comparable in the post-IFRS period, which is an interesting subject for
further investigation.
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Table 3.1: Sample distribution
Year of IFRS No. of No. of Percent
Adoption/Convergence Firms Observations
Panel A: Country breakdown
China 2007 491 4,910 43.26
Hong Kong 2005 217 2,170 19.12
Malaysia 2006 297 2,970 26.17
Singapore 2005 130 1,300 11.45
Total 1,135 11,350 100.00
Panel B: Year breakdown
2000 347 3.06
2001 644 5.67
2002 1,135 10.00
2003 1,135 10.00
2004 1,135 10.00
2005 788 6.94
2006 838 7.38
2007 644 5.67
2008 1,135 10.00
2009 1,135 10.00
2010 1,135 10.00
2011 788 6.94
2012 491 4.33
Total 11,350 100.00
Panel C: Industry breakdown
Basic Material (1000) 1,680 14.80
Industrials (2000) 3,790 33.39
Consumer Goods (3000) 2,840 25.02
Health Care (4000) 550 4.85
Consumer Services (5000) 1,830 16.12
Technology (9000) 660 5.81
Total 11,350 100.00
Note:
The industrial grouping is based on International Classification Benchmark (ICB).
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS
N Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75% N Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75%
VARNI 1,135 0.037 0.150 0.001 0.004 0.013 1,135 0.048 1.150 0.003 0.010 0.031
DAC 5,675 0.000 0.098 −0.042 0.003 0.046 5,675 −0.001 0.120 −0.055 −0.002 0.051
AbCFO 5,675 0.000 0.089 −0.047 0.003 0.046 5,675 0.000 0.097 −0.051 0.002 0.051
AbPROD 5,675 0.000 0.124 −0.049 0.011 0.061 5,675 −0.003 0.144 −0.058 0.011 0.069
AbEXP 5,675 0.004 0.100 −0.022 0.024 0.056 5,675 −0.002 0.111 −0.031 0.020 0.054
LEV 5,675 0.455 0.223 0.301 0.444 0.584 5,675 0.461 0.228 0.295 0.452 0.598
SIZE 5,675 13.659 1.491 12.576 13.777 14.626 5,675 14.127 1.716 12.908 14.178 15.259
Note:
Variable definitions are as follows: VARNI is the variance of net income. DAC is discretionary accruals. AbCFO is abnormal
operating cash flow. AbPROD is abnormal production costs. AbEXP is abnormal expenses. LEV is total debt scaled by total
assets. SIZE is logarithm of total assets. All variables are winsorized at 1% to control for outliers.
66
C
hapter
3
Table 3.3: Comparison of earnings management metrics
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat.
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Panel A: Sample grouping based on the level of income smoothing
VARNI Pre 0.001 (284) −13.84∗∗∗ 0.002 (284) −11.69∗∗∗ 0.007 (284) −6.82∗∗∗ 0.033 (283) 4.03∗∗∗
Post 0.003 (284) (0.000) 0.009 (284) (0.000) 0.012 (284) (0.000) 0.027 (283) (0.000)
DAC Pre 0.008 (1,420) 6.07∗∗∗ 0.006 (1,420) 2.87∗∗∗ 0.004 (1,420) 1.68∗∗ -0.010 (1,415) −4.06∗∗∗
Post -0.006 (1,420) (0.000) -0.002 (1,420) (0.002) -0.002 (1,420) (0.046) 0.004 (1,415) (0.000)
AbCFO Pre -0.004 (1,420) −0.90 -0.008 (1,420) −1.66∗∗ 0.001 (1,420) −0.11 0.025 (1,415) 1.91∗∗
Post -0.000 (1,420) (0.184) -0.005 (1,420) (0.049) -0.002 (1,420) (0.458) 0.020 (1,415) (0.028)
AbPROD Pre 0.001 (1,420) −3.30∗∗∗ -0.000 (1,420) −1.90∗∗ 0.015 (1,420) 1.29∗ 0.031 (1,415) 3.04∗∗∗
Post 0.010 (1,420) (0.001) 0.007 (1,420) (0.029) 0.008 (1,420) (0.099) 0.018 (1,415) (0.001)
AbPROD2 Pre 0.002 (1,135) −3.05∗∗∗ 0.001 (1,120) −1.66∗∗ 0.011 (1,115) 1.58∗ 0.030 (1,115) 3.64∗∗∗
Post 0.010 (1,135) (0.001) 0.004 (1,120) (0.048) 0.003 (1,115) (0.057) 0.015 (1,115) (0.000)
AbEXP Pre 0.021 (1,420) 2.62∗∗∗ 0.030 (1,420) 2.68∗∗∗ 0.027 (1,420) 3.19∗∗∗ 0.012 (1,415) −1.49∗
Post 0.017 (1,420) (0.004) 0.024 (1,420) (0.004) 0.020 (1,420) (0.001) 0.020 (1,415) (0.068)
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Table 3.3: Continued
High-Strong High-Weak Low-Strong Low-Weak
Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat.
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Panel B: Sample grouping based on the levels of income smoothing and legal enforcement
VARNI Pre 0.002 (88) −10.72∗∗∗ 0.001 (480) −13.75∗∗∗ 0.017 (259) −4.17∗∗∗ 0.010 (308) 2.09∗∗
Post 0.024 (88) (0.000) 0.004 (480) (0.000) 0.036 (259) (0.000) 0.010 (308) (0.018)
DAC Pre 0.010 (440) 1.30∗ 0.006 (2,400) 6.23∗∗∗ 0.002 (1,295) −3.40∗∗∗ -0.004 (1,540) 0.33
Post -0.003 (440) (0.098) -0.004 (2,400) (0.000) 0.014 (1,295) (0.000) -0.007 (1,540) (0.370)
AbCFO Pre -0.012 (440) −1.52∗ -0.004 (2,400) −1.26 0.005 (1,295) −0.06 0.018 (1,540) 2.07∗∗
Post -0.013 (440) (0.065) -0.001 (2,400) (0.104) 0.002 (1,295) (0.477) 0.013 (1,540) (0.019)
AbPROD Pre 0.007 (440) −0.54 -0.001 (2,400) −3.71∗∗∗ 0.018 (1,295) 0.61 0.025 (1,540) 3.70∗∗∗
Post 0.010 (440) (0.295) 0.009 (2,400) (0.000) 0.011 (1,295) (0.272) 0.014 (1,540) (0.000)
AbPROD2 Pre 0.014 (320) −0.44 0.000 (1,935) −3.37∗∗∗ 0.015 (980) 0.69 0.023 (1,250) 4.46∗∗∗
Post 0.012 (320) (0.329) 0.007 (1,935) (0.000) 0.013 (980) (0.247) 0.008 (1,250) (0.000)
AbEXP Pre 0.046 (440) 1.97∗∗ 0.023 (2,400) 3.24∗∗∗ 0.034 (1,295) −0.21 0.017 (1,540) 1.56∗
Post 0.036 (440) (0.025) 0.018 (2,400) (0.001) 0.032 (1,295) (0.419) 0.014 (1,540) (0.059)
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U test. For Panel A, the sample is grouped into quartiles based on the levels of
income smoothing. Quartile 1 represents the sample with the highest level of income smoothing. For Panel B, the sample is grouped
based on two criteria: 1) income smoothing levels (high and low) and 2) legal enforcement levels (strong and weak). All other variables
are defined in Table 3.2. AbPROD2 is abnormal accruals computed from the sample with consumer services and health care industries
excluded. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 3.4: Comparison of earnings management metrics - Excluding Malaysia
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat.
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Panel A: Sample grouping based on the level of income smoothing
VARNI Pre 0.001 (210) −15.26∗∗∗ 0.003 (209) −12.16∗∗∗ 0.009 (210) −6.11∗∗∗ 0.038 (209) 2.31∗∗
Post 0.008 (210) (0.000) 0.013 (209) (0.000) 0.015 (210) (0.000) 0.037 (209) (0.011)
DAC Pre 0.011 (1,050) 6.44∗∗∗ 0.007 (1,045) 3.42∗∗∗ 0.005 (1,050) 0.29 -0.015 (1,045) −3.74∗∗∗
Post -0.008 (1,050) (0.000) -0.005 (1,045) (0.000) 0.003 (1,050) (0.77) 0.002 (1,045) (0.000)
AbCFO Pre -0.003 (1,050) −0.52 -0.006(1,045) −1.79∗∗ -0.003 (1,050) −0.12 0.024 (1,045) 0.99
Post 0.001 (1,050) (0.302) -0.002 (1,045) (0.037) -0.005 (1,050) (0.454) 0.022 (1,045) (0.161)
AbPROD Pre 0.002 (1,050) −2.31∗∗ 0.002 (1,045) −1.24 0.014 (1,050) 0.49 0.032 (1,045) 2.56∗∗∗
Post 0.012 (1,050) (0.010) 0.009 (1,045) (0.107) 0.008 (1,050) (0.314) 0.018 (1,045) (0.005)
AbPROD2 Pre 0.011 (810) −3.30∗∗∗ 0.009 (780) −2.86∗∗∗ 0.016 (810) −0.56 0.039 (800) 1.68∗∗∗
Post 0.024 (810) (0.001) 0.021 (780) (0.002) 0.017 (810) (0.287) 0.028 (800) (0.003)
AbEXP Pre 0.027 (1,050) 3.49∗∗∗ 0.029 (1,045) 2.80∗∗∗ 0.029 (1,050) 2.59∗∗∗ 0.011 (1,045) −0.93
Post 0.019 (1,050) (0.000) 0.023 (1,045) (0.003) 0.022 (1,050) (0.005) 0.018 (1,045) (0.175)
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Table 3.4: Continued
High-Strong High-Weak Low-Strong Low-Weak
Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat.
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Panel B: Sample grouping based on the levels of income smoothing and legal enforcement
VARNI Pre 0.002 (109) −11.74∗∗∗ 0.002 (310) −15.06∗∗∗ 0.019 (238) −3.00∗∗∗ 0.011 (181) −0.23
Post 0.025 (109) (0.000) 0.007 (310) (0.000) 0.038 (238) (0.001) 0.012 (181) (0.409)
DAC Pre 0.014 (545) 1.72∗∗ 0.007 (1,550) 6.92∗∗∗ -0.001 (1,190) −3.85∗∗∗ -0.004 (905) 0.48
Post -0.002 (545) (0.042) -0.008 (1,550) (0.000) 0.014 (1,190) (0.000) -0.008 (905) (0.316)
AbCFO Pre -0.011 (545) −1.47∗ 0.001 (1,550) −0.94 0.005 (1,190) −0.00 0.016 (905) 1.15
Post -0.012 (545) (0.071) 0.004 (1,550) (0.175) 0.002 (1,190) (0.499) 0.013 (905) (0.125)
AbPROD Pre 0.010 (545) −0.15 -0.001 (1,550) −2.76∗∗∗ 0.017 (1,190) 0.43 0.026 (905) 2.85∗∗∗
Post 0.009 (545) (0.441) 0.009 (1,550) (0.003) 0.012 (1,190) (0.335) 0.014 (905) (0.002)
AbPROD2 Pre 0.016 (395) −0.92 0.009 (1,195) −4.51∗∗∗ 0.025 (905) −0.36 0.031 (705) 1.47∗
Post 0.021 (395) (0.180) 0.023 (1,195) (0.000) 0.019 (905) (0.361) 0.024 (705) (0.070)
AbEXP Pre 0.050 (545) 2.69∗∗∗ 0.023 (1,550) 3.63∗∗∗ 0.031 (1,190) −0.70 0.018 (905) 2.56∗∗∗
Post 0.039 (545) (0.004) 0.017 (1,550) (0.000) 0.031 (1,190) (0.243) 0.012 (905) (0.005)
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U test. For Panel A, the sample is grouped into quartiles based on the levels
of income smoothing. Quartile 1 represents the sample with the highest level of income smoothing. For Panel B, the the sample is
grouped based on two criteria: 1) income smoothing levels (high and low) and 2) legal enforcement levels (strong and weak). All other
variables are defined in Table 3.2. AbPROD2 is abnormal accruals computed from the sample with consumer services and health care
industries excluded. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 3.5: Regression analysis of IFRS on earnings management metrics
VARNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Panel A: Sample grouping based on the level of income smoothing
Quartile 1
IFRS 0.01∗∗ −0.03∗ −0.03 0.06∗∗ 0.04 0.05∗∗∗
(8.36) (−1.85) (−1.60) (2.34) (1.38) (2.77)
LEV 0.04 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(1.56) (3.64) (15.50) (9.34) (8.42) (−3.59)
SIZE 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(1.72) (3.85) (−7.39) (−0.62) (−0.21) (8.53)
Constant −0.01∗∗ −0.04∗ 0.02 −0.00 −0.02 −0.04∗∗
(−2.08) (−1.88) (1.21) (−0.12) (−0.68) (−2.12)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 568 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,270 2,840
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.09
Quartile 2
IFRS 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.00 0.00
(5.02) (−0.95) (−1.31) (−0.34) (−0.13) (0.16)
LEV 0.09∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗
(4.95) (−4.78) (13.98) (10.40) (10.03) (−2.36)
SIZE −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(−3.28) (2.81) (−6.83) (0.09) (−0.32) (10.01)
Constant 0.05 −0.04∗ 0.00 −0.06∗∗ −0.05∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(1.64) (−1.88) (0.00) (−2.08) (−1.69) (−4.42)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 568 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,240 2,840
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.17
Quartile 3
IFRS 0.03∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(5.54) (−0.26) (−1.20) (0.35) (0.82) (0.79)
LEV 0.03∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(2.39) (−4.00) (11.22) (8.57) (6.90) (−2.62)
SIZE −0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−2.53) (4.77) (−7.69) (−3.36) (−3.00) (5.12)
Constant 0.04∗ −0.05∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.05∗ −0.02
(1.84) (−2.50) (3.10) (1.70) (1.68) (−1.08)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 568 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,230 2,840
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.11
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Table 3.5: Continued
VARNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Quartile 4
IFRS 0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.00 0.01 −0.01
(0.26) (1.26) (0.58) (−0.21) (0.56) (−0.38)
LEV 0.29∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(7.52) (−6.99) (5.87) (3.63) (3.95) (−9.12)
SIZE −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(−4.70) (5.37) (−8.37) (3.12) (1.86) (14.22)
Constant 0.43∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ −0.01 0.02 −0.23∗∗∗
(4.39) (−2.98) (8.52) (−0.31) (0.73) (−9.27)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 566 2,830 2,830 2,830 2,230 2,830
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.12
Panel B: Sample grouping based on the levels of income smoothing and
legal enforcement
High-Strong
IFRS 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.00 0.00 −0.03
(4.12) (0.38) (2.15) (0.05) (0.17) (−1.59)
LEV 0.11∗∗ −0.05∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(2.35) (−2.21) (8.17) (1.96) (2.58) (−2.65)
SIZE −0.00 0.00 −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−0.22) (1.57) (−3.66) (2.04) (2.61) (5.40)
Constant −0.04 −0.02∗ 0.01 −0.06 −0.10∗∗ −0.07∗
(−0.53) (−0.71) (0.53) (−1.39) (−2.18) (−1.76)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 176 880 880 880 640 880
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.09
High-Weak
IFRS 0.01∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.02∗∗ 0.00 −0.03∗∗∗
(4.53) (−8.30) (−0.64) (−2.30) (0.39) (−5.07)
LEV 0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗
(5.50) (−5.14) (19.22) (15.51) (13.57) (−2.33)
SIZE −0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗ −0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−3.31) (4.59) (−9.25) (−2.39) (−2.38) (10.92)
Constant 0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 −0.09∗∗∗
(1.98) (−1.97) (4.06) (−0.95) (−0.49) (−6.86)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 960 4,800 4,800 4,800 3,870 4,800
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.16
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Table 3.5: Continued
VARNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Low-Strong
IFRS 0.04∗∗ −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.01
(1.97) (−0.65) (−0.21) (−0.06) (0.24) (−0.50)
LEV 0.24∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(5.74) (−4.34) (8.88) (2.87) (4.06) (−7.94)
SIZE −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(−4.83) (6.52) (−9.11) (2.19) (2.48) (11.59)
Constant 0.38∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.03 0.01 −0.15∗∗∗
(4.49) (−4.17) (8.41) (1.20) (0.47) (−5.81)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 518 2,590 2,590 2,590 1,960 2,590
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.14
Low-Weak
IFRS −0.00 −0.03∗∗ −0.00 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.03∗∗∗
(−0.06) (−2.43) (−0.01) (−2.58) (−0.41) (−3.87)
LEV 0.29∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(10.77) (−7.92) (8.63) (8.19) (7.34) (−9.69)
SIZE −0.02∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−4.17) (3.35) (−7.25) (−2.61) (−3.61) (9.67)
Constant 0.16∗∗ −0.03 0.10∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(2.49) (−1.58) (5.11) (2.17) (3.09) (−5.25)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 616 3,080 3,080 3,080 2,500 3,080
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.11
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression:
DEPit = β0 + β1IFRSit + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + it.
Variable definitions are as follows:
DEP is the dependent variable investigated including VARNI, AbCFO, AbPROD, and AbEXP;
IFRS is a dummy variable (1 = sample in IFRS period, 0 = otherwise); SIZE is a five-year average
logarithm of total assets; LEV is a five-year average firm leverage; industry is a dummy variable
for industry; year is a dummy variable for year. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Regression analysis of IFRS on earnings management metrics - Excluding
Malaysia
VARNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Panel A: Sample grouping based on the level of income smoothing
Quartile 1
IFRS 0.02∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
(2.37) (−1.68) (−1.39) (1.37) (0.40) (1.21)
LEV 0.09∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −0.01
(2.15) (−3.22) (12.54) (10.70) (9.25) (−0.48)
SIZE −0.01∗ 0.00∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(−1.75) (2.44) (−5.18) (−1.02) (−0.50) (4.25)
Constant 0.06 −0.04 0.00 −0.05 −0.07∗ −0.03
(0.88) (−1.53) (0.13) (−1.45) (−1.81) (−1.12)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 420 2,100 2,100 2,100 1,620 2,100
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.12
Quartile 2
IFRS 0.04∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.02∗ 0.01 0.02 0.02
(4.31) (−1.31) (−1.86) (0.54) (1.04) (1.48)
LEV 0.15∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.01
(5.21) (−4.65) (10.58) (9.39) (8.56) (−1.11)
SIZE −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(−4.02) (1.74) (−6.60) (−0.14) (−1.01) (7.54)
Constant 0.14∗∗ −0.02 0.03 −0.04 −0.01 −0.08∗∗∗
(2.51) (−0.63) (1.49) (−1.19) (−0.42) (−3.30)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 418 2,090 2,090 2,090 1,560 2,090
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.16
Quartile 3
IFRS 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(5.26) (0.12) (−1.12) (0.19) (0.58) (0.86)
LEV 0.05∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗
(2.83) (−2.99) (10.79) (8.03) (7.04) (−2.22)
SIZE −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗ −0.00 0.00∗∗∗
(−3.29) (3.19) (−5.60) (−2.16) (−1.51) (3.17)
Constant 0.08∗∗ −0.04∗ 0.03 0.01 0.01 −0.00
(2.37) (−1.77) (1.57) (0.49) (0.41) (−0.07)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 420 2,100 2,100 2,100 1,620 2,100
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.14
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Table 3.6: Continued
VARNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Quartile 4
IFRS 0.03 0.03 0.02 −0.01 0.01 −0.02
(0.69) (1.28) (0.97) (−0.30) (0.45) (−0.92)
LEV 0.50∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(7.44) (−5.43) (4.16) (2.70) (3.25) (−8.11)
SIZE −0.07∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(−5.22) (5.40) (−6.90) (4.11) (3.13) (13.81)
Constant 0.92∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.03 −0.32∗∗∗
(4.63) (−3.69) (7.49) (−1.42) (−0.81) (−9.87)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 418 2,090 2,090 2,090 1,600 2,090
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.15
Panel B: Sample grouping based on the levels of income smoothing and
legal enforcement
High-Strong
IFRS 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗ −0.00 0.02 −0.03∗
(4.12) (0.47) (2.33) (−0.22) (1.06) (−1.73)
LEV 0.11∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(2.35) (−2.64) (10.19) (2.45) (2.98) (−2.72)
SIZE −0.00 0.00∗ −0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−0.22) (1.73) (−3.36) (2.17) (2.38) (5.41)
Constant −0.04 −0.02 0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.04
(−0.53) (−0.52) (0.67) (−0.73) (−1.29) (−1.14)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 176 1,090 1,090 1,090 790 1,090
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.07
High-Weak
IFRS 0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.01 0.00 −0.02∗ −0.00
(4.53) (−2.43) (−1.01) (0.48) (−1.90) (−0.41)
LEV 0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(5.50) (−4.90) (12.73) (16.36) (13.61) (2.97)
SIZE −0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−3.31) (2.03) (−8.84) (−3.25) (−3.56) (6.88)
Constant 0.03∗∗ −0.01 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00 0.03 −0.10∗∗∗
(1.98) (−0.41) (5.86) (0.00) (0.98) (−5.45)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 960 3,100 3,100 3,100 2,390 3,100
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.23
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Table 3.6: Continued
VARNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Low-Strong
IFRS 0.04∗∗ 0.01 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(1.97) (0.86) (0.11) (−1.22) (−0.64) (−1.01)
LEV 0.24∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(5.74) (−4.20) (7.74) (2.50) (3.69) (−7.98)
SIZE −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(−4.83) (6.57) (−8.99) (2.28) (2.80) (11.58)
Constant 0.38∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.03 0.00 −0.17∗∗∗
(4.49) (−4.30) (8.48) (1.04) (0.14) (−6.10)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 518 2,380 2,380 2,380 1,810 2,380
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.14
Low-Weak
IFRS −0.00 −0.02 0.01 −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(−0.06) (−1.43) (0.53) (−2.92) (−2.81) (−4.28)
LEV 0.29∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(10.77) (−6.24) (6.76) (7.56) (7.03) (−8.63)
SIZE −0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(−4.17) (1.19) (−4.16) (0.29) (−0.60) (8.09)
Constant 0.16∗∗ −0.02 0.08∗∗∗ −0.02 0.02 −0.11∗∗∗
(2.49) (−0.52) (2.77) (−0.44) (0.57) (−4.91)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 616 1,810 1,810 1,810 1,410 1,810
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.18
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression:
DEPit = β0 + β1IFRSit + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + it.
Variable definitions are as follows:
DEP is the dependent variable investigated including VARNI, AbCFO, AbPROD, and AbEXP;
IFRS is a dummy variable (1 = sample in IFRS period, 0 = otherwise); SIZE is a five-year average
logarithm of total assets; LEV is a five-year average firm leverage; industry is a dummy variable
for industry; year is a dummy variable for year. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Comparison of earnings management - Based on STDNI
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat. Median (N ) z-stat.
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Panel A: Sample grouping based on the level of income smoothing
STDNI Pre 0.009 (284) −13.68∗∗∗ 0.022 (284) −6.17∗∗∗ 0.043 (284) 1.76∗∗ 0.102 (283) 8.95∗∗∗
Post 0.020 (284) (0.000) 0.030 (284) (0.000) 0.041 (284) (0.039) 0.063 (283) (0.000)
DAC Pre 0.010 (1,420) 4.81∗∗∗ 0.009 (1,420) 4.26∗∗∗ 0.002 (1,420) 1.25 -0.016 (1,415) −3.95∗∗∗
Post -0.004 (1,420) (0.000) -0.004 (1,420) (0.000) -0.001 (1,420) (0.105) -0.000 (1,415) (0.000)
AbCFO Pre 0.001 (1,420) −0.26 -0.007 (1,420) −1.12 -0.006 (1,420) −1.24 0.028 (1,415) 1.84∗∗
Post 0.002 (1,420) (0.399) -0.005 (1,420) (0.131) -0.003 (1,420) (0.108) 0.019 (1,415) (0.033)
AbPROD Pre 0.010 (1,420) −0.61 0.004 (1,420) −0.61 0.004 (1,420) −1.89∗∗ 0.026 (1,415) 2.42∗∗∗
Post 0.011 (1,420) (0.273) 0.008 (1,420) (0.271) 0.011 (1,420) (0.030) 0.013 (1,415) (0.008)
AbPROD2 Pre 0.009 (1,060) 0.30 0.003 (1,105) −1.29∗ 0.006 (1,145) −0.90 0.022 (1,175) 2.55∗∗∗
Post 0.009 (1,060) (0.381) 0.008 (1,105) (0.098) 0.006 (1,145) (0.184) 0.011 (1,175) (0.005)
AbEXP Pre 0.029 (1,420) 4.76∗∗∗ 0.027 (1,420) 4.28∗∗∗ 0.027 (1,420) 1.20 0.005 (1,415) −3.11∗∗∗
Post 0.022 (1,420) (0.000) 0.020 (1,420) (0.000) 0.023 (1,420) (0.116) 0.015 (1,415) (0.001)
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Table 3.7: Continued
High-Strong High-Weak Low-Strong Low-Weak
Mean (N ) z-stat. Mean (N ) z-stat. Mean (N ) z-stat. Mean (N ) z-stat.
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Panel B: Sample grouping based on the levels of income smoothing and legal enforcement
STDNI Pre 0.017 (121) −8.47∗∗∗ 0.015 (447) −10.03∗∗∗ 0.069 (226) 2.15∗∗ 0.058 (341) 7.56∗∗∗
Post 0.036 (121) (0.000) 0.022 (447) (0.000) 0.064 (226) (0.016) 0.043 (341) (0.000)
DAC Pre 0.020 (605) 0.30 0.006 (2,235) 6.83∗∗∗ -0.009 (1,130) −3.18∗∗∗ -0.003 (1,705) 0.06
Post 0.013 (605) (0.382) -0.006 (2,235) (0.000) 0.006 (1,130) (0.001) -0.004 (1,705) (0.477)
AbCFO Pre -0.009 (605) −1.42∗ -0.001 (2,235) −0.30 0.006 (1,130) 0.01 0.014 (1,705) 0.99
Post -0.010 (605) (0.078) 0.002 (2,235) (0.382) 0.002 (1,130) (0.495) 0.008 (1,705) (0.162)
AbPROD Pre 0.016 (605) 0.42 0.005 (2,235) −1.22 0.013 (1,130) 0.08 0.016 (1,705) 0.50
Post 0.011 (605) (0.336) 0.009 (2,235) (0.112) 0.010 (1,130) (0.468) 0.012 (1,705) (0.310)
AbPROD2 Pre 0.014 (430) −0.21 0.006 (1,735) −0.72 0.015 (870) 0.61 0.013 (1,450) 1.12
Post 0.014 (430) (0.417) 0.008 (1,735) (0.235) 0.011 (870) (0.270) 0.007 (1,450) (0.132)
AbEXP Pre 0.055 (605) 3.83∗∗∗ 0.024 (2,235) 5.03∗∗∗ 0.024 (1,130) −1.71∗∗ 0.014 (1,705) −0.31
Post 0.039 (605) (0.000) 0.018 (2,235) (0.000) 0.030 (1,130) (0.043) 0.015 (1,705) (0.379)
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U test. For Panel A, the sample is grouped into quartiles based on the levels of
income smoothing. Quartile 1 represents the sample with the highest level of income smoothing. For Panel B, the sample is grouped
based on two criteria: 1) income smoothing levels (high and low) and 2) legal enforcement levels (strong and weak). All other variables
are defined in Table 3.2. AbPROD2 is abnormal accruals computed from the sample with consumer services and health care industries
excluded. All other variables are also regrouped based on STDNI.∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 3.8: The effect of IFRS on earnings management metrics
STDNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Panel A: Sample grouping based on the level of income smoothing
Quartile 1
IFRS 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 0.03∗ 0.02 0.02∗
(6.51) (0.03) (−0.72) (1.85) (0.82) (1.68)
LEV 0.00 −0.04∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.31) (−4.15) (10.17) (10.69) (9.24) (0.57)
SIZE −0.00 0.00 −0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(−1.09) (1.62) (−4.34) (0.70) (−0.65) (4.51)
Constant 0.04∗∗∗ −0.01 0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.02
(3.48) (−0.61) (1.16) (−1.02) (−0.23) (−0.11)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 568 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,120 2,840
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.13
Quartile 2
IFRS 0.02∗∗∗ −0.01 0.00 0.03∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.02
(6.15) (−0.51) (0.05) (1.71) (2.59) (1.40)
LEV 0.04∗∗∗ −0.02∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ −0.02∗
(3.87) (−1.75) (14.79) (11.16) (11.50) (−1.85)
SIZE −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−4.99) (2.49) (−8.57) (−1.37) (−3.21) (9.22)
Constant 0.09 −0.02 0.04∗∗ 0.00 0.04 −0.06∗∗∗
(5.86) (−1.21) (2.43) (0.10) (1.48) (−3.36)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 568 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,210 2,840
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.12
Quartile 3
IFRS 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02 0.03∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(3.44) (−0.93) (−1.53) (1.88) (2.12) (2.46)
LEV 0.02∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗
(1.82) (−6.12) (11.55) (7.17) (6.60) (−2.40)
SIZE −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00 0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(−4.50) (5.59) (−8.25) (−1.21) (0.47) (9.10)
Constant 0.13∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.01 −0.07
(6.36) (−2.51) (3.61) (0.83) (−0.24) (−3.49)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 568 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,290 2,840
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.11
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Table 3.8: Continued
STDNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Quartile 4
IFRS −0.00 0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.00 −0.02
(−0.38) (0.90) (0.27) (−0.80) (−0.16) (−0.94)
LEV 0.10∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(6.06) (−6.92) (6.70) (5.12) (4.76) (−9.34)
SIZE −0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 0.02∗∗∗
(−6.79) (4.64) (−8.16) (−0.29) (−0.71) (11.28)
Constant 0.36∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04 −0.20∗∗∗
(8.32) (−2.59) (7.23) (0.85) (1.25) (−7.92)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 566 2,830 2,830 2,830 2,350 2,830
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.12
Panel B: Sample grouping based on the levels of income smoothing and
legal enforcement
High-Strong
IFRS 0.02∗∗∗ −0.00 0.02∗ 0.01 0.00 −0.01
(4.13) (−0.01) (1.67) (0.70) (0.06) (−0.94)
LEV 0.03 −0.03 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.01
(1.61) (−1.47) (8.57) (5.56) (6.83) (0.70)
SIZE −0.00 0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(−0.87) (3.73) (−1.99) (2.79) (0.36) (4.47)
Constant 0.01 −0.07∗ −0.01 −0.06∗ −0.02 −0.01
(0.54) (−2.31) (−0.45) (−1.78) (−0.43) (−0.41)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 176 1,210 1,210 1,210 860 1,210
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10
High-Weak
IFRS 0.02∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(7.66) (−7.43) (−0.89) (−2.44) (−1.69) (−5.62)
LEV 0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ −0.00
(3.09) (−2.02) (16.32) (15.59) (13.80) (−0.79)
SIZE −0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−4.30) (0.31) (−8.68) (−3.39) (−3.74) (7.74)
Constant 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03 −0.05∗∗∗
(6.53) (0.82) (4.95) (0.97) (1.46) (−4.28)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 960 4,470 4,470 4,470 3,470 4,470
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.14
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Table 3.8: Continued
STDNI DAC AbCFO AbPROD AbPROD2 AbEXP
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Low-Strong
IFRS 0.02∗∗ −0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(2.11) (−0.64) (−0.27) (−0.35) (−0.32) (−0.53)
LEV 0.10∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(4.66) (−4.41) (8.28) (1.49) (2.64) (−8.88)
SIZE −0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(−5.83) (4.74) (−9.68) (1.07) (3.34) (11.33)
Constant 0.30∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ −0.01 −0.19∗∗∗
(6.81) (−2.86) (9.17) (2.04) (−0.26) (−6.35)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 518 2,260 2,260 2,260 1,740 2,260
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14
Low-Weak
IFRS −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.02 0.00
(−0.93) (−0.95) (0.28) (1.00) (−1.17) (0.45)
LEV 0.13∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(11.56) (−9.77) (11.97) (10.39) (8.57) (−8.72)
SIZE −0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−8.13) (5.15) (−7.66) (−2.61) (−3.07) (10.49)
Constant 0.23∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04 −0.09∗∗∗
(8.41) (−2.32) (4.20) (0.93) (1.48) (−5.96)
Industry incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
N 616 3,410 3,410 3,410 2,900 3,410
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.13
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression:
DEPit = β0 + β1IFRSit + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + it.
Variable definitions are as follows:
DEP is the dependent variable investigated including VARNI, AbCFO, AbPROD, and AbEXP;
IFRS is a dummy variable (1 = sample in IFRS period, 0 = otherwise); SIZE is a five-year average
logarithm of total assets; LEV is a five-year average firm leverage; industry is a dummy variable
for industry; year is a dummy variable for year. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The effect of Japanese-SOX on earnings manage-
ment to avoid losses in Japan
4.1 Introduction
Prior research reports that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) leads to an im-
provement in the reliability of financial information in the US (Lobo and Zhou,
2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Singer and You, 2011; Aubert and Grudnitski, 2014). The
positive effect may be partly attributed to an increase in the penalties for financial-
reporting misconduct imposed by SOX (Lobo and Zhou, 2006) or new regulations
about the internal control system (Nagy, 2010; Singer and You, 2011) or an improve-
ment in audit quality (DeFond and Lennox, 2011) or all of them combined. The
Japanese business environment is reported to be different from those of the US, such
as the tight relationship between business and main banks and a cross-shareholding
between firms (Douthett and Jung, 2001; Bauer et al., 2008). The enactment of
SOX-like regulations in Japan (JSOX) provides an opportunity to study the effect
of the regulations on earnings management in a business environment that is dif-
ferent from that of the US. The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, it tests
the effect of JSOX on the loss-avoidance behaviour of Japanese firms. Second, it
examines earnings management components (EMC) that firms may use to engage
in such behaviour to gain more insight into the methods that Japanese firms use to
achieve loss avoidance.
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We conduct two types of test to investigate the effect JSOX on loss-avoidance
behaviour. Firstly, based on the studies of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and
Degeorge et al. (1999), we examine the discontinuity at zero of the earnings distri-
bution. The discontinuity occurs when small loss firms inflate earnings to present a
positive profit which results in the unexpectedly high number of small profit firms
(SPOS) and the unexpectedly low number of small loss firms (SLOS). We construct
histograms from the net annual income of Japanese firms from 2000 to 2008 (pre-
JSOX) and from 2009 to 2014 (post-JSOX) to examine the degree of discontinuity
of each period. Based on the standardised difference, we find that the degree of
the difference of SPOS and SLOS firms is somewhat high in the pre-JSOX periods
and the degree exhibits a decline in the post-JSOX period. Secondly, we test the
effect of JSOX on the prevalence of loss-avoidance firms between periods, using a
logistic regression controlling for debt, firm size, industrial group (keiretsu). The
logistic regression results show that the prevalence of loss-avoidance firms exhibits
a significant decline in the JSOX period.
We partition our sample into small and large firm sub-groups for additional
tests to address the effect of firm size on the extent of earnings management as
suggested by Burgstahler and Chuk (2015). The results from the histogram analysis
are partly consistent with the overall findings; they show a decrease in the degree of
standardised difference of SPOS and SLOS firms in the post-JSOX period for both
groups. The logistic regression results show a significant decline in loss avoidance
for large firms but show no significant effect of JSOX for small firms. It may be
that, as suggested by Depken and Ouyang (2006) and Lobo and Zhou (2006), the
regulations may impose more potential costs of manipulation on firms. Large firms
may be the first group to which the regulators pay more attention, so the regulations
may affect them first. It is also possible that an improvement in internal control
systems triggered by JSOX in large firms pays off much sooner as they have more
resources relative to small firms.
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Both types of analysis suggest some desirable effects of JSOX on loss-avoidance
behaviour in Japan, which is partly consistent with the US findings (Lobo and
Zhou, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Aubert and Grudnitski,
2014; Gilliam et al., 2015). A possible explanation for the moderate effect may
be that JSOX is basically different from SOX – it includes only a few parts from
SOX so it is less stringent. Another possible explanation would be the difference in
the institutional factors, such as legal enforcement and/or the strong incentive for
Japanese firms to report or maintain a modest profit.
We additionally examine five EMC including three specific accruals related to
accounts receivable, inventory, and accrued expenses, and two investment accounts
related to R&D and CAPEX. From the univariate and logistic regression tests, we
find that, in both pre- and post-JSOX periods, SPOS firms use both accrual and
investment manipulation to manage earnings in relation to other firms. Comparing
EMC of SPOS firms between the pre- and post-JSOX periods, we find no changes in
the methods used to avoid losses, which is inconsistent with prior US studies (Cohen
et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009) that report a decline in accounting and an
increase in real earnings management after SOX. It may be that JSOX, as mentioned
earlier, is less stringent in comparison to SOX. Another possible explanation may
be the different perceptions of earnings management. While American management
may perceive real activity earnings management as more ethical so they substitute
them for accounting methods, Japanese management may perceive both methods
as acceptable.
Furthermore, we find that SPOS firms switch from one specific accrual manipu-
lation to another specific account between JSOX periods to achieve loss avoidance.
So for accrual manipulation alone, firms have several accounts to use. The findings
link with Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) who propose that costs of manipulation
may be different among specific accounts. It is possible that Japanese managers
turn to other particular accounts perceived as having lower costs in order to com-
pensate for the potentially increased costs, such as penalty costs, imposed by JSOX.
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Interestingly, albeit Japanese firms have large R&D spending, we find that SPOS
firms are less likely to adjust R&D but are more likely to adjust CAPEX to achieve
loss avoidance. It may be that firms invest in more CAPEX in relation to R&D so
the larger amount may provide more scope for manipulation.
The analysis of large and small firms also shows more or less similar results. In
addition, we find that small SPOS firms are less likely to use real earnings man-
agement which is in contrast to large firms that use both methods. The findings
seem to support the notion of Burgstahler and Chuk (2015) that large firms tend
to have more accounting choices and a larger amount which is more susceptible to
manipulation.
In short, JSOX appears to have some desirable effects on the prevalence of loss
avoidance in Japan, especially for large firms. Firms still use the same methods, in-
cluding accrual and investment manipulation, to achieve loss avoidance after JSOX.
Accruals seem to be crucial tools as there are many sets of accounts which manage-
ment utilise to switch from one special type of accrual to another.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the
related literature, including the effect of SOX on earnings management, business
environment and earnings management in Japan. Section 4.3 documents research
design, including loss-avoidance measurement, analysis methods, sample selection,
and descriptive statistics. The tests and results are discussed in section 4.4 and
section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
4.2.1 SOX and earnings management
Corporate accounting scandals, such as the cases of Enron and WorldCom, have
raised scepticism about the reliability of accounting information of firms and about
the quality of independent auditors in the US. In response, the US Congress enacted
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. SOX establishes many standards for financial re-
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porting to improve the reliability of accounting information. For instance, the Act
prescribes corporate management to certify the accuracy and completeness of fi-
nancial reports and imposes penalties for financial misconduct. It also institutes
more auditing standards, such as requirements for assessing and reporting on the
effectiveness of internal control systems of a company and rotation of audit part-
ners auditing a particular client. In addition, SOX created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to regulate public auditors.
Prior studies demonstrate that SOX contributes to a positive change in the
financial reporting quality of US listed firms. For instance, Nagy (2010) reports that
SOX is linked to a decrease in the likelihood of misstated financial reports. Lobo and
Zhou (2006) and Singer and You (2011), by testing discretionary accruals (DAC)
around SOX periods, report that SOX leads to a decline in DAC in accounting
information of American firms. Lobo and Zhou (2006) point out that legal liabilities
imposed by SOX may outweigh earnings management incentives, resulting in more
conservative accounting choices by managers. Cohen et al. (2008) and Bartov and
Cohen (2009) examine not only DAC but also real earnings management (including
boosting sales, over-producing goods and cutting discretionary expenses) around
the passage of SOX and report a decline in DAC. However, they also report an
increase in aggregate real earnings management of US firms, especially those that
have a propensity for earnings management to avoid earnings losses/decreases or to
meet earnings forecasts. The authors caution that such changes may result from
the compound effects of SOX itself and an increase in the watchfulness of auditors
and regulators after the scandals. A decline in accrual manipulation suggests an
improvement in the quality of financial reports but an increase in overall real activity
manipulation may raise questions about the overall impact of SOX. A trade-off and
switching between accounting and real earnings management have also been reported
in the US market (Tan and Jamal, 2006; Zang, 2012) and in many other countries
(Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011) which is caused by the related costs of manipulation
and accounting standard restrictions.
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Some studies report on the effect of SOX on earnings management to exceed
earnings thresholds. For instance, Bartov and Cohen (2009) find that the preva-
lence of earnings management to meet or beat analyst expectations declines after
SOX. Aubert and Grudnitski (2014) report a decrease in opportunistic earnings
management by studying firms’ earnings per share and analysts’ earnings consensus.
Depken and Ouyang (2006) report a decrease in the prevalence of loss avoidance,
suggesting that SOX may impose more political and economic costs on earnings
manipulation thus restricting management of earnings manipulation. Gilliam et al.
(2015), by examining the earnings distribution of US firms between SOX periods,
report a disappearance of the zero-earnings discontinuity in the post-SOX periods.
4.2.2 Accounting changes in Asia
Many countries in Asia have been reported to have low quality corporate account-
ing information (high level of earnings management) caused by many institutional
factors such as ownership structure, legal enforcement level, and investor protec-
tion (Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003). Some countries, such as Thailand and
Malaysia, have converged their local accounting standards to align with IFRS that
are considered to be of high quality to improve the quality of their corporate ac-
counting information. The IASB has been in the process of improving IFRS for
many years by eliminating accounting choices from the standards in order to limit
managerial discretion of the adopting firms. Unlike IFRS, SOX, as a law, uses other
mechanisms, such as imposing penalties for financial misconduct and prescribing,
for example, internal control assessment. Both IFRS and SOX, however, could be
considered partly similar for they have the primary purpose of improving the quality
of financial information.
Recently, China and Japan have followed the US by enforcing SOX-like regula-
tions. China enacted such regulations in 2012 after the adoption of IFRS in 2007
making studying the effect of SOX in China relatively challenging as one has to
isolate the effect of SOX and IFRS on accounting quality. Japan has not adopted
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IFRS but it enacted the Financial Instrument and Exchange Law in 2006, after
Japanese accounting scandals around 2004-2005. The law consists of four main
purposes: 1) to establish a cross-sectional legislative framework for investor protec-
tion, 2) to enhance disclosure requirements, 3) to ensure appropriate management of
self-regulatory operations by exchanges, and 4) to maximise strict countermeasures
against various market frauds.13 To improve financial disclosure and internal control
over financial reporting, the law prescribes some requirements similar to Sections
302 and 404 of SOX. It requires the managerial certifying of financial reports and as-
sessment of the effectiveness of a firm’s internal control systems for listed companies
to comply with from April 2008. The certifying letter will be filed with annual and
quarterly financial statements. It also increases the criminal penalty of many mar-
ket fraud activities, including the submission of financial statements and attached
documents containing material misstatements or fictitious information. For exam-
ple, the imprisonment time for falsifying financial reports has been increased from
5 years to 10 years and the fines have also been increased from U5 million to U10
million for an individual and from U500 million to U700 million for a corporation.
JSOX, however, could be considered less stringent than SOX as it includes only
Sections 302 and 404 of SOX. Furthermore, while one of the main purposes of SOX is
to improve audit quality – SOX has created PCAOB to regulate public auditors and
many standards regarding auditing practices have been enforced – JSOX apparently
does not have any changes in regulating system for Japanese auditor. In addition,
unlike SOX, which requires an auditor’s assessment of and opinion on company
internal control, JSOX requires only an auditor’s opinion on the internal control
assessment report of management (Nishizaki et al., 2014). Though JSOX may be
less restrictive, the changes related to financial disclosure imposed by JSOX may, to
some extent, affect the financial reporting practices of Japanese management.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been few studies investigating the im-
pact of JSOX on Japanese financial reporting practices, except the study of Nishizaki
13http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fiel/
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et al. (2014) who report that, for the first two years after the passage of JSOX, disclo-
sure of internal control weakness is still low among Japanese firms relative to those
of US firms. However, the authors also report some evidence of investor reaction
supporting the informativeness of such disclosure. So, Japan would be an interesting
setting to gain insight into the effect of SOX-like regulations on accounting quality
in an Asian context.
4.2.3 Japanese business environment
The corporate sector in Japan is generally dominated by the unique industrial group
of companies namely "keiretsu" (hereafter K-firms). The relationship among firms
in keirestu may be different from that of firms in the same industry. A firm in a
particular industry may treat its peers as competitors but K-firms appear to treat
other K-firms in the same group as their allies or strategic partners. For example,
Gramlich et al. (2004) show evidence of income shifting between K-firms for tax
planning. Darrough et al. (1998) document that K-firms share business information
among members in a group. K-Firms generally have a cross-holding of equity and
have a main bank or main banks for financing. Inter-holding of equity is on a long-
term basis which leads to less short-term earnings orientation relative to western
business (Nobes, 2008a). Hence, K-firms may have different financial reporting
practices relative to non-K-firms.
The extent to which this kind of relationship affects the financial reporting prac-
tices of K-firms has been studied and the findings have been inconclusively reported.
For example, Cooke (1996) finds that there is no difference in the levels of financial
disclosure between K-firms and non-K-firms, though he argues that K-firms are less
subject to market regulation. However, Covrig and Low (2005) report that the ac-
counting information of K-firms is unlikely to explain firms’ market values, implying
that they disclose less financial information than non-K-firms do. It may be the case
that the long-term relationship between K-firms and main bank(s) makes available
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information sharing which leads to less external information disclosure (Darrough
et al., 1998).
In terms of the quality of accounting numbers, Douthett and Jung (2001) find
that K-firms have a lower level of DAC than do non-K-firms which may result from
the high level of regulatory and coordinated systems among members and main
bank(s). Then K-firms seem to have less earnings management relative to non-K-
firms. However, Rahman et al. (2010) claim that debt and equity holders (assumed
to be their main bank(s) or other K-firms in the group) do not play a monitoring
role in supervising accounting practices. Shuto and Iwasaki (2014) also report that
a strong relationship between banks and firms leads to the loss-avoidance behaviour
of the latter. So the accounting information of K-firms may not be of high quality.
Inoue and Thomas (1996) find that both firm size and debt influence Japanese
managers to choose accounting choices in the same way, regardless of belonging
to a keirestu group; their finding supports the political cost and debt covenant
hypotheses.
In Japan, the government has an important influence on the accounting practices
of the corporate sector through the commercial code and security law (Darrough
et al., 1998). The US practices have a moderate influence on Japanese accounting
reporting practices and the tax authority has a relatively high influence (Gray et al.,
1984). Since 2007, Japan has been working on converging its accounting standards
to IFRS. Japanese listed companies that meet certain criteria can voluntarily adopt
IFRS-based Japanese standards for their consolidated financial reports from March
2010. However, as of February 2014, only around 30 companies have disseminated
information about their adoption or solely their intention to comply.14 According
to Leuz et al. (2003), Japan is classified as a country with a high level of ownership
concentration, weak investor protection, and low disclosure levels in comparison to
the US or UK. These institutional factors contribute to a relatively high level of
earnings management in Japan (Leuz et al., 2003).
14www.ifrs.org
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4.2.4 Earnings management in Japan
Many studies report that earnings management incentives in Japan are similar to
those in the western countries, though institutional factors are somewhat differ-
ent. For example, Darrough et al. (1998) demonstrate that Japanese managers are
more likely to engage in income-increasing manipulation to boost their bonuses or
increase external financing. Shuto (2007) reports a positive relationship between
discretionary accruals and executive cash compensation suggesting that Japanese
managers manage earnings via DAC to inflate their bonuses. The author also finds
that they are more likely to take a big bath (using accruals and extraordinary items)
during the year the executive bonuses are cut in order to maximise future bonuses.
However, Inoue and Thomas (1996) show that the bonus plan hypothesis does not
hold in Japan. The authors explain that Japanese executive bonuses are relatively
low and stable in comparison to those of US firms, so they may have a small effect
on managerial accounting choices.
Unlike IFRS, Japanese GAAP prohibit capitalisation of R&D expenses.15 The
extant studies especially in the US and UK report that managers may alter invest-
ment to inflate earnings such as cutting R&D (Baber and Fairfield, 1991; Dechow
and Sloan, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Osma and Young, 2009). Nagy and Neal (2001) find
no evidence of accrual manipulation by American and Japanese firms listed on the
US stock exchanges but they report that the latter alter R&D to a higher degree to
smooth income. Consistently, Mande et al. (2000) find that listed Japanese firms
adjust R&D to smooth income and do so even more in expansion years. Albeit
Japanese firms can capitalise R&D investment and then amortise such investment
over a five-year period in according with the Japanese commercial code, the ma-
jority of the Japanese firms record R&D as expense when it is incurred (Mande
et al., 2000). Since Japanese firms are generally R&D-intensive (see OECD (2013)),
a large amount of R&D investment may open more opportunities for manipulation.
15www.iasplus.com
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A few studies have documented earnings management to meet thresholds in
Japan. For instance, Shuto and Iwasaki (2014) find a relatively strong disconti-
nuity at zero in the earnings distribution of Japanese firms, suggesting a strong
incentive for loss avoidance in Japan. Thomas et al. (2004) also examining earnings
distribution, report that Japanese companies use business transactions with their
affiliates/subsidiaries (could be considered as firms in keiretsu) to manage earnings
to avoid earnings losses. Herrmann et al. (2003) find a negative relationship between
gains from sale of fixed assets/securities and management forecast error of Japanese
firms. The relationship suggests that Japanese managers may choose the timing of
assets sales to manage earnings to meet their earnings forecasts.
This study extends prior research about earnings management to avoid losses in
Japan around the passage of JSOX. The research questions are as follows:
1. Does loss avoidance of Japanese firms decline after the passage of JSOX?
2. To what extent does accounting and real activity manipulation of loss avoid-
ance firms change around the JSOX period?
4.3 Research design and sample selection
4.3.1 Managing to avoid earnings losses
The extant research reports that small-loss firms have incentives to manipulate earn-
ings upward to avoid reporting losses, which causes a discontinuity at zero in the
earnings distribution. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find a discontinuity by exam-
ining the distribution of market value-scaled earnings and Burgstahler and Chuk
(2015) find the same pattern by examining the earnings (in million dollars) distri-
bution of US firms. They demonstrate that firms with loss-avoidance behaviour
cause a discontinuity in the distribution because the number of SPOS firms, firms
that may have achieved loss avoidance, is unexpectedly high and the number of
SLOS firms is unexpected low. Degeorge et al. (1999) find the same unsmooth pat-
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tern at zero in earnings per share distribution suggesting also managing earnings to
thresholds, including positive earnings, last year’s earnings, and analysts’ forecasts.
However, some studies argue that such discontinuity is not the evidence of earnings
management but is caused by the research design of prior studies.
Durtschi and Easton (2005, 2009) propose an alternative explanation of such
zero-earnings discontinuity, including earnings scaling and selection bias. In partic-
ular, the authors argue that an unexpectedly high (low) number of SPOS (SLOS)
could be explained as 1) profitable firms tend to have higher market value (MV) in
relation to loss making firms, so using MV to deflate earnings may draw profitable
firms toward zero – a problem of scaling and 2) a number of loss making firms are
excluded from the sample in the prior study due to a lack of MV leading to a rela-
tively low number of small loss firms – a problem of selection bias. Examining the
relatively similar sample with those in the study of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997),
they show the absence of zero-earnings discontinuity when earnings histograms are
plotted against net income (in million). In addition, Beaver et al. (2007) report that
the discontinuity may result from tax expenses and special items since such items
draw profits towards zero. Dechow et al. (2003) propose that if SPOS firms have
achieved loss avoidance by manipulating accruals then their discretionary accruals
might be higher than those of SLOS firms. The authors find no supporting evidence
that earnings management causes such a discontinuity.
Gilliam et al. (2015) examine MV-scaled earnings of US firms around SOX and
find no supporting evidence that scaling leads to the discontinuity of earnings distri-
bution in the pre-SOX period. In addition, Burgstahler and Chuk (2015) maintain
that the histograms of unscaled earnings still exhibit the discontinuities if the in-
terval widths of histogram being plotted correspond with firm size. They suggest
that a large firm is likely to have a variety of business transactions and in a larger
amount in relation to those of a small firm, which provides more opportunities for
large firm management to manage earnings to a greater extent.
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Prior studies used different interval widths to investigate loss-avoidance be-
haviour. For example, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Roychowdhury (2006)
used a bin width of 0.005 while Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) and Barth et al.
(2008) used a bin width of 0.01. Glaum et al. (2004) used several sets of bin widths
to study the earnings management of German and American firms. As suggested
by Burgstahler and Chuk (2015), a proper interval width may be essential for in-
vestigating loss avoidance effectively. Nevertheless, we argue that determining the
interval width for histogram plotting may be viewed as a selection bias since dif-
ferent widths may lead to different patterns around zero in the distribution and/or
different groups of suspect firms in investigated interval. Moreover, Glaum et al.
(2004) highlight the sensitiveness of the results to bin width if the sample being
tested consists of observations from many countries. Though the zero-earnings dis-
continuity is still a controversial issue among researchers, many studies have been
using SPOS firms, firms in the first interval to the right of zero, as firms suspected
of loss-avoidance behaviour (Lang et al., 2006; Roychowdhury, 2006; Barth et al.,
2008; Cohen et al., 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009).
This study examines the effect of JSOX on loss avoidance by examining the
degree of the discontinuity of the earnings distribution of Japanese firms for the
pre- and post-JSOX periods. To mitigate biases that may occur from the effects of
scaling and interval width selecting discussed earlier, we use unscaled net income
(in million yen) to plot earnings distributions. We follow Degeorge et al. (1999)
and Shuto and Iwasaki (2014) in systematically calculating the interval width for
earnings distribution plotting based on the Freedman–Diaconis rule as:
Interval width = 2(IQR)N (−1/3),
where, IQR is the interquartile of the data; N is the number of observations.
To test the degree of discontinuity at zero in the earnings distribution, we test
to what extent the observed number of SPOS and SLOS firms are different from the
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expected number. The significance of the difference is considered evidence of loss
avoidance. According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), the standardised difference
(d) of the number of firms in the interval i and the expected number is calculated
as follows:
di =
Observed number − Expected number
σ(Observed number − Expected number) , (4.1)
where, the expected number of firms in the interval i is the average number of the
two directly adjoining intervals (interval i+1 and i-1 ). We follow Beaver et al.
(2007) in calculating the standard deviation as follows:
σ = (Npi(1− pi) + (1/4)N(pi−1 + pi+1)(2− pi−1 − pi+1))0.5, (4.2)
where, N is the number of firms and p is the probability that firms fall into a
particular interval.
4.3.2 Accounting and real earnings management
According to the COSO report about fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley et al.,
2010), the number of firms committing financial fraud investigated by the US SEC
shows no decline in the last two decades (274 cases for 1987-1997 and 347 cases for
1998-2007). From the report, we can infer that accounting manipulation seems to
be a critical tool for manipulating earnings. For instance, to boost earnings, revenue
recognition accounts for around 61% followed by expense capitalising which accounts
for around 51% of the reported cases. Consistently, Nelson et al. (2002), based
on their survey of US auditors, report that the majority of earnings management
attempts by US firms are related to revenue recognition. The regulators and auditors
may not be interested in real activity manipulations since they may not directly
violate GAAP so no issues are documented.
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Graham et al. (2005), however, find that management themselves report a pref-
erence for real manipulations, such as altering discretionary expenses (e.g., R&D,
advertising, and maintenance) or postponing investment projects over accounting
manipulations. The authors also point out that managers are more likely to report
conducting real earnings manipulations, perceiving them to be more ethical. To
gain more insight about loss avoidance in Japan, the present study examines both
accounting and real earnings manipulation of Japanese firms around the passage of
JSOX.
To study the methods used to achieve loss avoidance, we basically compare ac-
counting and real activity of earnings management between firms with a propensity
for loss avoidance with other firms. This method is in the same spirit of many
prior studies that test earnings management components of loss avoidance firms
(Dechow et al., 2003; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen,
2009). In addition, we also employ a multivariate test to control for related fac-
tors. For accounting earnings management, a large body of accounting research
employs accrual models such as those based on the study of Jones (1991) to com-
pute aggregate DAC. Researchers have been debating about the proper use of such
models and many related problems have been documented, such as model specifi-
cation and omitted-variable problems, resulting in many extended versions of the
models (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005). The accrual model can be used
to detect earnings management but, as suggested by the Marquardt and Wiedman
(2004) study, specific accruals gain more insight into the methods used by firms
to accomplish earnings management. Researchers have also studied several specific
accruals as a tool of corporate managers for earnings management. For example,
Cohen et al. (2011) report that firms adjust warranty expenses and Jackson and Liu
(2010) demonstrate that firms use bad debt expenses to manage earnings. Frank
and Rego (2006) demonstrate that firms manage earnings to meet analyst forecasts
via an allowance for deferred tax assets.
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This study examines accruals related to accounts receivable, inventory, and ac-
crued expenses that may be used by Japanese managers to avoid reporting losses
around JSOX periods. We follow Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) in calculating
specific accruals as follows:
UARit = [ARit − (ARit−1 ∗ REV it/REV it−1)]/TAit−1, (4.3)
UINV it = [INV it − (INV it−1 ∗ COGS it/COGS it−1)]/TAit−1, (4.4)
UACCLit = [ACCLit − (ACCLit−1 ∗ REV it/REV it−1)]/TAit−1, (4.5)
where, UAR is unexpected accounts receivable; AR is accounts receivable; REV is
revenues; UINV is unexpected inventory; INV is inventory; COGS is cost of goods
sold; UACCL is unexpected total accrued expenses; ACCL is accrued expenses;
TA is total assets. Due to the availability of data, our total accrued expenses are
computed from total current liabilities minus accounts payable, short-term debt,
and the current portion of long-term debt. We also address the effect of industrial
business practices by calculating unexpected accruals from industrial revenue and
cost of goods sold growths.
While Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) construct several proxies to calculate
unexpected accounts, we employ three proxies that seem to be directly related to
accrual estimation the most. In particular, we do not employ unexpected special
items because they seem to be related to the choices of transaction timing rather
than accrual manipulation. The assumption for our test is that if a company inflates
earnings by intentionally underestimating an allowance for doubtful accounts, UAR
will be highly positive (the booked accounts receivable is larger than the expected
accounts receivable given the revenue growth). Note that Marquardt and Wiedman
(2004) also interpret an unexpectedly high value of accounts receivable as the result
of sales boosting. In the same spirit, UINV will be highly positive resulting from
an undervalued allowance for obsolete inventory. UACCL will be highly negative
assuming that accounts related to a provision for product warranty or a promotional
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programme is undervalued. We multiply UACCL by -1 to make interpretation
consistent with UAR and UINV in that the more positive the value the greater the
degree of earnings management via these accounts. These measures are calculated
from revenues or cost of goods sold, assuming that they are clean from managerial
intervention. However, Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) mention that this may
not be the case since, for example, revenues may be contaminated by premature
revenues. Furthermore, it can be argued that the models may be more accurate
to estimate the unexpected accounts of a steady state growth firm, not a firm, for
example, in a decline period.
As mentioned before, Japanese firms have been reported to adjust investment
spending to manage earnings, especially R&D, so we also examine the effect of
JSOX on real earnings management. The extant studies use changes in R&D and/or
CAPEX as the indicators of earnings management (Baber and Fairfield, 1991; De-
chow and Sloan, 1991; Bushee, 1998). Note that changes in the investment may
be caused by many factors. So to address the issue, Roychowdhury (2006) has de-
veloped a model to measure unexpected discretionary expenses including R&D and
maintenance expenses as follows:
DISEXP it = β0 + β1(REV it−1/TAit−1) + εit. (4.6)
According to the model, discretionary expenses (DISEXP) are modelled by lagged
revenues and the residual from the model represents unexpected discretionary ex-
penses.
Calculating unexpected accruals, discussed earlier, seems reasonable since these
accounts may vary correspondingly with revenue movement – an increase in revenues
plausibly leads to an increase in an allowance for doubtful accounts or a provision for
warranty – so variation from the expected value may be caused by unfair managerial
estimations while this may not be the case with R&D spending. Nguyen et al.
(2010) show a significant relationship between many factors and the R&D spending
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of Japanese firms, such as cash, debt, and firm size. Bhagat and Welch (1995) also
find that last year’s debt significantly explains the R&D expenses of Japanese firms.
The time-series regression model of US firms conducted by Berger (1993) shows that
significant explanatory variables for R&D are last year’s R&D, internal funds, and
industrial R&D. From these studies, funding and last year’s R&D seem to play an
important role in determining current R&D, so we compute the unexpected R&D
investment of Japanese firms from the following regression:
RDit = β0 + β1SIZE it + β2RDit−1 + β3CFOit−1 + β4LEV it−1 + εit, (4.7)
where, RD is research and development expenses; SIZE is the natural logarithm of
total assets; CFO is operating cash flow; LEV is total debt; ε represents unexpected
R&D (URD). RD, CFO, and LEV are scaled by total assets. We include lagged
operating cash flow and leverage to control for the funding of a company. Since
R&D may vary across industries, we conduct cross-sectional regression models by
year and industry to obtain URD. Unexpected CAPEX (UCAPEX) is computed in
the same way. We multiply URD and UCAPEX by -1 to make the interpretation
consistent with unexpected accruals.
We additionally test the effect of JSOX based on a multivariate analysis. Prior
studies employ either an OLS regression (Lang et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008) or a
logistic regression (Lang et al., 2003) to test the prevalence of loss-avoidance firms.
The assumptions of these tests may differ from the histogram test in that they do
not take SLOS into account. We additionally test the prevalence of loss avoidance
around JSOX using a logistic model as follows:
SPOS(1,0)it = β0 + β1JSOX it + β2LEV it + β3SIZE it
+ β4KEI it + Industry_dummy
+ Y ear_dummy + εit, (4.8)
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where, SPOS is a dummy variable (1 = sample in the first interval to the right of zero
of the earnings distribution (net income), 0 = otherwise); JSOX is a dummy variable
(1 = sample in JSOX period, 0 = otherwise); LEV is total debt over total assets;
SIZE is logarithm of total assets; KEI is a dummy variable (1 = sample belongs
to keiretsu group, 0 = otherwise). We expect a significantly negative coefficient on
the JSOX variable as an indicator of a decline in the prevalence of loss avoidance
in the JSOX period. We identify SPOS firms based not only on the distribution of
net income but also on the distribution of net income before extraordinary items
(NIBX) for sensitivity tests.
To test the effect of JSOX on the manipulating method of suspect firms control-
ling for related factors, we employ logistic regression models to examine EMC as
follows:
SPOS(1,0)it = β0 + β1JSOX it + β2UARit + β3UAR ∗ JSOX it + β4UINV it
+ β5UINV ∗ JSOX it + β6UACCLit + β7UACCL ∗ JSOX it
+ β8URDit + β9URD ∗ JSOX it + β10UCAPEX it
+ β11UCAPEX ∗ JSOX it + β12LEV it + β13SIZE it
+ β13KEI it + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + εit, (4.9)
SPOS(1,0)it = β0 + β1JSOX it + β2TACC it + β3TACC ∗ JSOX it
+ β4TREALit + β5TREAL ∗ JSOX it
+ β6LEV it + β7SIZE it + β8KEI it
+ Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + εit, (4.10)
4.3.3 Sample and descriptive statistics
The data of this study are the annual accounting information of Japanese firms listed
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange extracted from the DataStream databases covering
the 15-year period from 2000 to 2014 (inclusive). Financial firms are excluded due
to the difference in the business nature and accounting methods which may be
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inappropriate for the calculation of unexpected accounts being tested. We group
together utilities, communications, and oil and gas industries as they have a small
sample size. The final sample consists of 22,669 firm-year observations across seven
industries as presented in Table 4.1.
[Table 4.1 about here]
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables being tested and the
control variables.
[Table 4.2 about here]
From Panel A of Table 4.2, the frequency of SPOS firms shows a slight decrease from
the mean value of around 9% to 8% of the overall sample between JSOX periods.
Mean net income increases from around U6.5m to U7m. For unexpected accruals,
the mean (median) values of UAR increases from -0.004 (-0.002) to 0.000 (0.000),
UNIV shows no material change, and UACCL decreases from the mean (median)
values of 0.002 (0.001) to 0.000 (-0.001). URD and UCAPEX show no changes while
investment in R&D and CAPEX increases – R&D increases from around the mean
value of U9m to U10m and CAPEX increases from around U14m to U15m. Debt
decreases as the leverage ratio falls from around 24% to 21%. Firms show some
growth in SIZE in the period of JSOX. Regarding K-firms, around 15% of firms
belongs to keiretsu in both periods. We use information of both horizontal and
vertical keiretsu firms gathered by Ohsono (1995).
Panel B of Table 4.2 separately presents descriptive statistics of the sample of the
small and large firms on the basis of total assets. The frequency of SPOS firms in the
large-firm group is around 7% while the number of the small-firm group is around
4%. Large firms have the mean net income of around U12m while small firms have
around U0.82m. The two groups seem to have the same level of unexpected accruals
except that the small group has a higher level of UACCL. While there seems to be
no significant difference between URD and UCAPEX, large firms invest more in
R&D and CAPEX with the mean values of around U16m and U27m, respectively,
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in comparison to those of small firms of around U0.73m and U1.12m, respectively.
The small-firm group has a leverage ratio around 20% while the other group has
more debt with a corresponding ratio around 25%. There are around 27% of K-firms
presented in the large-firm group and only 5% in the other group.
4.4 Empirical results and discussion
4.4.1 The effect of JSOX on earnings management to avoid losses
This section presents and discusses the results from a histogram analysis and a
logistic regression on the effect of JSOX on loss avoidance.
A histogram analysis
[Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3 about here]
Figure 4.1 shows four histograms of unscaled net income with an interval width of
0.31. From Panel A, the left histogram shows a profound zero-earnings discontinuity
– a relatively high number of SPOS firms (the interval to the right of zero) relative
to that of SLOS firms (the interval to the left of zero) – in the pre-JSOX period.
So it is possible that in the pre-JSOX period there are a number of SPOS firms
that may have pursued loss avoidance, which is consistent with the prior Japanese
studies of Thomas et al. (2004) and Shuto and Iwasaki (2014). The histogram of
the post-JSOX period exhibits a somewhat similar pattern of zero-discontinuity.
From the histograms, there seem to be insignificant changes in the prevalence of
loss-avoidance behaviour after JSOX.
Standardised difference statistics presented in Table 4.3 quantitatively test the
significance of the difference between the observed number and the expected number
of both SPOS and SLOS firms. The results show that the observed number of SPOS
(SLOS) firms is significantly higher (lower) than the expected number at the 1% level
for both periods. Though the values are still significant in the post-JSOX period,
they are lower than those in the pre-JSOX period for both SPOS and SLOS firms.
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Specifically, the statistic of SPOS firms declines from 8.23 in the pre-JSOX to 4.90
in the post-JSOX period and that of SLOS drops from -14.90 to -10.56. The results
suggest some expected effects of JSOX on loss avoidance. Note that the number
of firms in the two next intervals to the right is also relatively high in relation to
that in the fourth interval for both histograms, so it is possible that Japanese firms
may have a relatively strong incentive to avoid losses. It may be the case that the
business practice of reporting low profits is prevalent in Japan. The histograms and
statistical tests with K-firms excluded show somewhat similar results.
Burgstahler and Chuk (2015) highlight the effect of firm size on the extent of
earnings management and so we conduct additional tests of sub-groups of large and
small firms, partitioning on the basis of total assets.
[Figure 4.2 and Table 4.4 about here]
Figure 4.2 shows the histograms of large-firm and small-firm groups with interval
widths of 0.97 and 0.11, respectively. The distributions of large firms in Panel A show
the clear discontinuities for both periods. Table 4.4 shows that the standardised
statistics of both SPOS and SLOS firms are significant at the 1% level in both
periods. However, the statistics decline in the post-JSOX period. The distributions
of small firms presented in Panel B also show the clear discontinuities in both periods
and the statistic values for SPOS show a decline from 2.66 (significant at the 1%
level) to 1.34 (significant at the 10% level). Consistent with the overall analysis, the
analysis suggests some desirable effects of JSOX on the loss-avoidance behaviour of
Japanese firms, though the degree of such discontinuities is still high especially for
large firms.
Multivariate analysis
Table 4.7 presents results from a logistic regression for the effect of JSOX on loss
avoidance controlling for related factors.
[Table 4.7 about here]
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From Panel A of Table 4.7, the results from model 1 for the overall sample show
that the estimated coefficient on JSOX is significantly negative at the 5% level with
a marginal effect of around 1% – this suggests that an average sample in the JSOX
period is less likely to engage in loss avoidance. Consistently, model 2 shows that
the coefficients on JSOX of large firms are significantly negative at the 1% level
with a marginal effect around 2%. The regression analysis in Model 3 shows no
effect of JSOX on loss avoidance of small firms. From the results, JSOX appears
to have a negative effect on loss avoidance. A possible explanation for the JSOX
effect on large firms would be that large firms may be the first group to which
the regulators pay attention after the passage of JSOX, so they may have greater
potential to face more costs if manipulation is detected resulting in a decline in
earnings management incentives. Another possible explanation would be that the
JSOX may trigger a firm’s internal control improvements but since large firms may
have more resources, the process of internal control improvement may pay off much
sooner.
Based on the histogram analyses and logistic regressions, JSOX appears to have
some desirable effect on loss avoidance, especially for large firms. The findings are
partly consistent with the findings in the US (Depken and Ouyang, 2006; Cohen
et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Aubert and Grudnitski, 2014; Gilliam et al.,
2015). The difference in the effectiveness of JSOX is possibly explained by 1) JSOX
is less stringent than SOX and 2) the difference in the institutional factors such
as different legal enforcement levels or the business practice of reporting or main-
taining a modest profit. To mitigate the effect of extraordinary items on earnings
distribution mentioned earlier, we additionally test net income before extraordinary
items. The histogram analyses (presented in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and Tables 4.5, 4.6)
show similar results. For logistic regressions (presented in Panel B of Table 4.7), we
find that JSOX appears to have a negative effect solely on large firms.
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4.4.2 Components of earnings management to avoid losses
This section presents and discusses the results from the analysis of EMC.
Univariate analysis
We compare UAR, UINV, UACCL, URD, and UCAPEX of SPOS firms and other
firms, treating the latter as the control group. We expect that if SPOS firms use
particular EMC to manage earnings their values might be statistically higher than
those of other firms. We also compare EMC of SPOS firms between the JSOX
periods to investigate changes. Since a firm may use several components together to
manage earnings, we also combine EMC into total unexpected accruals (TACC) for
accounting manipulation and total investment adjusting (TREAL) for real activity
manipulation for the tests. Table 4.8 reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U
tests.16
[Table 4.8 about here]
From Panel A of Table 4.8, we find that SPOS firms relative to other firms use both
accrual and investment adjustment to manage earnings in both pre-and post-JSOX
periods and the overall levels of unexpected accruals and unexpected investment
show no changes between the JSOX periods. In particular, in the pre-JSOX period
UAR, UINV, UACCL, and UCAPEX of SPOS firms are statistically higher than
those of other firms at the 5%, 1%, 1%, and 1% levels, respectively. TACC and
TREAL of suspect firms are also statistically higher, both at the 1% level. In the
post-JSOX period UAR, UACCL, and UCAPEX are statistically higher than those
of other firms, all at the 5% level. TACC and TREAL of suspect firms are also
statistically higher at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Comparing SPOS firms
between JSOX periods, we find that UAR significantly increases while UACCL
significantly decreases in the post-JSOX period – both are significant at the 1%
level. Based on the findings, it is possible to note that for accrual manipulation
16We use the Mann-Whitney U test to address the skewness of variables.
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alone, firms have several choices and are able to switch from one specific accrual to
another as required.
According to Marquardt and Wiedman (2004), the costs of manipulation may
be different across specific accounts, so managers may be selective in the methods
being used to manipulate earnings in a particular business circumstance. Therefore,
Japanese managers may switch from costly accounts to those with lower costs to
compensate for increased costs imposed by JSOX (e.g. penalty costs). However,
we cannot rule out other possible explanations for switching between accruals. As
reported by Barton and Simko (2002), a long-period undervaluation of an allowance
will pile up in the balance sheet (resulting in highly overvalued operating assets),
which automatically constrains management to manipulate such accounts. If this is
the case, management may turn to other specific accruals when a particular accrual
has been limited by a long-term manipulation. We find no evidence that SPOS
firms alter R&D to manage earnings but rather they are likely to alter CAPEX. It
is possible that investment in CAPEX is larger (recall the descriptive statistics) so
it provides more room for management to manipulate.
The findings are inconsistent with the findings of prior research in the US (Co-
hen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009) that report that SOX leads to a decline
(an increase) in accounting (real) earnings management. Basically, in both periods
Japanese SPOS firms alter both accruals and investment to achieve loss avoidance,
suggesting the small effect of JSOX on manipulating methods. The different find-
ings may be caused by the difference between JSOX and SOX. Another possible
explanation may be a difference between the perceptions of earnings management
as discussed in Chapter 1. While American management may perceive real activ-
ity earnings management as more ethical, so they substitute them for accounting
methods in the SOX period, Japanese management may perceive both methods as
acceptable. The analysis with K-firms excluded also shows more or less similar
results (presented in Panel B of Table 4.8).
[Table 4.9 about here]
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Table 4.9 presents the results for large and small firms. The findings are qualitatively
similar to the findings in Table 4.8. The additional findings are that suspect large
firms appear to manipulate both accruals and investment while suspect small firms
are more likely to use only accruals. We find some evidence of R&D manipulating by
large SPOS firms in the post-JSOX period. A possible conjecture for the different
methods used between small and large firms may be that the latter may have a
larger amount of R&D and CAPEX than the former which, as discussed earlier,
offers more room for manipulation. The descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table
4.2 seem to support the explanation. Both groups also appear to switch from one
specific accrual to another between periods.
Multivariate analysis
Table 4.12 presents the results from the logistic models of SPOS on EMC and control
variables including leverage, firm size, K-firms, industry- and year-fixed effects.
[Table 4.12 about here]
From Table 4.12, model 1, which tests the overall sample, shows that the coefficients
on UINV, UACCL, and UCAPEX are significantly positive at the 1%, 1%, and 10%
levels with marginal effect of around 17%, 13%, and 12%, respectively. So a 1-
unit increase in UINV would increase the likelihood of an average sample to belong
to SPOS group at around 17%, around 13% and 12% for the 1-unit increase of
UACCL and UCAPEX, respectively. The results suggest that firms with a high level
of unexpected accruals related to inventory and accrued expenses and unexpected
CAPEX are more likely to engage in loss-avoidance behaviour. Considering the
interact variables of unexpected accounts and JSOX, the coefficients on all interact
variables are not statistical significant, implying that JSOX has no significant effect
on the level of unexpected accruals and unexpected expenditures. Model 2 reports
the results for large firms showing that only the coefficient on UACCL is significantly
positive at the 5% level and JSOX has no significant effect on unexpected accrued
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expenses as well. We find no evidence of unexpected accounts used by small firms
to avoid losses.
The findings from the analysis of combined earnings management components are
presented in Table 4.13. Model 1 shows that SPOS firms are more likely to use both
methods to avoid losses. Specifically, from Model 1, the estimated coefficients on
TACC and TREAL are significantly positive at the 1% and 5% levels with marginal
effects of around 5% and 9%, respectively. Considering the interact variables, JSOX
appears to have no effect on the unexpected accounts used to manipulate earnings.
The results for large firms presented in Model 2 are more or less similar to Model
1. We find no evidence of unexpected accounts used by small firms to avoid losses.
[Table 4.13 about here]
Table 4.13 presents the results from logistic regressions based on NIBX. The
findings are more or less the same, except that for large firms there seems to be
some desirable effect of JSOX on manipulating methods used to avoid loss. In
particular, the coefficients on UAR, UINV, and UACCL are significantly positive
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level with the marginal effect of around 13%, 10%, and
8%, respectively. Considering the interact variables between unexpected accounts
and JSOX, it appears that JSOX has a significantly negative effect on UAR and
UINV both at the 5% level, suggesting that large firms use fewer accruals related
to accounts receivable and inventory in the post-JSOX period. The analysis of
TACC and TREAL presented in Table 4.14 shows more or less similar results to
those in Table 4.12 except that JSOX has a significant effect on the use of accruals
manipulation in large firms to avoid losses.
From the analysis, JSOX mainly seems to have no significant effect on methods
used to achieve loss avoidance. Japanese firms, especially large firms, use both
accruals and investment manipulation to achieve loss avoidance.
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4.5 Summary and conclusion
This chapter tests the effect of JSOX on earnings management to avoid losses in
Japan. It also tests the use of specific earnings management components including
three specific accruals and two investment accounts that may be used by firms
assumed to have a propensity for loss avoidance.
Based on the analysis of discontinuity in the unscaled earnings distribution,
JSOX appears to have some desirable effects on the loss avoidance of Japanese
firms, especially large firms. The results from the logistic regressions controlling for
firm size, leverage, keiretsu groups, industry- and year-fixed effects, are consistent
with the distribution studies in that JSOX has a significant effect on large firms. The
overall findings of the current study partly support the previous research that SOX
contributes to a significant decline in earnings management in the US. A possible
conjecture for the moderate effects of JSOX may be that JSOX is basically different
from SOX – JSOX includes only a few parts of SOX so is less stringent. In addition,
it may result from the difference in institutional factors such as legal enforcement
levels and/or business practices between the two economies.
The study also finds that firms suspected of having achieved loss avoidance use
both accrual manipulation and investment adjustment to avoid losses in relation to
other firms. JSOX appears to have no effect on the methods used by suspect firms.
We also find that suspect firms switch from one particular accrual to other accruals
during JSOX periods, which may result from the different costs of manipulation of
related accounts. Interestingly, we find that Japanese firms are less likely to adjust
R&D to manage earnings but are more likely to adjust CAPEX. It may be that
firms have a higher CAPEX budget so this provides more room for management to
manipulate. We also find that small suspect firms are less likely to alter investment
in comparison to large suspect firms. It could be the case that small firms have
smaller CAPEX and R&D budgets, which partly constrains managerial discretion.
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Our study contributes to the extant literature on the effect of SOX-like regula-
tions on loss-avoidance behaviour and on the components of earnings management.
In addition, it adds to the ongoing debates about the validity of the methods used
to study earnings management to avoid losses.
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Table 4.1: Sample distribution
No. of Percent
Observations
Panel A: Year breakdown
2000 1,325 5.84
2001 1,383 6.10
2002 1,418 6.26
2003 1,451 6.40
2004 1,500 6.62
2005 1,521 6.71
2006 1,536 6.78
2007 1,546 6.82
2008 1,564 6.90
2009 1,588 7.01
2010 1,604 7.08
2011 1,610 7.10
2012 1,617 7.13
2013 1,619 7.14
2014 1,387 6.12
Total 22,669 100.00
Panel B: Period breakdown
Pre-JSOX (2000-2008) 13,244 58.42
Post-JSOX (2009-2014) 9,425 41.58
Total 22,669 100.00
Panel C: Industry breakdown
Basic Materials (1000) 2,539 11.20
Industrials (2000) 7,897 34.84
Consumer Goods (3000) 4,335 19.12
Health Care (4000) 1,071 4.72
Consumer Services (5000) 4,037 17.81
Technology (9000) 2,184 9.63
Other 606 2.67
Total 22,669 100.00
Note:
The industrial grouping is based on International Classification
Benchmark (ICB). Other includes Utilities (7000), Telecommuni-
cations (6000), and Oil and Gas industries (0001).
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
N Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75% N Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75%
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by period
SPOS 13,244 0.087 0.281 0 0 0 9,425 0.076 0.256 0 0 0
NI (UMillion) 13,244 6.544 20.623 0.387 1.360 4.420 9,425 7.006 22.420 0.417 1.591 5.139
UAR 12,869 −0.004 0.039 −0.018 −0.002 0.010 9,058 0.000 0.043 −0.016 0.000 0.016
UINV 12,608 −0.001 0.025 −0.009 0.000 0.008 8,930 0.000 0.026 −0.008 0.000 0.009
UACCL 12,923 0.002 0.036 −0.011 0.001 0.013 9,066 0.000 0.031 −0.012 −0.001 0.011
URD 7,389 0.000 0.005 −0.001 0.000 0.002 5,809 0.000 0.005 −0.001 0.000 0.002
UCAPEX 10,769 0.000 0.021 −0.008 0.003 0.011 8,458 0.000 0.020 −0.007 0.003 0.011
R&D (UMillion) 9,036 8.915 31.208 0.340 1.167 4.102 6,290 9.880 32.679 0.311 1.133 4.507
CAPEX (UMillion) 13,153 14.005 41.346 0.581 2.002 6.945 9,118 14.816 43.005 0.544 2.044 7.771
LEV 12,114 0.241 0.182 0.085 0.214 0.363 8,641 0.207 0.171 0.058 0.175 0.320
SIZE 13,243 18.217 1.512 17.248 18.058 19.080 9,162 18.316 1.529 17.294 18.160 19.184
KEI 14,616 0.153 0.360 0 0 0 9,744 0.153 0.360 0 0 0
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Table 4.2: Continued
Small firms Large firms
N Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75% N Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75%
Panel B: Descriptive statistics by firm size
SPOS 11,195 0.042 0.201 0 0 0 11,198 0.073 0.260 0 0 0
NI (UMillion) 11,195 0.824 1.872 0.229 0.690 1.481 11,198 12.758 29.163 1.407 4.446 12.207
UAR 10,849 −0.002 0.045 −0.019 −0.001 0.014 11,078 −0.002 0.036 −0.016 −0.001 0.011
UINV 10,613 −0.001 0.027 −0.009 0.000 0.009 10,925 −0.001 0.024 −0.008 0.000 0.008
UACCL 10,919 0.002 0.040 −0.013 0.000 0.014 11,070 0.000 0.028 −0.011 0.000 0.010
URD 5,605 0.000 0.005 −0.002 0.000 0.002 7,593 0.000 0.005 −0.001 0.000 0.002
UCAPEX 9,073 0.000 0.024 −0.008 0.004 0.012 10,154 0.000 0.018 −0.007 0.003 0.010
R&D (UMillion) 6,876 0.726 0.866 0.149 0.421 1.013 8,445 16.306 41.572 1.053 3.397 10.774
CAPEX (UMillion) 11,100 1.212 1.560 0.230 0.680 1.608 11,160 27.405 56.404 2.691 6.695 21.240
LEV 9,952 0.202 0.167 0.059 0.166 0.308 10,803 0.250 0.185 0.091 0.230 0.375
SIZE 11,203 17.082 0.800 16.680 17.268 17.701 11,202 19.433 1.102 18.554 19.127 20.040
KEI 11,203 0.054 0.227 0 0 0 11,202 0.265 0.441 0 0 1
Note:
Variable definitions are as follows: SPOS is a dummy variable (1 = a firm that shows a small positive profit, 0 = otherwise). NI is
net income. UAR is unexpected accounts receivable. UINV is unexpected inventory. UACCL is unexpected accrued expenses. URD
is unexpected R&D. UCAPEX is unexpected capital expenditure. R&D is research and development expenses. CAPEX is capital
expenditure. LEV is total debts scaled by total assets. SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets. KEI is a dummy variable for keiretsu
firms (1 = keiretsu firms, 0 = otherwise). The interval width for SPOS of the overall sample is U0.31 Million. The interval width for
SPOS of small (large) firm group is U0.11 Million (U0.97 Million.). The sample is grouped into large and small firm groups on the
basis of total assets. Variables being tested are winsorized at 1% to control for outliers.
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Panel A: Overall sample - NI
Panel B: K-firms excluded - NI
Figure 4.1: Distributions of net income (in million yen). Panel A present the distributions of
overall sample with the interval width of 0.31 (U310,000). Panel B presents the distributions of
overall sample with K-firms excluded.
Table 4.3: Statistics of standardised difference - Overall sample - NI
Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
N Small loss Small Profit N Small loss Small profit
Overall sample 13,244 −14.90∗∗∗ 8.23∗∗∗ 9,425 −10.56∗∗∗ 4.90∗∗∗
K-firms excluded 11,111 −14.20∗∗∗ 7.61∗∗∗ 7,966 −9.94∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗
Note:
∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-
tailed).
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Panel A: Large firms - NI
Panel B: Small firms - NI
Figure 4.2: Distributions of net income (in million yen) of large and small firms. Panel A presents
the distributions of large firms with the interval width of 0.97 (U970,000). Panel B presents the
distributions of small firms with the interval width of 0.11 (U110,000).
Table 4.4: Statistics of standardised difference - Large and small firms - NI
Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
N Small loss Small Profit N Small loss Small profit
Large firms 6,458 −8.89∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗ 4,740 −7.19∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗
Small firms 6,779 −6.90∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗ 4,416 −4.63∗∗∗ 1.34∗
Note:
∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-
tailed).
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Panel A: Overall sample - NIBX
Panel B: K-firms excluded - NIBX
Figure 4.3: Distributions of net income before extraordinary items (in million yen). Panel A
presents the distributions of overall sample with the interval width of 0.41 (U410,000). Panel B
presents the distributions of overall sample with K-firms excluded.
Table 4.5: Statistics of standardised difference - Overall sample - NIBX
Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
N Small loss Small Profit N Small loss Small profit
Overall sample 13,243 −12.77∗∗∗ 6.60∗∗∗ 9,426 −9.70∗∗∗ 4.78∗∗∗
Keiretsu excluded 11,110 −12.62∗∗∗ 6.53∗∗∗ 7,967 −9.55∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗
Note:
∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-
tailed).
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Panel A: Large firms - NIBX
Panel B: Small firms - NIBX
Figure 4.4: Distributions of net income before extraordinary items (in million yen) of large
and small firms. Panel A presents the distributions of large firms with the interval width of 1.22
(U1,220,000). Panel B presents the distributions of small firms with the interval width of 0.12
(U120,000).
Table 4.6: Statistics of standardised difference - Large and small firms - NIBX
Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
N Small loss Small Profit N Small loss Small profit
Large firms 6,459 −7.44∗∗∗ 0.89 4,740 −4.80∗∗∗ 0.49
Small firms 6,777 −3.78∗∗∗ 0.02 4,417 −2.13∗∗∗ −0.32
Note:
∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-
tailed).
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Table 4.7: The effect of JSOX on the prevalence of loss avoidance
Overall Sample Large firms Small firms
Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM
Panel A: Net income
JSOX −0.42∗∗ −2.20 −0.01 −0.70∗∗∗ −3.05 −0.02 −0.44 −1.12 −0.01
LEV 1.99∗∗∗ 12.33 0.07 2.62∗∗∗ 11.85 0.08 1.86∗∗∗ 6.62 0.06
SIZE −1.13∗∗∗−39.06 −0.04 −1.53∗∗∗−20.21 −0.05 −0.93∗∗∗−15.73 −0.03
KEI 0.45∗∗∗ 4.37 0.02 0.34∗∗∗ 3.21 0.01 0.12 0.46 0.00
Constant 17.26∗∗∗ 33.29 26.02∗∗∗ 18.37 12.41∗∗∗ 11.82
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 20,745 10,800 9,945
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.17 0.09
Panel B: Net income before extraordinary items
JSOX −0.15 −0.76 0.00 −0.91∗∗∗ −3.27 −0.02 0.19 0.47 0.00
LEV 2.14∗∗∗ 12.79 0.06 2.79∗∗∗ 11.55 0.06 2.12∗∗∗ 6.51 0.04
SIZE −1.41∗∗∗−43.42 −0.04 −1.86∗∗∗−19.57 −0.04 −1.11∗∗∗−16.46 −0.02
KEI 4.11∗∗∗ 3.59 0.01 0.35∗∗∗ 3.08 0.01 0.10 0.30 0.00
Constant 21.97∗∗∗ 38.04 31.96∗∗∗ 18.03 14.49∗∗∗ 12.10
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 20,746 10,801 9,945
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.20 0.13
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following logistic model:
SPOS(1,0)it = β0 + β1JSOXit + β2LEVit + β3SIZEit + β4KEIit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + εit.
JSOX is a dummy variable (1 = a sample in the JSOX period (2009-2014), 0 = otherwise). Other
variables are defined in Table 4.2.∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). MEM is the marginal effect at mean.
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Table 4.8: Comparison of earnings management components - Overall sample
Pre-JSOX Mann-Whitney Post-JSOX Mann-Whitney SPOS Mann-Whitney
Median Median z p-value Median Median z p-value Median Median z p-value
Panel A: Overall sample
SPOS Others SPOS Others Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
UAR 0.000 −0.002 1.99∗∗ 0.023 0.002 0.000 2.23∗∗ 0.013 0.000 0.002 −2.66∗∗∗ 0.004
UINV 0.000 0.000 2.42∗∗∗ 0.008 0.001 0.000 1.09 0.139 0.000 0.001 −0.48 0.316
UACCL 0.003 0.000 4.89∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.001 2.15∗∗ 0.016 0.003 0.000 2.81∗∗∗ 0.002
TACC 0.004 −0.002 4.60∗∗∗ 0.000 0.005 0.000 3.19∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004 0.005 −0.82 0.206
URD 0.000 0.000 −0.48 0.317 0.000 0.000 −0.23 0.410 0.000 0.000 −0.08 0.466
UCAPEX 0.005 0.003 2.70∗∗∗ 0.003 0.005 0.003 2.15∗∗ 0.016 0.005 0.005 0.37 0.354
TREAL 0.005 0.003 2.67∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004 0.003 1.87∗∗ 0.031 0.005 0.004 0.55 0.292
Panel B: K-firms excluded
UAR 0.000 −0.001 1.55∗ 0.060 0.001 0.000 1.68∗∗ 0.047 0.000 0.001 −2.28∗∗ 0.011
UINV 0.000 0.000 1.64∗ 0.050 0.001 0.000 0.98 0.163 0.000 0.001 −0.70 0.241
UACCL 0.004 0.000 5.11∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.001 2.06∗∗ 0.020 0.004 0.000 2.98∗∗∗ 0.001
TACC 0.004 −0.002 4.13∗∗∗ 0.000 0.005 0.000 2.68∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004 0.005 −0.48 0.317
URD 0.000 0.000 −0.88 0.189 0.000 0.000 −0.50 0.308 0.000 0.000 −0.32 0.374
UCAPEX 0.005 0.003 2.22∗∗ 0.013 0.005 0.003 1.55∗ 0.061 0.005 0.005 0.41 0.340
TREAL 0.005 0.003 2.12∗∗ 0.017 0.004 0.003 1.21 0.114 0.005 0.004 0.59 0.277
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U tests. All variables are defined in Table 4.2. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 4.9: Comparison of earnings management components - Large and small firms
Pre-JSOX Mann-Whitney Post-JSOX Mann-Whitney SPOS Mann-Whitney
Median Median z p-value Median Median z p-value Median Median z p-value
Panel A: Large firms
SPOS Others SPOS Others Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
UAR −0.001 −0.001 0.64 0.261 0.002 0.000 1.81∗∗ 0.035 −0.001 0.002 −2.82∗∗∗ 0.002
UINV 0.000 0.000 0.37 0.357 −0.001 0.000 −1.96∗∗ 0.025 0.000 −0.001 0.63 0.266
UACCL 0.003 0.000 3.72∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 1.06 0.146 0.003 −0.001 2.47∗∗∗ 0.007
TACC −0.001 −0.003 1.69∗∗ 0.046 0.001 0.000 0.97 0.166 −0.001 0.001 −1.16 0.123
URD 0.000 0.000 −0.63 0.266 0.001 0.000 2.88∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000 0.001 −2.60∗∗∗ 0.005
UCAPEX 0.005 0.003 3.55∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004 0.002 2.91∗∗∗ 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.38 0.352
TREAL 0.005 0.003 3.42∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004 0.002 3.23∗∗∗ 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.07 0.474
Panel B: Small firms
UAR 0.000 −0.002 1.05 0.147 0.003 0.000 1.98∗∗ 0.024 0.000 0.003 −1.89∗∗ 0.029
UINV 0.000 0.000 0.94 0.174 0.001 0.000 1.41∗ 0.079 0.000 0.001 −0.80 0.213
UACCL 0.004 0.001 2.84∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.003 −0.001 1.49∗ 0.069 0.004 −0.003 1.50∗ 0.067
TACC 0.006 −0.001 2.63∗∗∗ 0.004 0.007 0.000 2.68∗∗∗ 0.004 0.006 0.007 −0.76 0.224
URD 0.000 0.000 −0.51 0.306 0.000 0.000 −1.19 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.33 0.370
UCAPEX 0.005 0.004 0.29 0.385 0.004 0.004 0.34 0.369 0.005 0.004 −0.20 0.423
TREAL 0.004 0.004 0.29 0.385 0.002 0.004 −0.12 0.452 0.004 0.002 0.08 0.470
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U tests. All variables are defined in Table 4.2. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 4.10: Comparison of earnings management components - Based on net income before extraordinary items
Pre-JSOX Mann-Whitney Post-JSOX Mann-Whitney SPOS Mann-Whitney
Median Median z p-value Median Median z p-value Median Median z p-value
Panel A: Overall sample
SPOS Others SPOS Others Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
UAR 0.000 −0.002 2.95∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.000 3.26∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.002 −2.77∗∗∗ 0.003
UINV 0.000 0.000 0.84 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.72 0.237 0.000 0.000 −1.18 0.119
UACCL 0.002 0.001 3.32∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 1.10 0.135 0.002 −0.001 2.62∗∗∗ 0.004
TACC 0.004 −0.002 4.56∗∗∗ 0.000 0.006 0.000 3.45∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004 0.006 −0.79 0.215
URD 0.000 0.000 −1.40∗ 0.081 0.000 0.000 −0.89 0.187 0.000 0.000 −0.14 0.444
UCAPEX 0.005 0.003 2.52∗∗∗ 0.006 0.005 0.003 2.18∗∗ 0.015 0.005 0.005 0.35 0.365
TREAL 0.005 0.003 2.13∗∗ 0.017 0.004 0.003 1.60∗ 0.055 0.005 0.004 0.49 0.311
Panel B: K-firms excluded
UAR 0.000 −0.001 2.89∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.000 2.73∗∗∗ 0.003 0.000 0.002 −2.23∗∗ 0.013
UINV 0.000 0.000 0.34 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.55 0.293 0.000 0.000 −1.24 0.108
UACCL 0.003 0.000 3.36∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.001 1.24 0.107 0.003 0.000 2.52∗∗∗ 0.009
TACC 0.004 −0.002 4.40∗∗∗ 0.000 0.005 0.000 3.06∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004 0.005 −0.42 0.339
URD 0.000 0.000 −1.00 0.159 0.000 0.000 −1.05 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.01 0.497
UCAPEX 0.005 0.003 2.16∗∗ 0.015 0.005 0.003 1.92∗∗ 0.028 0.005 0.005 0.24 0.405
TREAL 0.005 0.003 1.91∗∗ 0.028 0.004 0.003 1.33∗ 0.092 0.005 0.004 0.46 0.234
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U tests. All variables are defined in Table 4.2. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 4.11: Comparison of earnings management components - Based on net income before extraordinary items
Pre-JSOX Mann-Whitney Post-JSOX Mann-Whitney SPOS Mann-Whitney
Median Median z p-value Median Median z p-value Median Median z p-value
Panel A: Large firms
SPOS Others SPOS Others Pre-JSOX Post-JSOX
UAR 0.000 −0.002 2.76∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 0.000 1.98∗∗ 0.024 0.000 0.002 −1.61∗ 0.054
UINV 0.001 0.000 2.87∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.001 0.000 −2.05∗∗ 0.020 0.001 −0.001 2.19∗∗ 0.014
UACCL 0.002 0.000 1.66∗∗ 0.049 0.001 −0.001 2.57∗∗∗ 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.15 0.443
TACC 0.005 −0.003 4.51∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004 0.000 1.92∗∗ 0.028 0.005 0.004 −0.08 0.467
URD 0.000 0.000 −0.48 0.316 0.000 0.000 0.44 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.27 0.395
UCAPEX 0.004 0.003 1.47∗ 0.070 0.005 0.002 2.45∗∗∗ 0.007 0.004 0.005 −0.40 0.343
TREAL 0.004 0.003 1.27 0.102 0.005 0.002 2.42∗∗∗ 0.008 0.004 0.005 −0.51 0.306
Panel B: Small firms
UAR 0.002 −0.002 2.84∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003 0.000 2.40∗∗∗ 0.008 0.002 0.003 −0.79 0.214
UINV 0.000 0.000 −0.21 0.418 0.001 0.000 0.44 0.329 0.000 0.001 −0.72 0.236
UACCL 0.003 0.001 2.00∗∗ 0.023 0.000 −0.001 0.78 0.218 0.003 0.000 1.57∗ 0.059
TACC 0.009 −0.001 3.49∗∗∗ 0.000 0.010 0.000 2.83∗∗∗ 0.002 0.009 0.010 0.06 0.475
URD 0.000 0.000 −0.06 0.475 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.498 0.000 0.000 −0.33 0.372
UCAPEX 0.003 0.004 −0.04 0.484 0.005 0.004 0.53 0.298 0.003 0.005 −0.71 0.238
TREAL 0.002 0.004 −0.04 0.485 0.005 0.004 0.51 0.304 0.002 0.005 −0.72 0.236
Note:
This table reports the results from the Mann-Whitney U tests. All variables are defined in Table 4.2. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
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Table 4.12: Logistic regression of earnings management components - NI
Overall Sample Large firms Small firms
Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM
JSOX −0.24 −0.23 −0.01 −0.50 −0.76 −0.01 9.85 0.01 0.27
UAR 1.02 0.77 0.03 2.70 1.35 0.07 −0.07 −0.03−0.00
UAR*JSOX −0.63 −0.33 −0.02 −1.11 −0.38 −0.03 3.23 0.95 0.09
UINV 6.85∗∗∗ 3.38 0.17 1.81 0.68 0.05 3.04 0.79 0.08
UINV*JSOX −1.77 −0.61 −0.04 −4.76 −1.25 −0.12 0.86 0.16 0.02
UACCL 5.26∗∗∗ 2.80 0.13 6.90∗∗ 2.53 0.17 3.33 0.96 0.09
UACCL *JSOX 1.62 0.57 0.04 −6.52 −1.59 −0.16 0.78 0.15 0.02
URD 0.24 0.02 0.01 5.87 0.35 0.15 −1.33 −0.07−0.04
URD*JSOX −4.64 −0.29 −0.11 32.35 1.21 0.80 −25.28 −0.92−0.69
UCAPEX 4.86∗ 1.87 0.12 6.61∗ 1.68 0.16 7.49 1.52 0.20
UCAPEX*JSOX 1.61 0.41 0.04 10.35∗ 1.66 0.26 5.18 0.70 0.14
LEV 2.17∗∗∗ 9.06 0.05 2.63∗∗∗ 8.37 0.07 −1.68∗∗∗ 3.85 0.05
SIZE −1.19∗∗∗−26.37 −0.03 −1.50∗∗∗−15.67 −0.04 −0.86∗∗∗−7.91−0.02
KEI 0.39∗∗∗ 3.12 0.01 0.33∗∗∗ 2.60 0.01 0.26 0.95 0.01
Constant 18.16∗∗∗ 13.62 25.17∗∗∗ 13.01 0.69 0.00
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 12,978 7,506 5,472
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.18 0.07
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following logistic models:
SPOS(1,0)it = β0 + β1JSOXit + β2UARit + β3UAR ∗ JSOXit + β4UINVit
+ β5UINV ∗ JSOXit + β6UACCLit + β7UACCL ∗ JSOXit + β8URDit
+β10URDit + β11URD ∗ JSOXit + β12UCAPEXit
+β11UCAPEX ∗ JSOXit + β12LEVit + β14SIZEit
+β15KEIit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + εit,
All variables are defined in Tables 4.2 and 4.7. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed).
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Table 4.13: Logistic regression of earnings management components - NI
Overall Sample Large firms Small firms
Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM
JSOX 0.75 0.74 0.02 −0.42 −0.92 −0.01 10.23 0.02 0.29
TACC 1.69∗∗∗ 2.60 0.05 2.02∗ 1.66 0.06 1.83 1.64 0.05
TACC*JSOX 0.81 0.79 0.03 −1.21 −0.68 −0.04 1.71 0.97 0.05
TREAL 3.00∗ 1.92 0.09 6.58∗∗ 2.34 0.19 2.35 0.85 0.07
TREAL*JSOX 0.02 0.01 0.00 3.65 0.85 0.11 2.69 0.59 0.08
LEV 2.11∗∗∗ 12.03 0.07 2.81∗∗∗ 11.88 0.08 1.80∗∗∗ 5.69 0.05
SIZE −1.12∗∗∗−35.16 −0.03 −1.51∗∗∗−19.11 −0.04 −0.82∗∗∗−11.76 −0.02
KEI 0.41∗∗∗ 3.66 0.01 0.31∗∗∗ 2.88 0.01 0.15 0.58 0.00
Constant 15.91∗∗∗ 13.55 25.52∗∗∗ 16.29 −0.19 −0.00
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 18,950 10,089 8,861
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.18 0.08
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following logistic models:
SPOS(1,0)it = β0 + β1JSOXit + β2TACCit + β3TACC ∗ JSOXit + β4TREALit
+ β5TREAL ∗ JSOXit + β6LEVit + β7SIZEit
+β15KEIit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + εit,
All variables are defined in Tables 4.2 and 4.7. For this table we combine EMC into total unexpected
accruals (TACC) for accounting manipulation and total investment adjusting (TREAL) for real
activity manipulation for a regression models. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed).
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Table 4.14: Logistic regression of earnings management components - NIBX
Overall Sample Large firms Small firms
Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM
JSOX 11.66 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.00 8.27 0.02 0.13
UAR 1.17 0.86 0.02 9.19∗∗∗ 4.07 0.13 4.45 1.45 0.07
UAR*JSOX 1.05 0.55 0.02 −7.20∗∗ −2.29 −0.10 0.87 0.22 0.01
UINV 4.20∗∗ 2.05 0.07 6.85∗∗ 2.21 0.10 0.47 0.10 0.01
UINV*JSOX −2.35 −0.81 −0.04 −8.53∗∗ −2.00 −0.12 −2.93 −0.47−0.05
UACCL 3.98∗∗ 2.07 0.06 5.21∗ 1.66 0.08 4.41 1.00 0.07
UACCL *JSOX −0.74 −0.26 −0.01 −3.10 −0.70 −0.05 −4.95 −0.82−0.08
URD −17.42 −1.55 −0.28 −11.28 −0.58 −0.16 9.50 0.35 0.15
URD*JSOX 3.73 0.23 −0.06 −9.10 −0.32 −0.13 −11.30 −0.34−0.18
UCAPEX 5.54∗∗ 2.06 0.09 2.89 0.67 0.04 0.51 0.08 0.01
UCAPEX*JSOX −2.96 −0.76 −0.05 12.76∗ 1.93 0.19 6.78 0.79 0.11
LEV 2.08∗∗∗ 8.26 0.03 2.72∗∗∗ 7.85 0.04 2.29∗∗∗ 4.23 0.04
SIZE −1.47∗∗∗−29.05 −0.02 −1.87∗∗∗−15.31 −0.03 −0.94∗∗∗−7.46−0.01
KEI 0.38∗∗∗ 2.84 0.01 0.31∗∗ 2.21 0.00 −0.10 −0.26−0.00
Constant 11.19 0.03 31.12∗∗∗ 12.27 3.22 0.01
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 12,979 7,506 5,473
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.21 0.10
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following logistic models:
SPOS(1,0)it = β0 + β1JSOXit + β2UARit + β3UAR ∗ JSOXit + β4UINVit
+ β5UINV ∗ JSOXit + β6UACCLit + β7UACCL ∗ JSOXit + β8URDit
+β10URDit + β11URD ∗ JSOXit + β12UCAPEXit
+β11UCAPEX ∗ JSOXit + β12LEVit + β14SIZEit
+β15KEIit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + εit,
All variables are defined in Tables 4.2 and 4.7. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). MEM is the marginal effect at mean.
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Table 4.15: Logistic regression of earnings management components - NIBX
Overall Sample Large firms Small firms
Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM Coef. z-stat MEM
JSOX 12.64 0.03 0.27 0.41 0.53 0.01 10.35 0.02 0.20
TACC 2.25∗∗∗ 3.43 0.05 6.25∗∗∗ 4.59 0.11 3.66∗∗∗ 2.76 0.07
TACC*JSOX 0.44 0.43 0.01 −4.87∗∗ −2.53 −0.09 −0.57 −0.28 −0.01
TREAL 2.74∗ 1.73 0.06 −0.05 −0.02 −0.00 2.06 0.65 0.04
TREAL*JSOX −1.49 −0.60 −0.03 7.67∗ 1.72 0.14 4.24 0.84 0.08
LEV 2.23∗∗∗ 12.33 0.05 2.75∗∗∗ 10.58 0.05 2.16∗∗∗ 5.85 0.04
SIZE −1.40∗∗∗−39.56 −0.03 −1.87∗∗∗−18.48 −0.03 −0.94∗∗∗−11.78 −0.02
KEI 0.41∗∗∗ 3.43 0.01 0.40∗∗∗ 3.33 0.01 0.13 0.37 0.00
Constant 8.99 0.02 30.86∗∗∗ 15.09 1.39 0.00
Industry incl. incl. incl.
Year incl. incl. incl.
N 18,951 10,089 8,862
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.20 0.10
Note:
This table reports the results from estimating the following logistic models:
SPOS(1,0)it = β0 + β1JSOXit + β2TACCit + β3TACC ∗ JSOXit + β4TREALit
+ β5TREAL ∗ JSOXit + β6LEVit + β7SIZEit
+β15KEIit + Industry_dummy + Y ear_dummy + εit,
All variables are defined in Tables 4.2 and 4.7. For this table we combine EMC into total unexpected
accruals (TACC) for accounting manipulation and total investment adjusting (TREAL) for real
activity manipulation for a regression models. ∗, ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). MEM is the marginal effect at mean.
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Summary and conclusion
This thesis investigates the effect of changes in accounting standards and regulations
on earnings management in Asian countries. The main research question of this
thesis is to what extent these changes affect the earnings management of Asian firms.
The first study investigates the effect of IFRS convergence on discretionary accruals
in Thailand. The second study investigates the effect of IFRS on income smoothing
in China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. The final study investigates the
effect of JSOX on loss-avoidance behaviour in Japan. Our contributions add to
the existing literature regarding the effect of the IFRS and SOX-like regulations
on many earnings management aspects in an Asian context. It also adds to the
literature about quantifying and testing earnings management.
5.1 The effect of IFRS on accounting quality in Thailand
From the univariate tests, we find some evidence that IFRS lead to a decline in
discretionary accruals in Thailand. However, based on the regression analysis, the
results show no effect of IFRS on discretionary accruals. The analyses show that
firm-level factors exhibit a significant relationship with the level of discretionary
accruals, including debts and equity issuance. Board size and block shareholders
appear to play some role in reducing the discretionary accruals of Thai firms while
big-4 auditors, as an external corporate governance mechanism, do not.
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At least on the accounting-based proxy, the findings are inconsistent with prior
studies (Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2009; Vichitsarawong et al., 2010) that find an
improvement in accounting quality shortly after the crisis. From our study, we find
no strong evidence of a decline in discretionary accruals, which does not support
prior research that finds that IFRS constrain earnings management (Barth et al.,
2008; Chen et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2010; Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Zéghal et al.,
2011; Chua et al., 2012).
For the case of Thailand, we suggest that since firm-level factors appear to have
a strong negative influence on accounting quality may not be changed easily, policy
makers and regulators may require country-level corporate governance to support
IFRS and firm-level corporate governance principles. For example, the law regarding
the right of minority interest may require improvement and the process of enforce-
ment should be vigorously implemented accordingly.
5.2 The effect of IFRS on income smoothing in Asia
We find Asian firms with a high level of income smoothing in the pre-IFRS period
show a significant decline in income smoothing in the post-IFRS period. The find-
ings are consistent with those of Barth et al. (2008), Garcia Osma and Pope (2011)
and Liu et al. (2011), that find the negative effect of IFRS on income smoothing in
many countries. In addition, firms with a high level of income smoothing exhibit
a significant decrease in signed discretionary accruals and an increase in the use
of real activity earnings management, especially those related to reducing of costs
via overproduction, which is consistent with prior studies (Tan and Jamal, 2006;
Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011) who report switching from accounting to real earn-
ings management when accounting choices have been restricted. Firms with less
income smoothing appear to use no real activity earnings management though they
experience a decrease in income smoothing.
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The findings suggest that firms with greater income-smoothing incentives are
more likely to turn to real activity in the IFRS period in an attempt to mitigate
earnings fluctuation. It is important to note that though income smoothing of firms
in this group statistically declines, their income smoothing level is still relatively
high in the post-IFRS period in comparison to those with a low income smoothing
level. We conclude that compliance with IFRS may lead to a statistical improvement
in accounting quality but may not be economically significant. We also find some
evidence that strong legal enforcement leads to a stronger effect of IFRS, which is
consistent with Daske et al. (2008) and Landsman et al. (2012), but find no evidence
that it leads to a prevalence of real earnings management as found in a prior study
(Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011). Our tests show that income-smoothing incentives
have a strong positive effect on real manipulation in the IFRS period.
In addition, IFRS appear to have different effects on firms with a low level income
smoothing, which we assume to have conservative accounting practices. These firms
exhibit an increase in income smoothing and discretionary accruals. We conjecture
that IFRS may shift these firms from conservative to neutral accounting practices
which result in more true and fair views of reported earnings.
5.3 The effect of Japanese-SOX on earnings management to
avoid losses in Japan
From the earnings-distribution analysis we find some evidence of a desirable effect
of JSOX on loss avoidance in Japan – the loss-avoidance degree exhibits a decline in
the post-JSOX period. Consistently, the additional tests from the logistic regression
models controlling for debt, firm size, keiretsu firms, indicate a negative effect of
JSOX on loss avoidance, especially for large firms. The findings are partly consistent
with the US findings (Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen,
2009; Aubert and Grudnitski, 2014; Gilliam et al., 2015). A possible explanation
for the different degrees of effectiveness may be that 1) JSOX is less stringent in
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relation to SOX or 2) there is a difference in the institutional factors, such as the
enforcement levels and/or the business practices of Japanese firms, for reporting or
maintaining modest profits.
We find that, in both pre- and post-JSOX periods, loss-avoidance firms use both
accrual and investment manipulation to manage earnings in relation to other firms.
Focusing on only suspect firms, there are no changes in the methods used to achieve
loss avoidance – firms use both methods for their purposes. The findings are in-
consistent with prior US studies (Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009) that
report a decline in accounting and an increase in real earnings management after
SOX. The different findings may be due to, as already mentioned, the difference
between JSOX and SOX. Another possible explanation may be the perception of
earnings management methods, in that Japanese management perceive both meth-
ods as acceptable while American management accept only real manipulation as
ethical.
Furthermore, we find loss-avoiding firms appear to switch from one specific ac-
crual to another between the JSOX periods to manipulate earnings. It is possible
that Japanese managers may turn to other particular accounts, perceiving them as
having lower costs in order to compensate for the potentially increased costs im-
posed by JSOX (e.g. penalty costs). In addition, we find that firm size affects the
methods used to avoid reporting losses. Specifically, small firms are likely to use
only accruals while larger firms use both accruals and investment, which supports
the proposal of Burgstahler and Chuk (2015) about the effect of firm size on the
extent of earnings management.
JSOX appears to have some desirable effects on the prevalence of loss avoidance
in Japan but not on the manipulating methods used to achieve such goals. Accruals
still seem to be crucial tools because there are many sets of accounts which manage-
ment utilise to switch from one specific accrual to another. As well as adding to the
literature about the effect of SOX-like regulations in Asian context, the study also
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contributes to the debates about the validity of research design regarding earnings
management to avoid losses.
5.4 Potential limitations and future research
Research investigating one country at a time such as Chapters 2 and 4 may relax the
confounding effect of country-level institutional factors. However, Chapter 3 which
studies four countries may suffer the problem of confounding variables, especially
those related to country-level, though we have attempted to control for country-level
factors by using the legal enforcement level.
Our studies heavily rely on regression models, not only to compute earnings
management proxies but also to analyse the effect of IFRS and JSOX. The findings
may be biased in some sense from the problems of outliers and omitted-variables so
we have conducted many sensitivity tests and/or attempted to control for outliers
and related factors.
In addition, the assumption of clean revenues in calculating unexpected specific
accruals in Chapter 4 may be problematic because the revenues of some firms may
be contaminated by real manipulation or premature revenues, or both.
As evidenced in Chapter 1, the effect of big-4 auditors on accounting quality
in Thailand has raised an interesting question about the quality of auditors in the
region. The study can be extended by focusing on the quality of auditors across
Asian countries to gain insight into the role of auditors in the process of financial
reporting during the IFRS period in this region. Though many Asian countries have
adopted IFRS, based on the findings of Chapter 3, there has been incomparability
in the level of income smoothing across sub-groups. Therefore, gaining some insight
about the overall effect of IFRS may not be adequate to understand accounting
quality under the IFRS regime. The comparability aspect of accounting quality
after the adoption of IFRS may be a potential issue that can be investigated in the
future.
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Appendix A
Thai Accounting Standards
Table A.1: Thai Accounting Standards before Financial Crisis of 1997
No Description Superseded by
TAS 1 Fundamental Accounting Assumption Framework
TAS 2 Accounting Policies TAS 35
TAS 3 Extraordinary Items TAS 39
TAS 4 Accounting Change TAS 39
TAS 5 Earnings Per Share TAS 38
TAS 6 Revenue Recognition TAS 37
TAS 7 Accounting for Hire Purchase for Lessor ED Lease
TAS 8 Construction Contracts TAS 49
TAS 9 Property, Plant and Equipment TAS 32
TAS 10 Depreciation TAS 32
TAS 11 Doubtful Account and Bad Debt −
TAS 12 Accounting for Marketable Securities TAS 40
TAS 13 Related Party Disclosures TAS 47
TAS 14 Accounting for Research and Development Activities TAS 51
TAS 15 Capitalization of Borrowing Cost TAS 33
TAS 16 Current Assets and Current Liabilities TAS 35
TAS 17 Accounting for Investments TAS 40
TAS 18 Accounting for Investments in Subsidiaries and Associations TAS 45
TAS 19 Consolidated Financial Statements TAS 44
TAS 20 Accounting for Business Combination TAS 43
TAS 21 Contingencies and Events after the Balance Sheet Date TAS 52,53
TAS 22 Valuation and Presentation of Inventories TAS 31
TAS 23 Information to be Disclosed in Financial Statements TAS 52
TAS 24 Reporting Financial Information by Segment TAS 50
TAS 25 Statement of Cash Flow -
TAS 26 Revenue Recognition in Real Estate Business -
TAS 27 Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Financial Institutions -
TAS 28 Accounting for Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Warrant TAS 48
TAS 29 Accounting for Lease ED Lease
TAS 30 The Effect of Foreign Currency Translation -
TAS 31 Inventories -
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Table A.2: Revised Thai Accounting Standards
No Description Based on Effective Date
– Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements IASB Framework 25-Feb-99
TAS 32 Property, Plant and Equipment IAS 16 1-Jan-99
TAS 33 Borrowing Costs IAS 23 1-Jan-99
TAS 34 Troubled Debt Restructuring SFAS 15 and 114 30-Sep-98
TAS 35 Presentation of Financial Statements IAS 1 1-Jan-99
TAS 36 Impairments of Assets IAS 36 1-Jan-99
TAS 37 Revenue Recognition IAS 18 1-Jan-99
TAS 38 Earnings Per Share IAS 33 1-Jan-99
TAS 39 Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Fundamental Errors, and Accounting Changes IAS 8 1-Jan-99
TAS 40 Accounting for Investments in Debt and Equity Securities IAS 39 SFAS 115 1-Jan-99
TAS 41 Interim Financial Statements IAS 34 1-Jan-00
TAS 42 Accounting for Investment Companies AICPA Industrial Guide 1-Jan-00
TAS 43 Business Combination IAS 22 1-Jan-00
TAS 44 Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investment in Subsidiaries IAS 27 1-Jan-00
TAS 45 Accounting for Investments in Associates IAS 28 1-Jan-00
TAS 46 Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures IAS 31 1-Jan-00
TAS 47 Related Party Disclosures IAS 24 1-Jan-00
TAS 48 Financial Instruments : Disclosure and Presentation IAS 32 1-Jan-00
TAS 49 Construction Contracts IAS 11 1-Jan-01
TAS 50 Segment Reporting IAS 14 1-Jan-02
TAS 51 Intangible Assets IAS 38 1-Jan-04
TAS 52 Events after the Balance Sheet Date IAS 10 1-Jan-04
TAS 53 Provision, Contingent Assets and Contingent Liabilities IAS 37 1-Jan-04
TAS 54 Discontinuing Operations IAS 35 1-Jan-06
TAS 55 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosures of Government Assistance IAS 20 1-Jan-04
TAS 56 Income Taxes IAS 12 1-Jan 07
– Exposure Draft : Leases IAS 17 -
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Table A.3: Revised Thai Accounting Standards - Effective as at March 2013
No Description
Panel A: Based on IAS and IFRS
– Framework (Revised 2009)
TAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements (Revised 2009)
TAS 2 Inventories (Revised 2009)
TAS 7 Statement of Cash Flows (Revised 2009)
TAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors (Revised 2009)
TAS 10 Events After the Balance Sheet Date (Revised 2009)
TAS 11 Construction Contracts (Revised 2009)
TAS 12 Income Taxes
TAS 14 Segment Reporting
TAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment (Revised 2009)
TAS 17 Leases (Revised 2009)
TAS 18 Revenue (Revised 2009)
TAS 19 Employee Benefits
TAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government (Revised 2009)
TAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates (Revised 2009)
TAS 23 Borrowing Costs (Revised 2009)
TAS 24 Related Party Disclosures (Revised 2009)
TAS 26 Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans
TAS 27 Consolidated Financial Statements (Revised 2009)
TAS 28 Investments in Associates (Revised 2009)
TAS 29 Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies
TAS 31 Interests in Joint Ventures (Revised 2009)
TAS 33 Earnings per Share (Revised 2009)
TAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting (Revised 2009)
TAS 36 Impairment of Assets (Revised 2009)
TAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (Revised 2009)
TAS 38 Intangible Assets (Revised 2009)
TAS 40 Investment Property (Revised 2009)
TFRS 2 Share-based Payment
TFRS 3 Business Combinations (Revised 2009)
TFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations (Revised 2009)
TFRS 6 Explorations for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources
TFRS 8 Operating Segments
Panel B: Self-developed Thai Accounting Standards
TAS 101 Bad Debts and Allowance for Bad Debts
TAS 103 Disclosure in Bank and Finance Business
TAS 104 Troubled Debt Restructuring
TAS 105 Accounting for Investments in Debt and Equity Securities
TAS 106 Accounting for Investment Companies
TAS 107 Financial Instruments : Disclosure and Presentation
Source: These appendixes were gathered from the website of the Government Gazettes of
Thailand and the website of the Federation of Accounting Professions of Thailand.
Appendix B
Rule of Law
Table B.1: Rule of Law Scores
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
China −0.41 −0.47 −0.43 −0.49 −0.55 −0.45 −0.34 −0.32 −0.33 −0.39 −0.49 −0.42
Hong Kong 1.24 1.53 1.59 1.61 1.53 1.51 1.48 1.48 1.54 1.55 1.56 1.51
Malaysia 0.50 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.52
Singapore 1.44 1.61 1.73 1.76 1.63 1.64 1.64 1.60 1.68 1.73 1.77 1.66
Source: info.worldbank.org
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